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
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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

JOWETT



VOL. II.

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THE
"POLITICS" OF ARISTOTLE,

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

*WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS
ESSAYS, NOTES AND INDICES*


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
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NOTES

ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

1. 1.

ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

Whereas all communities aim at some good,
the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

*πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ
τῶς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάνησαν τὰγαθὸν οὐ πᾶντ' ἐφίεται.*

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, *πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ἐρέγονται φύσει*; and the Posterior Analytics, *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προὔπαρξουσιν γίνεται γνῶσις*.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: 'But a community is a complex organisation;' Or, 'But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;' Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;—

'We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.'

1. 2. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle's enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See *Politicus*, 259 C, *φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα*· ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1-5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2-8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in *Xen. Mem.* iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

1. 2. οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων. Sc. ἄρχων ὃ, or ἄρχη.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ.

1. 2. καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,
Sc. τὸν ἄρχοντα λέγουσι.

1. 2. τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης,

Sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικὸν which follows:—'According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.' Cp. i. 8. § 7, θάλατταν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained from εὐλείας which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη κτῆσις, where τοιαύτη (meaning 'in the sense of a bare livelihood') is gathered from αὐτόφωτος and μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν; where τοιοῦτους, meaning 'disunited,' is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἥτιον γὰρ ἔσται φύλα κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, ὡς μὲν οὖν οἶκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, where the

idea of an 'imperfect' state, like that contained in Plato's *Laws*, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον.

1. 3.

i. e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὅπως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν.

ὑφηγημένην, 'which we have followed,' not merely in the *Ethics*, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but 'generally' or 'in this discussion.' The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. *De Gen. Anim.* 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη 1. 3. διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ εἰσὶν ἀμέγιστα μέρη τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

τούτων may either refer 1)* to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, i. e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τούτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of 'the kinds of rule' in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καί, according to the first explanation= 'as about the state so about the elements of the state,' according to the second,= 'about kinds of government as well as about other things.' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις . . καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e. g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human

frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

2. 1. εἰ δὲ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν.

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e. g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

2. 2. καὶ ἐν . . . φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλείπειν ἕτερον.

Aristotle, like Plato (Symp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.

2. 2. ταῦτα ποιεῖν,

sc. τὰ προοράμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχόντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

2. 3. τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν.

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the ὀβελισκολύχνην mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as λαμβάνουσα ἔμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν, 'having an iron part added to it in front.' The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

2. 4. τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, . . . γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου.

'Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.' Cp. infra, cc. 12, 13.

‘οἶκον μὲν πρότεστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ’ ἀροτῆρα’

2. 5.

Compare Wallace's Russia (p. 90. ed. 8). ‘The natural labour unit (i. e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.’

εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν.

2. 5.

‘For wants which recur every day,’ and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.

ὁμοκάπνους.

2. 5.

‘Sitting in the smoke of one fire’ is read by MSS. of the better class, P⁴, L¹, corr. Mb, William de Moerbek; ὁμοκάπνους by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word ‘fed at the same manger’ is better suited to the context.

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμῃ. 2. 5.

There was a time when the κώμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πᾶσι δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκειας), and Thucydides, i. 5: ib. 10 (κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῇ παλαιᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῃ οἰκισθείσης, sc. τῆς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Ætolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. To be taken with the words which follow: ‘When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.’

μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ζοῦεν ἡ κώμη ἀπουκία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὐς καλοῦσι 2. 6.
τις ἐμογάλακτος, παῖδας τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας.

‘The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.’ (There should be a comma in the Greek after ἐμογάλακτος; the words παῖδας τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας, though construed with καλοῦσι, being really an explanation of ἀπουκία.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ἀπουκία οἰκίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.'

δμογάλακτες, a rare term for *γενήται* or *φράτερες*.

2. 6. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνῆλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος,

‘θεμστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων.’

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐάντοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, *Laws* 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνῆλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts

have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κώμη (γένος) to one another,' or 'to the original οἰκία.'

'θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παῖδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων.'

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παῖδων ἢδ' ἀλόχου.

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

τέλειος πόλις.

2. 8.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

γυομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εἶν ζῆν.

2. 8.

'The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.'

οὐσα partly derives its meaning from γυομένη, 'having a true being' opposed to 'coming into being' (cp. οὐσία and γένεσις).

ἣ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν.

2. 8.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this transcendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the οἰκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the οἰκία as prior to the state and more necessary (πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οἰκία πόλις). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 a 26.

εἴτερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι.

2. 8.

'If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.' But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

2. 9. τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις.

i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word φύσις, which is not applicable to the state.

2. 10. φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὧν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς.

Lit. 'For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.'

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives 'sicut in volatilibus') reads πετεινοῖς. πετοῖς is the reading of one late MS., πεττοῖς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἄζυξ occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our backgammon; the game is not however called πεττοί, nor does the description answer to the game of πεττοί. The word ἄζυξ, when applied to a game, may mean either 'exposed' or 'blocked,' and so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πετεινοῖς, ἄζυξ might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου in the next sentence.

But neither ἐν πεττοῖς nor ἐν πετεινοῖς can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ἄζυξ ὧν, alteration into ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ἄζυξ is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

2. 10. διότι.

Either 1) *'why,' or 2) 'that.' In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—'Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.'

2. 12. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

τούτων, sc. 'of these perceptions,' or rather 'of those who have these perceptions.' For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ.

2. 12.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is φύσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνῳ πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἴσται τοιαύτη.

2. 13.

Referring either 1) to δυνάμεις:—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαφθαρεῖσα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *to ὥσπερ λιθίνῃ ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ 2. 14.
αὐτάρκειῃ ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

2. 14.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀρετή.

2. 15.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.

2. 16. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα.

1) *ὅπλα ἔχων = ὀπλισμένος, the words φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of φρόνησις and ἀρετή as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished φρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called *δευότης*, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become φρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become *πανουργία*) and ἀρετή, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the *Magna Moralia* i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, as *ὀρμαί τινες ἀνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ.*, which may become injurious unless directed by reason (*ἀνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι*, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate 'Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments *for* wisdom and virtue;' i.e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into φρόνησις and ἀρετή, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of 'for' after ὅπλα ἔχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with φύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὅπλα ἔχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that 'man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.'

ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's *Faust*, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6.

§ 7, *Πλατὼν δὲ θηριώτης κακίας φοβερώτερον δέ.* Compare also Plato *Repub.* vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—*καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ οἱ τὰγαθά, οἱ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχῳσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα αἰδέεσθαι οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.*

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ 2. 16. δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

‘But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.’

In this passage *δίκη* is the ‘administration of justice’: *δικαιοσύνη*, ‘the virtue of justice’: *τὸ δίκαιον*, ‘the principle of justice to be applied in each case.’

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν αὖθις οἰκία συνίσταται· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ 3. 1. δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.

αὖθις = ‘in turn.’ ‘As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.’ Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἀνένημον γὰρ ἡ γυναῖς καὶ ἀνδρὸς 3. 2. σίζευσις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικὴ.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to *γαμική* and *τεκνοποιητική*. In ordinary Greek they would have meant ‘of or referring to marriage,’ and ‘to the procreation of children’: here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, *Theat.* 182 A, where he calls *ποιότης* an *ἀλλόκοτον ὄνομα*, and Nic. *Eth.* v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis *τὸ εὐνοητικὸν δίκαιον*, or *τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον*: cp. also c. 12. § 1 *infra*, where *πατριὰ* is used for what is here called *τεκνοποιητική*. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. *Eth.* ii. 7. §§ 2,

3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. 1. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀναισθησία, upon the anonymous mean of φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, upon ἀφοβία the excess of courage, and upon ὄνομα ἀρίστον, ῥῆμα ἀρίστον, ἀρίστος ἀρχή.

3. 2. ἴστωσαν δ' αὐται τρεῖς ὡς εἵπομεν.

'Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.' Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αἱ were inserted before τρεῖς: 'let there be those three.'

3. 4. τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

ἐν γὰρ τι τοῖς δούλοις αἰσχύνῃ φέρει
τοῦτομα' τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων
οὐδεὶς κακίῳ δούλῳ, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ἦ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακὸς γὰρ ὅστις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν
καὶ ξυγγίγηθε καὶ ξυνωδίνει κακοῖς.
ἔγω μὲν εἶην, καὶ πέφυχ' ὑμῶν λάτριάς,
ἐν τοῖσι γυναικίσιν ἡρωμεγμένος
δούλοις, τοῦτομ' οἶκ' ἔχω ἐλευθέρων
τὸν τοῦν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δοῦλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτομ' οὐ διαφθερεῖ
πολλοὶ δ' ἀμείρους εἰσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἦ τις, αἰεὶν ἦεναι, δέσποτα,
ἄθρωπος οὐτός ἐστιν, ὡς ἄθρωπος ἦ.

ib. fr. 39,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
φύσει γὰρ οἶδεις δοῦλος ἐγγύθι ποτὶ
ἢ δ' αὖ Τύχῃ τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

3. 4. βίαιον γάρ.

Either 1) * = *παρὰ φύσιν* or simply 2) 'brought about by violence;' *βία* may be opposed either to *φύσις* or *νόμος* or both.

ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ 4. 1. οἰκία ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The first six words *ὥσπερ . . . τέχναις* are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of *δέ*; and for the omission of both *δὲ* and *ἐν*.

Retaining Bekker's reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to *ἐπεὶ οὖν* begin with *καὶ ἡ κτητική*; or 2) *δὲ* after *ὥσπερ* may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after *ἐπεὶ* in Aristotle (cp. *Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26* *ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν δι' εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν κ.τ.λ.*). If we omit *δέ*, the apodosis still begins with *ὥσπερ*.

ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 *ὁ γὰρ βέλαιστος τεχνίτης ἀφορισμένην τιὰν ἔχει δουλείαν.*

Instead of Bekker's reading *οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν* another reading *οὕτω καὶ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ* has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) 'sic et yconomico.' But *τῶν οἰκονομικῶν* is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. *οἰκία ὄργανα δὲ ὑπάρχειν.*

καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων.

4. 2. ✓

Not 'instead of' but 'taking precedence of':—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of *πρὸ* cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 *δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότης.* So the hand is spoken of as *ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων* (*De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21*).

οἱ γὰρ ἡδύνατο κ.τ.λ.

4. 3.

The connexion is as follows:—'There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.'

4. 4. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κεκμήδος ἑτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθιῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίσης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ὄργανα should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πληθὺς ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ὄργανον: 'there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the *instrument* of doing something'). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the 'instrument preceding instruments' (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12-14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

4. 5. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστὶν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν.

'Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master's life.'

4. 5. τὸ γὰρ μέρος οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλος ἄλλου.

Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 8, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ὥς ἂν § 9 πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ.

4. 5. ὅλος ἐκείνου.

7. 4 The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave's individuality is lost in his master.

5. 1. τῇ λόγῳ θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων καταμαθεῖν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and

facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. *infra* vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the 'long and difficult language of facts.' The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them any more than between the *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.

εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς.

5. 2.

'From their very birth,' or, with a logical turn, 'to go no further than the state of birth;' cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν and *infra* § 4, τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.

ἔσπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχει, τὸ δὲ ἀρχεται, ἔστι τι τοῦτων ἔργον.

5. 3.

'As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.'

εἴτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διηρημένων.

5. 3.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀνάγκης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ γὰρ ἐν 5. 4. τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι (οἷον ἐστὶ τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας).

1) The connexion is as follows: 'This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them.' *It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate' (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or δὲ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. 'Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings' (Stahr, Susseml). But according to this interpretation,

the addition of *μάλιστα* after *ἐνυπάρχει*, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

οὖν ἁρμονίας.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,' or 2) 'as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The first accords best with the common meaning of the word *ἁρμονία* and with the use of the genitive.

5. 4. *ἐξωτερικώτερας.*

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*.

5. 4. *τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον.*

i. e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by *δὲ* in *τὸ δὲ ζῶον* is as follows: 'not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For *πρῶτον* (which is to be taken with *συνέστηκεν*) meaning either 'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. *πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῇ θεωρῆσαι* infra § 6, and the similar use of *εὐθὺς* supra § 2.

5. 5. *δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις.*

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

5. 6. *ἔστι δ' οὖν ὥσπερ λέγομεν.*

A resumption of the words *τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον* above.

5. 6. *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.*

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

5. 7. *τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως.*

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 *ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν.*

εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημέτοις.

5. 8.

— I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὰ παθητικὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

Ὡς καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν.

5. 9.

‘Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.’

τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ καὶ ἡ 5. 9.
χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν.

‘The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.’

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in noting the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν 5. 10.
λευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ’
ἐρῶς καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὴν
βίαν (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται δεημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν
εἰρημικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῖναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ’ ἔχειν
λευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς.

‘Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen; that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τοὺς μὲν to the freemen and τοὺς δὲ to the slaves: ‘the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i.e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.’

Λευθέρων must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχάς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, ‘intention’ or ‘design;’ secondly, ‘tendency.’ The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλεται Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μέντοι μᾶλλον, sc. τὸ νόμισμα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general

thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), *οὐποτε δουλείη κεφαλὴ ἰδέα πέφυκεν | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ σκολιή, καὶ χεῖνα λοξὸν ἔχει.*

- 5.11. *ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.*

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

- 5.11. *ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερὸν οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ are not subdivisions of τινὲς, which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) τινὲς μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τινὲς δὲ δοῦλοι: and 2) οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι.* In other words the construction beginning with τινὲς has varied into οἱ μὲν—οἱ δὲ.

- 6.2. *ὥσπερ βῆτορα γράφονται παρανόμων.*

‘But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.’ The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, *νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις αἰδιὸς ἐστίν, ὅταν πολεμοῦντων πόλεις ἀλλή, τῶν ἐλόντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα.*

- 6.3, 4. *αἵτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινα ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χαρηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αἰ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῷ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μένον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὖτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γὰρ χωρὶς τοῦτων τῶν λόγων οὐτ' ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὐτε πλεονὲς ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὥς τὸ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.*

ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, *ὁμοῖον πωλόφρον' | κείραρ ἐπαλ-*

λέξαντες (Il. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—*τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διειδομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.* vi. 1. § 3,—*ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιῇ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε oligarchίας εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικατέρας.* See also *infra* c. 9. § 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue. Cp. *Plat. Rep.* i. 352 ff.

Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees with that of Bernays: the phrase *τούτων τῶν λόγων* in § 4 refers, not to the *τούς λόγους* of § 3, but to the two positions which immediately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second, that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the connexion between *ἀρετή* and *βία*; the point in dispute being whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4). If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: 'but there is no force or plausibility in this' [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong conviction, which is repeated again and again in the *Politica*, that the superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: 'There are others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the war may be unjust, and the persons may be 'nature's freemen,' and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable; and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror is invalid.

The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of *διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο* (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is *εὐνοια* *a*) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or *b*) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, *ὅς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεῦν*, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)? The thesis that 'justice is benevolence' is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words *διαστάντων χωρὶς* = *a*)*, 'being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,' or *b*) 'being set aside?' Both uses of *διόσταςθαι* are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, *ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα* (sc. of Empedocles) *διαστήκει χωρὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους*, and *supra* c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words *ἄτεροι λόγοι* refer *a*) to one of the two preceding propositions, or *b*) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of 'the latter,' or 'one of these two propositions.' It is better to translate 'the other view,' which is explained by what follows, *ὅς οὐ δέει κτλ.*, being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that *δικαιοσύνη* is *εὐνοια*. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1–3 notes some resemblances between *δικαιοσύνη* and *φιλία*: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

6. 5. *ἄλλες δ' ἀντεχόμεναι τινες, ὥς οἰοῦνται, δικαίου τινός*

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' *ὅλως* may be taken either 1) with *τιθέασι*, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with *ἀντεχόμενοι*, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

6. 5. *ἀμὰ δ' οὐ φασιν*

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are.

compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρχῇ ἐνδέχεται μὴ δίκαιαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν 6. 5.
ἀνάξιον δουλεῖν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1)* the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. 6. 6.

Cp. Xen. Hell. i. 6. § 14, *κελευσάντων τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθymαίους οὐκ ἔφη [ὁ Καλλικρατίδας] ἑαυτοῦ γε ἀρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι*, and Plat. Rep. v. 469 B, C, where Plato indignantly prohibits Hellenes from becoming the owners of other Hellenes taken in war.

ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησί.

6. 7.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, *παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσίβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν, ὃν ἡ πόλις νομίζει*; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, *οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμασιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγνωματικῶν, εἰ ἀνταΐων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλακτίτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχους πεπληγμένος*, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγῃσι, οὐθενὶ ἀλλ' ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι τὸ 6. 8.
δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον.

'When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.'

ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μὲντοι δύναται. 6. 8.

Not 'nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,' for

she always intends it; nor 'nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,' which does violence to the order of the words *πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι*: but 'this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,' *πολλάκις* adhering to both clauses.

6. 9. *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.*
ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, *ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰναντία φάσκοντες*.

6. 9. *καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δούλοι οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.*
 'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating *ὅτι*. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινες οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δούλοι, φανερόν*: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words *εἰσὶ καὶ* are inserted before *οὐκ, εἰσὶν* by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

6. 9. *ἐν τισι διάρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεῖν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.*

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule'; *ὅν* is substituted for *οἷς*, that it may be in regimen with *τῷ μὲν*.

6. 9. *ὅστις καὶ δεσπόζειν.*
 'And consequently the master over his slaves' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

6. 10. *διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τι καὶ φίλια δούλων καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.*
 Cp. *Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7*, *ἡ μὲν οὖν δούλος οὐκ ἐστὶ φίλος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπος*. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle's position.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων.

7. 1.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; 'From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,' is clearly proven.

ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἐτέρων κ.τ.λ.

7. 3.

'Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.' Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

7. 3.

Aristotle clearly uses the word *πρὸ* in the sense of precedence as *supra* c. 4. § 2, ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνου. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

ἡ δὲ κτηνικὴ ἑτέρα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμικὴ τις οὖσα ἢ 7. 5. θηρευτικῇ.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 31) or hunting. The words *οἷον ἡ δικαία* imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος εἵηται [sc. τῆς κτηνικῆς], § δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοῦναι ποικίλους ἀρχαίους μὴ θέλουσαν, ὥς φέρεται διακεῖναι τοῦτον ὅτι τὸν πόλεμον). The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of *οἷον* is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays,

'for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting; for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to *τις* is feeble; but 'I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, s.v. *οἶον*.)

8. 1. *ὅπως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφ'ηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν.*

'We have been speaking (*ἦν*) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For *ὑφ'ηγημένον* cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

8. 1. *πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομῇ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.*

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

8. 3. *ὥστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.*—'the question arises' or 'we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,' which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast *χρηματιστικὴ* in all its branches with *οἰκονομική*, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause *ὥστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.* following as if *ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι* without *εἰ* had preceded. The words *ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ κ.τ.λ.* are to be repeated with *πότερον μέρος τι*.

8. 4. *ἀλλὰ μὲν εἴδη γὰρ πολλὰ τροφῆς.*

'The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.'

πρὸς τὰς βαστάνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων.

8. 5.

τὰς βαστάνας κ.τ.λ. 'For their convenience and the obtaining'; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, 'for the opportunity of obtaining.'

τούτων. Sc. καρποῦ, ζῴων, understood from ζοφοάγα, καρποφάγα.

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes 8. 6. that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks.

· βάλλανται τοιαύτην.

8. 7.

Sc. συμφέρουσαν πρὸς ἄλιαν. Cp. note on c. 1. § 2.

αὐτόφωτον.

8. 8.

Either 1)* 'immediately obtained from the products of nature' = ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, or 2) = αὐτουργόν, 'by their own labour.'

τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον.

8. 8.

Bernays reads ἐνδεέστερον without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (ἐνδεέστατον) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

σκαληροτατέ.

8. 10.

Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τῶν δ' ἀναίμων τὰ ἔντομα σκαληροτατέ. The term 'vermiparous' is not strictly correct: for all animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an egg.

τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν.

8. 10.

A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. ἡ τῆς ἀρμίδος τοῦ σπέρματος, τῶν πατερμίδων, φύσις, Hist. Animal. *passim*. (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

ὅστε ἡμεῖς δὴλον εἶναι καὶ γενομένοις αἰγρίων τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἔσκεν 8. 11. οἷον καὶ τὰλλα (ἴσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χεῖρας, τὰ μὲν ἡμεῖς καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ

διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν.

Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (*Politicus* 263 D) that 'a crane or some other intelligent animal' would have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. I., ch. vii.: 'It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.' Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to *κατὰ τὴν πρότην γένεσιν*, and *εἰθὺς καὶ τελειωθείσι*: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Götting and Bernays) *γενόμενοις*, which is found with a slight variation, *γενόμεναις*, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has 'genitis.' For the use of *γενόμενοις* = 'after they are born' cp. *Nic. Eth.* viii. 12. § 5, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἵτιοι (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδεύεσθαι.

8. 12. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς πολεμικῆς).

Cp. *Plat. Soph.* 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (*Primitive Property*, c. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.

ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν. 8. 13.

In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—‘one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.’

κατὰ φύσιν is equivalent to ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, and is best taken, not with οἰκονομικῆς (Bernays) but with κτητικῆς, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι’ ἣν αἰτία, δῆλον.

ὁ δεῖ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὡς ἐστὶ θησαυρισμός 8. 13. χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας.

ὁ δεῖ is a confused expression referring grammatically to εἶδος κτητικῆς or τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It is needless to read with Bernays καθ’ ὃ δεῖ, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

αὐτὴν refers to κτητικὴ or possibly to φύσις: the nominative to ὑπάρχει is either the same as to ὑπάρχειν, i. e. δ=κτήματα understood from εἶδος κτητικῆς, or θησαυρισμός χρημάτων δ’ ἐστὶ πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖον, the genitive ὡς being substituted by attraction for the nominative = ὅπως ὑπάρχει κτήματα ὡς ἐστὶ θησαυρισμός. It must be admitted that the words ὡς ἐστὶ would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

πλούτου δ’ οὐδὲν τέγμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται. 8. 14.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἀνθρώποισι for ἀνδράσι κείται.

κείται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις. 8. 15.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) πλούτης understood=τῇ τέχνῃ τοῦ πλούτου: or 2) ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely=‘in the other arts’: or 3) τῇ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικῇ may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἀπειρον οὐδεμῶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλεῖς οὔτε μεγάλης, 8. 15. ὁ δὲ πλεόντος ἔργον πλεῖός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.

Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, 'the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.'

8. 15. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν.

Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

9. 1. δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρασ.

'Owing to which,' or 'to the nature of which,' 'there appears to be no limit,' etc.

9. 1. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει.

So Plato divides κτητικὴ into θηρευτικὴ and ἀλλακτικὴ, Soph. 223 ff.

9. 2. ἐκάστου κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις.

Cp. Adam Smith's 'Value in use' and 'Value in exchange'; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

9. 4. ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς.

Sc. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

9. 5. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκούνουν πάντα, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων ὅν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιέσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.

Bernays inserts ἕτεροι before ἑτέρων, which he would translate 'different persons want different things;' and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κεχωρισμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:—1)* 'In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same': or 2) καὶ ἑτέρων may be taken more simply: 'they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well'; i. e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The

word *ἐκουνέονον* = *κοινὰ εἶχον* is not equally applicable to both clauses ; in the second clause some other word like *εἶχον* or *ἐκτῶντο* was wanted.

For *κεχωρισμένοι* compare ii. 2. § 3, *Διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πᾶσι ἔθουσ ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ᾖσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες.*

οἱ μὲν, sc. *οἱ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ*, 'mankind in the first stage of society'; *οἱ δέ*, sc. *πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας ὁσῆς* further explained by *κεχωρισμένοι*, 'mankind after their dispersion.'

ὅν in the words which follow is to be connected with *τὰς μεταδόσεις*.

καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν.

9. 5.

καὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause 'As moreover some barbarian nations still do.' There is no need to introduce *οὖν* after *καὶ* without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας.

9. 6.

Lit. 'to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;' or 'to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,' = *εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείας ὥστε αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι.*

κατὰ λόγον. 'In a natural way'; 'as might be expected.'

9. 7.

ξενικωτέρας γινομένης τῆς βοηθείας.

9. 7.

'When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,' etc.

διὲ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις.

9. 7.

'Of necessity there arose a currency.'

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 371 B, *νόμισμα σύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς εἶναι.* Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 11, *οἷον δ' ἐπαλλάγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γίγνεται κατὰ συνθήκην.*

ὅ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὅν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν ἐμμεταχειρίστων.

9. 8.

'Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,' although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (*λῆρος*); see § 11.

πορισθέντες οὖν ἢδ' ἐκ νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος 9. 9. *τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλιαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἵσως γινέ-*

μενον, εἴτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος.

θάτερον εἶδος, i.e. 'other' than what Aristotle before called *ἐν εἶδος κατηλικῆς* (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from *κατηλική*. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessities of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that *κατηλική*, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on *δι' ἐμπειρίας*.

9. 11. For the story of Midas see Ovid, *Met.* xi. 90-145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

9. 12. τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.

Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

9. 13. καὶ ἀπειρος δὲ ὁὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος.

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there *is* a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word *πέρας*, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to the infinite or indefinite *ἀπειρος*, and (2) 'end' as opposed to 'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

ὅπερ γὰρ ἡ λαμβάνη τοῦ ὑγιάειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν 9. 13.
τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρόν (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν
δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρόν (πέρασ γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ
ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρασ, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις.

'The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρασ· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς 9. 14.
μικτὴ ἔργον.

Lit. 'the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.'

ἀναλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶνα ἑκατέρω τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. 9. 15.
 'For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.'

ἡ χρῆσις governs both τῆς χρηματιστικῆς and τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The emendation of Bernays *ἑκατέρω τῇ χρηματιστικῇ* is unnecessary.

9. 15. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ ἀξίησις.

χρήσεως κτήσις. 'For acquisition belongs to the same use of χρηματιστική,' i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

9. 16. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (τοῦτ') depend on wealth. Cp. τοῦτο, § 15, referring to χρηματιστική.

9. 17. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος.

I.e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

10. 1. ὁλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ ἀπορούμενον. see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2.

τοῦτο, sc. τὰ χρήματα, understood from χρηματιστική as infra § 3. τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν refers to τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ δεῖ is the other alternative of the ἀπορία, implying the answer to the question: 'whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.'

10. 1. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδίδουαι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι.

The last words γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι are either 1)* in apposition with τὴν φύσιν, or 2) accusatives after παραδίδουαι. In the first case γῆν and θάλατταν are an explanation of τὴν φύσιν. In the second case τροφὴν is a remote accusative, 'nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.' The latter way of taking the words is

forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ, ταῦτα διαθεῖναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. 10. 1.

ἐκ τούτων, 'thereupon,' i.e. ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν παρὰ φύσεως; ταῦτα διαθεῖναι, 'to order them,' i.e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or ἐκ τούτων='from what is given by nature.' ταῦτα διαθεῖναι, 'to set in order,' i.e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.

καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις. 10. 2.

'Were this otherwise' (as in the translation) i.e. 'if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.'

καὶ περὶ ὑγείας. 10. 3.

About health as well as about wealth.

μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. 10. 3.

τοῦτο refers to some general idea, such as 'the means of life,' to be gathered from τὰ χρήματα in the preceding sentence.

παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τὸ λειπόμενον ἐστίν. 10. 3.

τὸ λειπόμενον=τὸ λειπόμενον ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i.e. milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, φὸν . . ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ζῷον ἐκ μαρίου τῆν ἀρχήν, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τροφή τῷ γινόμενῳ ἐστίν: and supra c. 8. § 10.

διὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῷων. 10. 4.

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (διὰ), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίματος. 10. 5.

Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, τοῦτο δ' ἔσθ' ὁ τόκος τί θηρίων; Thesm. 845, ἄβλα γούν εἰ τόκου τεκοῦσα τοιοῦτον τέκον.

Cp. also Shakspeare's Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—‘A breed of barren metal.’


It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E; Laws v. 742.

11. 1. τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.

1*) ‘To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.’ In modern language ‘a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.’ Cp. infra § 5, περὶ ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογῆσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν: and iv. 15. § 4, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν· οὐ γάρ πο κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ἀνόματος· ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῇ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκίαν ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορῶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἑκάστων ἀλήθειαν.

Or again 2) ‘Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;’ i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e.g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words *χρήσιμον πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας* supporting the second, *φορτικὸν τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν* the first. *ἐμπειρίαν* connects with *ἐμπειροῦ* which follows: ‘experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.’

SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF ΚΤΗΓΙΚΗ, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.



11. 3. *ναυκληρία, φορτηγία.*

ναυκληρία='commerce by sea,' *φορτηγία*='commerce by land.'
The word *ναυκληρία* may also be taken in the narrower sense of 'owning of ships'; and *φορτηγία* in the sense of 'carrying whether by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

11. 3. *διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρίαν.*

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of *τὰ μὲν* . . . *τὰ δὲ* favours the more general application of the words.

11. 4, 5. *οἷον ὕλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιεἰληφθε γίνῃ· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευόμενων ἐστίν.*

In these words Aristotle is illustrating 'the third or mixed kind of chrematistic,' which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἤδη, 'mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.'

11. 6, 7. *εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσώταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λαβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείωται χρήσεις, ἀγενεστόταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐπίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.*

The connexion is with the word *καθόλου* in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστίν* skips the intervening passage *εἰσὶ δὲ . . . ἀρετῆς*, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle's Politics; e.g. iii. 4. §§ 11-13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, *ἀναγκαῖον τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικῶν εἶναι.*

οἷον Χάρητι δῆ.

11. 7.

δῆ is to be taken with οἷον like δῶκε δῆ, οὕτω δῆ, καὶ δῆ with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e. g. καὶ πλούτῳ δῆ, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου.

11. 8.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. 'But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.'

τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν.

11. 8.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

ἐπῶλεῖ μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

11. 11.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

δραμα Θάλεω.

11. 12.

δραμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of 'idea' here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

* εὔρημα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δράμα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theat. 150 A.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

12. 1.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that 'all three parts are concerned with man' is resumed in the next chapter.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνον.

12. 1.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either ἦν μέρος οἰκονομικῶς or εἴρηται αὐτὸν from the preceding words.

ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδὲν. ὅμως δέ, 12. 2.

ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχῇ τὸ δ' ἀρχῇται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ λόγον.

βούλεται sc. ἡ πολιτεία or ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρχή, understood from ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς: 'where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.' The construction of ζητεῖ may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.

"*Ἀμασις*, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: 'Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.'

12. 3. τὸ δ' ἄρρεν δὲ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Resuming the words in § 1 *γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς*, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a *πολιτεία*, is permanent (*ἀεί*). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an 'aristocratical' than a 'constitutional' rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

13. 2. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων.

Supply *ἀρετὴ τις* before *τῶν ἄλλων*—assisted by *οὐδεμία* in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, *στυγερὸς δ' οὐθεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν*. The words *τῶν τοιούτων* are used inaccurately 'of such habits,' meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

13. 5. ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφορὰς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων.

'Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]'; or, with Bernays, 'corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,' cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert *ἀρχόντων καὶ* before *ἀρχομένων*. Better: 'There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.'

13. 6. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐφύγγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.

1) '*And this is immediately suggested by the soul': or 2) 'And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.' There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb *ἐφύγγηται* in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz,

'and this distinction was indicated in the soul.' Cp. Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* i. 2. 3, *δηλον ὅτι καθάπερ ὑφίγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτέον*. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. *supra* c. 5. §§ 2-6.

ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ελεύ- 13. 6-8.
θερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν
ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
δοῦλος ὧς οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον· ὁ δὲ
πᾶσι ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς.

By inserting *ἐπεὶ* before *φύσει*, altering *τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα* into *πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα*, and omitting *ἀναγκαῖον* before *ἔχειν* a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacoluthon seems more probable, and Bernays' alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον* go back to *ταύτης εἶναι διαφοράς*.

ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ 13. 9.
αὐτῇ σωφροσύνῃ κ.τ.λ.

'Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.'

καθὼν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

13. 10.

In the *Meno* of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to

allow,—that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand, and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the *Meno* is intended.

13. 13. καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος τῶν φύσει σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐθείς.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan. The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of the modern operative with that of the mediæval serf. We may note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household servant in England has received an impress from a master or mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from them.' Cp. iii. 5. § 4, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἐν λειτουργούντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δούλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινὸι βάνανσοι καὶ θῆτες, where, in a similar spirit, Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to the individual.

13. 14. ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικήν.

These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the slave in his particular employment;' i.e. it is not as the teacher of a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

13. 14. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δούλους ἀποστερούντες καὶ

φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

These words may mean: either 1)* 'who do not allow us to converse with slaves,' or 2) 'who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.' In either case there is a reference to Plato, *Laws*, vi. 777, 778.

περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον 13. 15. αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν.

This is one of the many promises in the *Politics* which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of παιδονόμος and γυναικονόμος.

BOOK II.

1. 1. *ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων.*

τὸ ζητεῖν is the nominative of *μὴ δοκῇ*: *πάντως* is to be taken closely with *μὴ*, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' *μὴ δοκῇ* and *δοκῶμεν* are dependent on *εἶνα*.

1. 1. *ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.*

'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s. v.

1. 2. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὃ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινῶν τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.*

εἰς ὃ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read *ἐν τῇ*.

1. 3. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

The comments of Aristotle on Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the

Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle.' Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

δεῖ ἢν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νομοθετησθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ 2. 1. φαίνεται συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὁ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον. πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν οὐδὲν διώρισται.
δεῖ ἢν αἰτίαν, sc. unity.

'The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after *πρὸς*, which he takes with *ἔτι*: cp. *πρὸς τοῦτοις ἔτι* (Meteorol. i. 8, 346 a. 10); *πρὸς δὲ ἔτι* (Herod. iii. 74). The construction is thus made simpler; but the adverbial use of *πρὸς* hardly ever occurs in Aristotle. 'Moreover, the end, viz. unity, which he attributes to the state upon his own showing is impossible.'

The first of these propositions, τὸ μίαν εἶναι μάλιστα εἶναι τὴν πόλιν is discussed in the remainder of this chapter,—the second at the commencement of chapter 3.

ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, 'as it is described in his book,' or 'as it is actually described.' Cp. infra c. 5. § 23, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται.

πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν. Sc. τὸ τέλος, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.'

For the use of *διελεῖν* in the sense of '*to interpret,' cp. Herod. vii. 16, εἰ δὲ ἄρα μὴ ἴσθι τοῦτο τοιοῦτο οἷον ἐγὼ διαίρειν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχον, σὺ πᾶν αὐτὸ συλλαβὴν εἴρηκας. *διελεῖν* may also be taken in the more common sense of 'to distinguish,' i.e. how we are to distinguish or define unity and plurality (cp. iii. 13. § 6: εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ὀλίγους πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;).

οἱ γὰρ γίνονται πόλεις ἐξ ὁμοίων.

2. 3.

The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (iii. 16. § 2; iv. 11. § 8; vii. 8. § 4) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

δοῖσιν δὲ τῇ τοιούτῃ καὶ πόλεις ἴθουσιν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόσμους ᾖσι καχυρισ- 2. 3. μέναι τὸ πλεῖθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες.

The clause *ὅταν μὴ κ.τ.λ.* may be a description either 1)* of the

ἔθνος, 'when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages'; or 2) of the *πῶλις*, 'when they are no longer dispersed in villages.' According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato's Symposium, 193 A, *συνὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν διακρίσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων*. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state. 2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the *ἔθνος* but of the *πῶλις*, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a *συνολικισμός*. We may paraphrase 'When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.'

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation.

To Aristotle the *ἔθνος* is a lower stage than the *πῶλις*. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek *πῶλις* was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

2. 3. *ἢ ἔθνος δὲ δὲ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει.*

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

2. 4. *διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηδὸς σέβει τὰς πῶλεις, ὥστερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.*

Euclid in his 6th Book uses *ἀντιπεπονημένοι* to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical

use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τε καὶ ἴσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰ 2. 5. σκυτοτόμοι καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν.

These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, 'yes, if possible,' but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9; cp. also *infra*, c. 11. § 13).

ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν . . ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

2. 6.

'However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.'

ἐν τοτέτοις δὲ μιμῆσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶναι ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐξ 2. 6. ἀρχῆς.

ἐν τοτέτοις, *sc.* among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government.

μιμῆσθαι, 'to imitate,' i.e. to come as near as we can to 'this principle of succession,' dependent on βέλτιον.

τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, *sc.* εἰκουσι. Like 'the original rulers, who have yielded to them;' or, without supplying εἰκουσι, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, διὰ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἐσθήτητα τῶν

πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἀρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, ἣ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἀρχὼν ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον.

2. 7. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἀρχουσιν ἀρχάς.

1) The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways :

a) by succession; b) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, 2) the words are a passing thought suggested by ἄλλοι γενόμενοι, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. 'There is a further variety; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.'

3. 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὃ Σωκράτης . . . νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτω φήσουσιν κ.τ.λ.

'When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common; they mean "all," not "each."'

3. 3. τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἱριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὧδὶ μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὧδὲ δ' οὐδὲν ὁμοιοητικόν.

The absolute unity of 'all' in the sense of 'each' is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable; a state without individuals is a *μάταιον εἶδος*. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term 'all,' like the term 'one,' is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα. The fallacy is that these words may mean 'all' or 'both,' either in a collective or individual sense.

περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια. The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together

are even : e.g. the odd numbers, $5 + 7 = 12$, which is an even number ; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist. Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, *ὁ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἀρτιον*, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. 'For the word *πάντες* is fallacious, and indeed the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.' *καί*, 'not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.'

The fallacy referred to is that of *σύνθεσις* and *διαίρεσις*, cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει.

8. 4.

Either, 'only so far as comes in the way of,' or, 'is the business of each,' or, with a slight difference of meaning, 'only so far as it touches or affects each.' Cp. i. 13. § 8, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ἀρχοντα τελείαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡδικῆν ἀρετὴν τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς*.

καὶ οὕτοι οἶχ' ὡς ἐκάστου.

8. 5.

'Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.'

ὅτι οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς, 8. 5. *ἐκείνους τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δαίμονος, τοῦτον τὸν τρέπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων.*

*οὕτως**, 'on this principle' ; *ἐμὸς* = *ἐμός* ἐστι. 'Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, "he is mine," whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number ; I mean that (*οἷον*) he will say, "he is mine," or, "his," and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato's thousand citizens.' The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, *μάλιστα συμφωνήσουσιν ἐνέε τινας ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντες . . . ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς*. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest : he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way : we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other : they say, 'my son is doing well,' or, 'is not doing well,' being each of them a thousandth part

of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words τὸν εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντα: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντα = ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα, οὐκ ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν κακῶς πράττοντα. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τῶν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. *infra* c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

3. 7. ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν κ.τ.λ.

'In Plato's state they are all "mine": in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardsman or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.'

3. 7. ὁ δ' ἀνεψιὸν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τιὰ συγγένειαν.

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato's society in which the state and the family are identified.

3. 7. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν.

A resumption of πότερον οὕτω κρεῖσσιν; 'Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato's fashion.'

3. 9. φασὶ τινες . . τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων εἶναι τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γαστράματα τέκνα διαίρεισθαι κατὰ τὰς ἐμοιότητας.

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῷ δὲ οἷον τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸ παῖδες, τοῦτον παῖς νομίζονται, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.

ὅν οὐδὲν δεινόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς μὴ 4. 1.
πάρῃ τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπῶθεν.

‘Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.’ Aristotle here mixes up Plato’s point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

καὶ γενομένων, τῶν μὲν γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι 4. 1.
λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδελίαν.

τῶν δὲ is opposed to τῶν μὲν, though not parallel with it=‘but in the other case,’ as if τῶν μὲν without γνωρίζοντων had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after τῶν μὲν, and γνωρίζοντων may be separated from it. ‘And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.’

ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινούς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν 4. 2.
τῶν ἐρώτων, τὸ δ’ ἐρᾶν μὴ καλύψαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἄλλας, ὥς πατρὶ
πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάστων ἐστὶν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν· ἐπεὶ
καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον.

The instance quoted, πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τὸ ἐρᾶν evidently in the lover’s sense of the word.

δοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

4. 4.

‘If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians’—that is, according to Aristotle’s view of communism, not Plato’s. Cp. vii. 9. § 8; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should

destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

4. 4. τοιούτους.

Sc. ἦγον φιλικούς gathered from ἦγον φιλία.

4. 5. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἰεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα.

Supply τοῦναντίον (from the preceding) τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν, viz. unity.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετησθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

4. 6, 7. ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὰ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφύσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων ἓνα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἓνα· ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῇ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥμιστά λέγειν τὸν ἑμὸν ἢ υἱὸν πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν.

Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.

ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων, a rare construction after λέγειν. Cp. Plat. Meno 95 E, ὡς διδακτοῦ οὐσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει.

ἢ τὸν ἓνα. 'If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.'

4. 8. οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν νομμάτων τοιούτων διαφροντίζειν ἥμιστά ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἢ πατέρα ἢ υἱὸν ἢ υἱὸν ἢ πατέρα, ἢ ἢ ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐν is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ἥμιστά with διαφροντίζειν.

The latter word has two constructions, 1) with τὰ for subject, and οἰκειότητα as object; 2) with πατέρα, υἱόν for subjects, and the genitives υἱόν, πατρός following, e. g. ἢ πατέρα διαφροντίζειν ὡς υἱόν.

4. 9. τὸ τε τιμὴν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητέν.

ἀγαπητέν, 'that which is to be cherished or valued,' like ἀγαπητός in Plat. (?) Alcibiades I. 121 E, εἴτ' ἐγένετο, ὅτι ποιεῖν, Ἀλκιβιάδης. τῷ

Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης δὲ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης: and Rhet. i. 7, 1365 b. 19, οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἂν τις τὸν ἐτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δὴ ἔχοντα ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ εἰσέφηρηται: also Homer (Odyssey ii. 365) μούνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητός. Compare the English 'dear.' Or, more simply, ἀγαπητὸν may also be taken as answering to φιλεῖν: 'men love an object which is naturally to be loved.'

καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν [εἰς] τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

4. 10.

Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another. Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. 'those who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.' The words εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας have been explained as a pleonasm='in relation to the other citizens' (οὐ προσαναγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς, κ.τ.λ.), 'they do not call them brothers.' But the use of εἰς in a different sense in two successive lines is objectionable. It is possible that the words εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας are an error of the copyist, who may have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of εἰς (which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., M^a P¹, but inserted as a correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the passage.

καὶ ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς,

5. 2.

2C. τὰ περὶ τὰ τέσσα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

πότερον . . τίς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις.

5. 2.

These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led, un-

necessarily, to alter the reading. The change made by him of *τε* into *γε* and of *καὶ* into *κατὰ* impairs the parallelism of *κτήσεις* and *χρήσεις* (*τὰς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον κατὰ τὰς χρήσεις*). The three cases are: 1) the soil divided, produce common: 2) soil common, produce divided: 3) soil and produce alike common.

5. 2. ὅπερ ἔτια ποιεῖ τῶν ἐθνῶν.

ἔθνη as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for *βάρβαροι* and generally opposed to *πόλεις* or *Ἕλληνες*: also any loosely organised people, ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. 5. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

5. 3. ἐτέρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ βίῃς.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

5. 4. τῶν συναποδῆμν κοινωῖαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* 'fellow-travellers' or 'fellow-settlers in a foreign city.' Whether the *κοινωῖαι* were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words *σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* supply *προσκεινέουσι*.

5. 5. καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν . . διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for *ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, διαφέρει, καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν* ('when it has been improved'), *οὐ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι*.

5. 6. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαὶ διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν.

: Either 1), 'for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,' i.e. will prevent complaints, *ἐπιμέλεια* being taken as the nominative to *οὐ ποιήσουσιν*: or 2) regarding (as the words *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* and the following clause *μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιδόσουσιν* seem to indicate) *αἱ μὲν ἐπιμέλεια* as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, 'Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.'

5. 6. δὲ ἀρετὴν δέ.

'But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.'

ὑπογεγραμμένον.

5. 6.

‘Sketched out or faintly indicated.’ For ὑπογράφειν, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 6, 743 b. 24, οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῆον.

οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρώνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὥς εἰπείν 5. 7. ἰδίοις, ἔτι δ’ ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

χώρα as opposed to πόλις:—‘When on a journey in the country, they take the produce in the fields.’ The apodosis (i. e. some such words as χρώνται ἐφοδίοις) is omitted. Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, §§ 1, 3, 4, Ἐκαστὴ γὰρ μὴν ἔγνω καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος καὶ παίδων καὶ οἰκετῶν καὶ χρημάτων ἀρχουσιν· ὁ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιος, κατασκευάσαι βουλόμενος ὥς ἂν μηδὲν βλάπτουσι ἀπολαύουσιν τι οἱ πολῖται ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν, ἐποίησε παίδων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀρχεῖν. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκέταις, εἴ τις δεηθείη, χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυνῶν δὲ θηρευτικῶν συνῆψε κοινωνίαν· ὥστε οἱ μὲν δεόμενοι παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ θήραν, ὁ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸς σχολάζων ἡδέως ἐκπέμπει. Καὶ ἵπποις δὲ ὡσαύτως χρώνται· ὁ γὰρ ἀσθενήσας ἢ δεηθείς ὀχήματος ἢ ταχύ ποὶ βουλευθείς ἀφικέσθαι, ἢν ποὺ ἰδῇ ἵππον ὄντα, λαβὼν καὶ χρησάμενος καλῶς ἀποκαθίστησιν, κ.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, εἰ δὲ ξένος ἐπιδημήσας δαπάνης ἐπιθυμῇ φαγεῖν διαπορευόμενος τὰς ὁδοὺς, τῆς μὲν γενναίας ἀπιέσθω, εἰ δὲ βούληται, μεθ’ ἐνὸς ἀκολουθοῦ χωρὶς τιμῆς, ξένια δεχόμενος, τῆς δὲ ἀγροίκου λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος εἰργέτω μὴ κοινωνεῖν ἡμῖν τοὺς ξένους.

ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι.

5. 8.

‘Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.’

τὸ δὲ φιλοπρεπὲς εἶναι ψέγγεται δικαίως, κ.τ.λ.

5. 9.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato’s Laws, v. 731 E.

τῶν τοιούτων.

5. 9.

‘Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.’ Cp. note on i. 1. § 2.

ἀμφοτέρω ἔργῳ . . . συμφροσύνης περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

5. 10.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness

in the relation of the sexes, and is very far from allowing his guardians to indulge in sensuality.

5. 11. *Εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλόανθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἕσσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς πάντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τίς τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὥς γινόμενων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυρῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας.*

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the opening of Book vii, noticed by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regularity *supra* c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories, especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing institutions. Cp. *Plat. Rep.* v. 464, 465; iv. 425.

5. 12. *ὣν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν.*

A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, *ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὀφέλος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.*

The emphatic negative *ὣν οὐδὲν γίνεται* for *ἀ οὐ γίνεται* is curious.

5. 12. *ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις.*

To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers, than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referring to disputes arising in 'guilds' or 'clubs,' or partnerships in business. *διαφερομένους* is to be repeated with *κεκτημένους*. The meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

5. 15. *ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος εἶναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιῆν.*

Aristotle takes up a position half way between the communism

of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις δ' 5. 15. νομοθέτης ἐκόινωσεν.

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30-32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6-9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὐρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ 5. 16. χρῆσται γινώσκοντες.

οὐ συνήκται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (*ὥς εἰ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβῃ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς φέροντο τὰς πρῶτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρησθαι νομίσκειν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένης καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περιστεῖσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν*), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἴδῃ τὴν τοιαύτην 5. 17. πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην.

'In the actual process of creation.'

Cp. Plat. Tim. 19 B, *προσείκει δὲ δὴ τινὶ μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος, οἷον εἴ τις ζῆα καλὰ πον θεασάμενος, εἴτε ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀλθιυῖαι, ψυχρίαν δὲ ἄγοντα, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καὶ τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασι δοκούντων προσήκειν κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀλλοιούνα. ταῦτόν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πάλιν ἢ διφθόρην.*

5. 17. μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὰ μὲν and τὰ δέ, which follow.

5. 17. ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

1)* 'Which already,' i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato's ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), 'which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]' (Schneider). For the use of νῦν compare ii. 8. 6.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon) is used pleonastically='do carry out.' So τῶν ἐπιχειροῦσάντων νεωτερίζειν (v. 7. § 13)=τῶν νεωτερισάντων. And Plato's Phaedrus, 265 E, μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνῖναι μέρος μὴδέν.

5. 20. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουροὺς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

1)* The emphasis is on τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δέ. 'He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, 'to these he opposes the husbandmen'] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.' 2) Bernays translates, 'For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison],' making a pause at τοὺς ἄλλους. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between φρουροὺς and πολίτας is harsh. For the φρουροὶ or φύλακες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he 'snatches' at the word φρουροῦντας, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ποιεῖ γὰρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοὺς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προσπολεμῶν καὶ τὰ ἑπὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν.

5. 23. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἶναι μὴ, νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διόρισται.

Here, again, the antecedent to ταῦτα is to be gathered generally from the context, = 'whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,' &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

τῶν γε.

5. 23.

'As far, at least, as his book shows.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων.

5. 23.

Sc. οὐδὲν διάρρισταί from the previous sentence. 'And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.' A repetition of § 18. The emendation ἀρχομένων (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

καὶ εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

5. 24.

Sc. τίς οἰκονομήσει; or more generally, 'What then?' Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιῆσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ 5. 24.
ἀντὶ ἐκτελεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιῆσθαι τὴν παραβολήν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. οἷς: sc. τοῖς θηρίοις.

'The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change 5. 26. the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.' But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν 5. 27.
εὐδαιμονία ποιῆν τὴν πάλιν τὴν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ
τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

This passage, like many others in the Politics, involves a miscon-

ception of Plato's meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents him from seeing that Plato does not really take away the happiness of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common with him (cp. *Pol.* i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice. Compare also *Rep.* iv. 420 B, C, and *Politics* vii. 9. § 7, (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμόνα δὲ πᾶσι οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας*) where Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he here repudiates.

5. 27. *ὥνπερ τὸ ἀρτιον, κ.τ.λ.*

Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 *supra*); but happiness must always exist in both.

6. 1-4. Socrates is here spoken of by implication (*ὄλγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν*, § 4) as if he were the chief speaker in the *Laws*, though he is not introduced at all. The *Laws* are quoted as Plato's in c. 7. § 4.

6. 1. *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάνπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης.*

The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the subjects contained in the *Republic*. Probably the metaphysical and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle *ποιητικὰ καὶ μεταφορὰ* (*Met.* c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.

6. 2. *τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευμένον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.*

'And a third class taken from the warriors,' (*τῶν προπολεμοῦντων*).

6. 3. *περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσιν τινος ἀρχῆς . . . οὐδὲν διώρικεν.*

Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the declaration of an oracle, 'that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed' (*Rep.* iii. 415, and *supra* c. 5. § 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes

are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the *Laws* v. 776 ff.

τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις.

6. 3.

I.e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (*Books* ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though naturally entering into Plato's conception of the state, which includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.

τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ θ. 4. περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν.

This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the *Laws* of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the twelfth to legislation.

καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινωτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν θ. 4. περιέγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word κοινωτέραν cp. c. 6. § 16, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὥς κοινωτέραν ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἑτέραν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the *Laws* (*Laws* v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical, of the *Laws* more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to 'bring round the *Laws* to the Republic' in the assimilation of male and female education, in the *syssitia* for women, in the assertion of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to

which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (Laws xii. 965 ff.).

6. 5. τὴν μὲν χιλίων.

Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, supra.

6. 6. τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττόν κ.τ.λ.

This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάτους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιναμένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλων ὁσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the *odium philosophicum* of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

6. 6. χέρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας κ.τ.λ.

A strange remark: Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

6. 7. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον.

Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the Laws he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; Laws v. 739.

6. 7. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεινιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἰ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῆσται βίον κ.τ.λ.

[sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute *πολεμικὸν* for *πολιτικὸν* which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of *μὴ μονωτικὸν* or *μὴ μονώτερον* in some MSS. after *πολιτικὸν* appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini's forcible saying, 'Non-interference is political suicide.'

εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς 6. 8.
πόλεως . . ἀπελθοῦσιν.

'But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.' In modern language, 'however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.'

ἀπελθοῦσιν, i.e. 'lest they renew the attempt.'

καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὄραν δεῖ, μήποτε βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι 6. 8.
τῷ σαφέως μᾶλλον.

Literally, 'Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?'

ὥστερ ἂν εἰ τις εἴπεν ὥστε [ἢν εὖ] τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον. 6. 8.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato's definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) 'this is only saying, "enough to enable a man to live well."' But this explanation seems to require that the following words *τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον* should be translated 'this however is too general' (Bernays), giving a sense to *μᾶλλον* (=μᾶλλον § δεῖ) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* 'By the confused expression "Enough to live upon with temperance," he means only "enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea."'

6. 9. *ἔξεις αἰπeral*.

The MSS. give *αἰπeral*, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into *αἰπeral*. But the words *ἔξεις αἰπeral* are unmeaning. It is possible that *ἔξεις* may be the true reading and *αἰπeral* the gloss or vice versâ. See note on text.

6. 10. *ἀφείναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν*.

Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

6. 11. *δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν*.

'But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,' i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.

6. 11. *παράξυνας*.

'For whom there is no place at the banquet of life.'—Malthus.

6. 12. *τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἃν συμβαίῃ τελευτῶν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν*.

τῶν ἄλλων, 'the sterility of others,' i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word *γεννηθέντων*,—'the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.'

6. 13. *Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους φήσῃ διῶν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος*.

ἴσους and *ἀνίσους* are here used in slightly different senses, *ἴσους* referring to the numbers of the families, *ἀνίσους* to the size of the lot. 'He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.' That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.

Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Dorians i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word *Κορίνθιος* may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, *infra* c. 11.

§§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10. § 6.

περὶ μὲν τούτων . . . λεκτέον ὕστερον.

6. 14.

There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.

φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν κ.τ.λ.

6. 14.

Aristotle is finding fault with Plato's vagueness:—'He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.'

τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφήσει γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας.

6. 15.

Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (κτᾶσθαι) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὐ συμφέρῃ 6. 15.
πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vii. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.

ἐκ γὰρ τῶν πολιτευόμενων ἐστίν.

6. 16.

The normal idea of a πολιτεία is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. -iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλεῖστον πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πᾶσιν τῶν πολιτευόντων, πολιτεία· συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ εὐρίους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ὅβρι χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολιτείαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλείοσι γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προκαλεῖσθαι, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κακῶς τὰ ὅπλα, and see also Ib. c. 17. § 4; iv. 13. § 7; and Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6.

τὴν γὰρ πρῶτην πολιτείαν.

6. 16.

The same as the πρώτη πολιτεία (§ 4), i.e. the Republic of Plato.

6. 17. Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So uncritical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans. . . With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the *Laws*, iv. 712 D, E, *καὶ μὴν ξυνοῶν γε, ὃ ξένε, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως, ἥτινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσοικεῖναι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε· καὶ τις ἐνιστὲ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μάλιστα ἰοικέσθαι. τὸ δ' αὖ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀποπον. καὶ μὴν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ' ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτῃ πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς οὕτως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διωρισμένον εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν.* Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.

6. 18. *ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τοῖς τοῖς ὡς δέον συγκρίσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος.*

This is not really said, though in *Laws* (iv. 710 ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.

6. 19. *φέρειν ἀρχοντας.*

φέρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

6. 20. *ἀρροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τμήματος, εἴτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν οὐ πᾶσι ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνους ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις.*

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versa, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.

There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting: for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words *ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων* can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either *τοῦ τετάρτου* or *τῶν τετάρτων* must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for *τοῦ τετάρτου* agrees best with *τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος* and *τοῦ δευτέρου* antea, and *τῶν τετάρτων* may have crept into the text from the preceding *τετάρτων*. Either alternative is simpler than reading *τετάρτων* (for *τετάρτων*) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit *τρίτων ἢ* before *τετάρτων*. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc. The words *οὐ πᾶσι ἐπανάγκη*, sc. *αἰρεῖσθαι*, do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently *τὸ οὐ παντὶ* and *τὸ οὐ τινί*, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.

ὡς μὲν οὖν οἷα ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην Θ. 22. πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ τῶν ὑστερον βεβαιουμένων, ὅταν ἐπιβέλλῃ παρὰ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκίψις.

ἐκ τούτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (*ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ*), Aristotle is looking forward to the discussion of what he calls *πολιτεία*, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τοιαύτης, 'a state similar to that in the Laws.'

6. 22. τῶν ὑστερον ῥηθρισμένων.

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7-9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

6. 22. ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοῦς ἐπικίνδυνον· εἰ γὰρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι τὸ πλῆθος, αἰὲ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἵρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of *ἐπικίνδυνον* cp. Thuc. i. 137, *ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ ἀσφαλείῃ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῃ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομὴ ἐγένετο*.

7. 1. αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ἰδιώτης is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to *δημοουργοί* (Laws 921 B) and to *πολιτῆς* (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to *ιστῆρες*. '*ἰδιώται*' such as Phaleas

and Hippodamus; 'philosophers' such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; 'statesmen' such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. *infra*, c. 12. § 1).

διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος.

7. 2.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. 'Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.'

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 φησὶ γάρ, § 8 εἶποι ἂν ὁ Φαλέας, οἴεται γάρ) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of 'the best state,' c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words *περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης*, 'Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state' which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

καταυζομένης, sc. ταῖς πόλεσι or *πολιτείαις*, an emphatic present, 7. 3. 'when in process of settlement.'

τῇ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους δίδουσι μὲν λαμβάνουσι δὲ μή κ.τ.λ.

7. 3.

Cp. the Babylonian 'marriage-market' in Hdt. i. 196.

ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτους.

7. 5.

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato 'that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,' to which he replies that 'it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.'

7. 6. οἶον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν κ.τ.λ.

Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

7. 7. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιούς κλήρους διασώζειν.

Dependent on νόμοι εἰσὶ, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

7. 7. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν.

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

7. 9. ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὀφελος.

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

καὶ τὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ. 'Moreover there is no point in saying that it is one and the same, for it may be bad.'

7. 10. τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, εἰς ἴσους.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.

περὶ ἐκάτερον, SC. τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰς τιμὰς.

οὐ τοῖνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ 7. 12.
λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. Τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων ;

The words καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, καὶ ἀνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν (Bojesen), sc. ἀδικήσουσιν, an ingenious conjecture; ἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; ἀνεπιθύμητοι (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain : 'And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.' The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. 7. 12.
'They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.'

οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥεγῶσιν. Διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι. 7. 13.

Cp. the Story of Jason, who said πειρῇν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that 'he knew nothing except how to govern.' 'And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.'

δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεγινηέντας κ.τ.λ. 7. 14.
A favourite idea of Aristotle. Cp. supra c. 6. § 7.

ἀλλ' οὕτως ὥς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. 7. 16.
= ἀλλ' οὕτως ποιῶν ὥς ἂν ποιοῖεν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν, the more general word ποιῶν being understood from πολεμεῖν.

'That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,' i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in 7. 17. Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradates, the Satrap of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. Ἀριστοτέλης.

7. 19. διωβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in 'the good old times.' Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. Vesp. 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] Politics that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times: also cp. Lucian Dem. Encom. 36; Prooem. Dem. 1459, 27, a remarkable place; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, 'Public Economy,' Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. 1, pp. 296 ff.

7. 20. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή κ.τ.λ.

If ἀρχή be retained, τῶν τοιούτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. ἀκη conj. Scaliger, ἀρκεῖ Coraes.

7. 23. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ ὡς Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Bernays places a comma after εἴπερ, and omits the second δεῖ, placing a καὶ before καθάπερ. 'But if this is so (i.e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be engaged in public works should be slaves.' Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ἐργαζομένους: 'But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.'

τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or 'some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known,' was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

8. 1. Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work περὶ πολιτείας, which bear the name of 'Hippodamus the Pythagorean' (Florileg. xlii. pp. 248-251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. Fragm. Philos. Graec. vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The

portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of *καλόν*, *δίκαιον*, and *συμφέρον*, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

HIPODAMUS *Περὶ Πολιτείας*.

‘In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the “Good”—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessities. The first class I call councillors; the second, “allies” or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman’s life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

‘Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before

them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers; and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessities into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

‘Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things—reason (*λόγος*), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling

and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation;—if the amount of wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil;—if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them, since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.'

Aristotle's account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato(?) (368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—*τραυλὸς τὴν φωνήν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ λοχρὸς καὶ ἥν, καὶ μικρόμματος, ἐσθλὴν τε ἐπισήμην χρώμενος καὶ θαυμάσιον καὶ ποικίλ.* (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippodāmus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (Knights 327) the α is long, yet if the name be a compound of δῆμος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the *Ἱπποδάμιος ἀγορὰ* at the Piræus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, *ὡς φασὶν*), that the architect of the Piræus was the architect of the

magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (*κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά*); but he had probably no special means of information and only 'combined' the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called 'the Thurian' in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 B.C. and Rhodes was built in 406 B.C. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, B.C. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, *ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκίσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται . . . ἂν εὐτομος ᾗ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον*, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

8. 1. *καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ὅτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς κ.τ.λ.*

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted in combining expensiveness and simplicity: *ἐσθῆτος* is dependent on some such word as *χρήσει* to be supplied from *κόσμῳ*.

8. 3. *διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱεράν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ' ἰδίαν.*

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

8. 4. *δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριον.*

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. 'The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.'

τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις κ.τ.λ.

8. 5.

See *infra* note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of *n. l.* or *non liquet*, whence the Scotch verdict of 'not proven.' The ideas of Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

ὡς οὐκ οὐ τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις 8. 6.
οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν πόλεων.

Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: '*But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,' and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: 'And this law now exists at Athens.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

τοὺς δ' αἰρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.

8. 7.

I. e. 'They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.'

Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an 8. 10, 11. opponent, raises several *ἀπορίαι* respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. 'How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a *raison d'être*, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by force.'

To these ἀπορίαι he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: 'How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?'

8. 12. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας.

Either οἰκία is here used like οἶκος in the sense of 'property' or 'inheritance'; or γεωργήσει must be taken to mean 'maintains by agriculture.' (Cp. for a similar use of οἰκία Dem. de Falsâ Leg. καρπούμενη τὰς τῶν χωρέων οἰκίας: and for another singular use of γεωργέω, i. 8. § 6, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν γεωργοῦντες.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading *eis* δύο οἰκίας (Bernays), or δύοσιν οἰκίαις. The old Latin translation 'ministrabit' has suggested the emendation ὑπουργήσει. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than γεωργήσει in the sense given above.

8. 13. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται.

'This in an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.'

8. 14. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μῶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει δέκα μῶς, ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. ὀφειλεσθαι οἶται. But in what follows, the words ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μῶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει δέκα μῶς. But in the second case the words are restricted to ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει δέκα μῶς, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words ἄλλος δὲ πέντε κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle ὁ μὲν πλεόν κ.τ.λ. already stated.

8. 16. εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μένων.

A confusion of language: cp. εὐπρόσωπος (c. 5. § 11).

8. 16. ἔχει γὰρ συκοφαντίας.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not

of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus' error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermae at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις.

8. 18.

Every art and science is also a power to make or become ; hence the word *δύναμις* being the more general term is constantly associated with both *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη*.

ζητοῦσι δ' ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τάγαθόν πάντες.

8. 21.

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται 8. 21.
κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν.

ὁμοίους has been altered by Bernays into *ὀλίγους* but without reason. It may be taken 1) as = *ὁμοίους τοῖς γηγενέσι*, or, 2)* *ὁμοίους* may be joined with *καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας* = 'no better than simple or common persons.' Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, *γρόμῃσι ἐχρίοντο ὁμοῖοι καὶ σύ.* Plat. Theact. 154 A, *ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι ἢ ὅμοιοι καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτιοῦν.*

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον 8. 22.
ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι.

1)* If we take *πάντα* as subject, *τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν* may be the remote object of *γραφῆναι*, or the words may be governed by *περὶ* of which the force is continued from *περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας*. Or 2) *τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν* may be the subject of *γραφῆναι*, in which case *πάντα* is to be taken adverbially.

οὐ γὰρ τοσούτων ἀφελίσσεται κινήσεις, ὅσων βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν 8. 23.
ἀπειθεῖν ἰδοῦθαίς.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, *μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ὅτι χαίροσι νέμει ἀπειθεῖς χρηστήν πάλαι εἰσέσσαν ἔστιν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις.*

κινήσας, sc. ὁ πολίτης gathered from the previous sentence.

8. 24, 25. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχύει οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥαδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν . . ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν.

Cp. Plat. Laws i. 634 D, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα εἶναι, ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει and Arist. Met. ii. 3, 995 a. 3, ἡλικίαν δὲ ἰσχύει τὸ σύμψες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μείζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γινώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος. ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν, lit. 'makes a great difference.'

9. 1. In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephoralty is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. §§ 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

9. 1. εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

εἴ τι, sc. νομοθετῆται : καὶ τὸν τρόπον following πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. προκειμένης αὐτοῖς, i.e. 1)* 'which is proposed to the citizens,' πολιτείας understood from πολιτειῶν supra; or 2) 'which legislators set before themselves' referring to νομοθεταί implied in νομοθετῆται : cp. ἡ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

9. 2. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from *ἐν τῇ σχολῇ πακοῦ* of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C *δταν εἰς ἐν, σχολήν τῶν ἄλλων ἔγω, πρᾶττη*.

9. 2. ἢ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πανσθενία πολλὰκις ἐπίθεται τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκεδαιμον οἱ Εἰλωτες ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχέμασι διατελοῦσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: 'I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving

and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.' Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν πῶ τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν· αἴτιον δ' ὅπως τὸ Θ. 3. τὰς γειτνιώσας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημένοις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωνιν οἱ γειτνιώντες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no out-siders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἰρηται σάζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 *supra*, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word 'perioeci' appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, γεωργοὺς τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν (sc. Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἔδωκεν, τοῖς δὲ Κρήταις οἱ περιοίκου. But compare also Sosicrates [B.C. 200-128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), τῶν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μολίαν, τῶν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαιμένους, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπηγούους. The use of the term *μολία* in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated

Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), *τούτω* (sc. *τῷ ξίφει*) *δεσπότας μνωίας κέκλημαι*. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term *μνώτης* is said by Hermon to be applied to 'well-born' serfs: *εὐγενεῖς οἰκέται*.

καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημένοις περιόικους. 'Since they too have perioeci.'

9. 4. With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle's proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

9. 5. *ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή*.

The singular *μέρος* is used by attraction with the singular *ἀνὴρ*.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E ff.: 'For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.'

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 1361 a. 10, *δοῖς γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῖλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίους, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσι*: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

*οἶδ' ἂν, εἰ βούλοιστό τις,
σώφρων γίνουτο Σπαρτιατῶν κῆρη.*

9. 8. *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν*.

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, 'in the days of their greatness,' i. e. in the fourth century B. C. after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained 'many things in their government were ordered by women'? (Schlosser). For why should

women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations *ἀρχῆς* corresponds to *ἀρχῶν* in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. *ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς*. Arist. Wasps 557; *τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*, sc. *δοντας*, Dem. 309. 10.

For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of 9. 10. Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5. § 28, *τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν ὁρᾶσαι ἠνέχοντο, ἅτε οὐδέποτε ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίους*, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, *οὐχ ἦντον δὲ τούτων ἐλπίσιν τὸν Ἀγησίδαον οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θόρυβοι καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ διαδρομαὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων δυσσασχετούστων τὰ γυνώμενα, καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυνάμενων ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν: πρὸς τε τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν πολεμίων*.

χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέrais πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ 9. 10. παρείχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων.

Either 1)* 'For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless'; or 2) 'For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.'

The employment of the men on military service, which rendered 9. 11. it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (*φασὶ μὲν*), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words *καὶ Μεσσηνίων* in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one

hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2. c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the *φιλολάκων*) Laws vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (Ages. c. 31), and even supposes that 'their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.' Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.

9. 12. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν γενομένων.

Sc. the women: * or 'these are the causes' (αὗται by attraction for ταῦτα). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

9. 12. τίνοι δὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν.

'We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.'

9. 13. οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν.

αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν must agree with πολιτείαν understood in ἀπρέπειαν τὴν ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, these words being equivalent to ἀπρεπῆ ποιεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν: or αὐτῆς, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὐτήν.

9. 13. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ οὖν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσεις ἂν τις.

1)* The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

9. 14. Plutarch (Ages. c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition,

or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων.

9. 15.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπικληροὶ οὐσαι.

ἢ καὶ μετρίαν.

9. 15.

'Or even a moderate one.' καὶ is here qualifying. 'Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.'

νῦν δὲ ἔξιςται δοῦναι τὴν ἐπικληρον ὅτε ἂν βούληται.

9. 15.

νῦν, not 'now,' as opposed to some former time, but 'as the law stands.' See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. δοῦναι, sc. τινα.

'A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases': i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle νῦν.

οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν, sc. ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς, §§ 10, 16. 9. 16.

γένετο δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι φαύλας αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην.

τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of ταύτην with a vague antecedent, cp. below ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν: also i. 2. § 2.

ρίαν πληγὴν.

9. 16.

The battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240-248 B.C. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 8), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλείων μετεδίδωσαν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

9. 17.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the

prophet, and Hegias, were the only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

9. 17. *καὶ φασιν εἶναι ποτὲ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίου.*

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

9. 18. *ἰπεναντίος δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιῶν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.*

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phaleas, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4-8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. *τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα*, 6. § 10; *τῆς χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης*, 9. § 19; and so Plato, *Laws* 684 D.

9. 19. *διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἄνθρωποι ἦσαν.*

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, *πιστεύων χρήμασιν διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν*. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, *Καὶ ὥς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυσόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτῶμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολυθῆναι ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη. 'Ὁ δέ, 'Οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτα ἔθου;'. Καὶ ὅς ἔφη. 'Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν,' ἔφη 'καὶ σὺ ἀπολεύῃ;'. 'Οὐ δῆτα,' ἔφη, 'οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἐπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γνῶμη.'*

9. 20. *καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις.*

Ἀνδρίοι is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in

which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word *ἄνδρια* for *φιδίτια* or *συσσίτια*. For this use of the word *ἄνδρια* cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἄνδρια, καθάπερ οἱ Ἑρῆτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (*ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν*).

ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

9. 20.

'So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.'

δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ 9. 22.
μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοί, κ.τ.λ. show that the corresponding words τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως are the subject of βούλεσθαι=δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά.

ταῦτά is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν=κατὰ ταῦτά.

ἄθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν.

9. 22.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the *γερουσία*, he says, ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίῳ γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων.

παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λίαν.

9. 23.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the *γέροντες* (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls *παιδαριώδης*. Plato, *Laws* iii. 692 A, says that the Ephoralty is *ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως*, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephoralty was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is 9. 24. everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer *ἀρχόμενοι* but *ἀρχοντες*, the citizens of Sparta seem

to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

9. 25. τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, οὐκ ἀσφαλές.

'But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.' The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (ὅτι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης, κ.τ.λ.), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

οὐκ ἀσφαλές, sc. τὸ κυρίου αὐτοῦ εἶναι μεγάλων.

9. 26. δόξειε δ' εἰ κ.τ.λ.

The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

9. 27. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερότων, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: 'The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.'

9. 27. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλευόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλευόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.
Cp. Plat. Rep. 345 E ff., 347 D.

νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν 9. 28.
φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν
αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων.

According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. 9. 30.
συμπρεσβευτὰς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the dissensions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. διόπερ = 'by reason of a like suspicion.'

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) 'they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,' e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as συμπρεσβευταί, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent παραπρεσβείαι among Spartans, but that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), 'A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.'

τὴν σίνοδον. 9. 31.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.

9. 32. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων.

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of leveling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

9. 33. The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Lysander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king.

9. 35. τοῦτου δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μίντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.

'The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue' (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The 'not less error' is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained.

9. 37. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Gylippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them was the real source of the evil.

The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying *χρήματα χρήματα* ἀλήρ is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle *ἂ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν* is quoted in the Aristotelian *Πολιτείας* fr. Rel. Lac. 1559 b. 28.

10. 1. παράγγυς μὲν ἔστι ταύτης.

Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lacedaemon, *Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταβάτης (πολιτείας) ἄξιον ἐπιστήσαι*

κατὰ δύο τρόπους πῶς οἱ λογιώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων Ἐφορος, Ξενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρῶτον μὲν ὁμοίαν εἶναι φασὶ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ, δεύτερον δ' ἐπαινετὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαίνουσιν. ὡς οὐδέτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the *γέροντες*; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

τὸ δὲ πλείον ἦντον γλαφυρῶς.

10. 1.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12. § 11, τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian 10. 2. but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευά- 10. 3. σματος Μίνω πρῶτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. διὸ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (a.c.?) the Cretan Syssitia are described as still exist-

ing (see the passage quoted in note on § 6). Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 480], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called *Ἀνδρῖα* or *Ἀνδρεία*, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo l.c.

10. 3. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκῖναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not indisposed to a geographical digression; cp. vii. 10. §§ 3-5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15, 16. The 'silver streak' and 'the empire of the sea' are the symbols of two different policies.

10. 4. Διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν ἐπέσχετο ὁ Μῖνος.

Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

10. 5. γεωργοῖσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλωτοὶ τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίουκοι.

But if Sosicrates, a writer of the second century B.C., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες ἀπαιτοῦσι μισθόν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαιμίας, τοὺς δὲ περιούκους ὑπαίτουσιν: see c. 9. § 3.

ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

10. 5.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10. § 2, ἀρχαία δ' εἴκειν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γεγόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλὰ παλαιότερα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common meals came from Crete to Sparta.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις 10. 6. κόσμοις.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi, never acquired the military command, which was retained by the Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circumstance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

οὗς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλὴν.

10. 6.

Yet we are told that the term βουλὴ was generally used to signify 'the council in a democracy.' Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17, also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamnus] ἀπὸ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησεν. In the Cretan use of the term βουλὴ there may be a survival of the Homeric meaning of the word.

βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἦν.

10. 6.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiades, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following account of the Cretan Syssitia: 'The Lycians collect the materials for their common meals in the following manner: Every one brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (τραπεζία) to which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city, which the municipal authorities distribute to the several households. Further, each of the slaves contributes a poll-tax of an

Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call *andrea*. A woman takes care of the *syssitia* with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called *καλοφόροι*, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the *syssitia*, one called the *andreion*, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (*κοιμητήριον*). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the *syssitia*, called "strangers' tables," at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat, but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the *syssitia* in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.

10. 8. *ὅστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεισθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας.*
ἐκ κοινοῦ, 'out of a common stock'; not necessarily at common tables. The *syssitia* or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the Laws, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of Dosiades (*supra*). The name *ἄνδρια* or *ἀνδρεία* also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words *ἐκ κοινοῦ* are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with Oncken (*Staatslehre der Arist.* ii. 386) we should suppose the words *γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας* on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

10. 9. *ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἀλεγομένην.*

The connexion appears to be as follows: 'And as there were so many mouths to feed,' the legislator had many devices for

encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαῦλως ἢ μὴ φαῦλως 10. 9.
ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καιρὸς.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in Book vii. c. 16, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of c. 8. § 25 supra, Δὲ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν, ἄλλων γὰρ ἔστι καιρῶν.

ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ 10.10-12.
τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἂν τις εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γινομένων. τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον, καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μείζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς. . . τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ ὧν. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (Susemihl, Bernays) or to the κόσμοι (Stahr)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the Cosmi appear not to have held office for life (cp. γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων), perhaps only for a year (Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see infra, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has 'gone off upon a word' as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν. περὶ ὧν and γινομένων have also been taken as neuters: 'about which things,' i.e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' αἰτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές. 10. 11.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

οὐδὲ γὰρ λήμματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πάρος γ' ἐποι- 10. 12.
κώσων ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούμενων.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers,

and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

10. 13. οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a *κανὼν*. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.

10. 14. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι.

The words *ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις* which follow and the preceding *ἐκβάλλουσι συστάτες τινὲς* show that the expression *τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν* means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

10. 15. ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (*οὕτως ἔχουσα*) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

10. 16. Διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιόικων μένει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

10. 16. ὅτε γὰρ ἑξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσι.

Either 1*) have no foreign domains; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

10. 16. νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβίβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be B.C. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly after-

wards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a 'foreign war.' Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (B. c. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander.

νεωστὶ τε refers to *σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον*, 'Quite lately [her isolation did not save her,] foreign mercenaries brought war into the island.'

καὶ πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

11. 1.

'And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations' or 'with the others of whom I have been speaking.' For the use of *περιττός*, cp. c. 6. § 6.

αὗται γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλήλαις τε σύνεγγός πῶς εἰσι.

11. 1.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only 'the common tables,' the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 *infra*): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

σημείον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης.

11. 2.

'And the proof that they were an organized state' or 'that they had a regular constitution.' The insertion of *εἰ* before *συντεταγμένης* (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. *supra* ii. 9. § 22.

τὸν δῆμον ἔχουσιν agrees with some word such as *πᾶσι* understood 11. 2. from *πολιτεῖαν* = 'the city with its democracy.' There is no need to change *ἔχουσιν* into *ἐκόντα* (Bernays) or *ἐκούσιον* (Spengel).

μήτε στάσις γιγνησθαι.

11. 2.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that 'the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,' which is also irreconcilable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in *loco*.

11. 3. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν τοῖς φειδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις . . τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσι.

Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the 'camp life' of the Spartan syssitia; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councillors of Carthage: or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or suffetes who seem to have been elected annually and were not military officers at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, *infra* § 9.

11. 3. οὐ χεῖρον.

Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, 'and this is an improvement.'

11. 4. καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μῆτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, εἴ τε διαφέρων ἐκ τούτων αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.

The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With *διαφέρων* supply *τὸ γένος ἐστὶ*. The correction of Bernays, *τυχόν, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίαν αἰρετοὺς* is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, *εἰ δέ, ἀλλ' εἴ τε, εἴτε* have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. *εἴ τε* is to be read as two words and answers to *μῆτε*, as *διαφέρων* does to *μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν*. 'It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.'

11. 4. μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθιστῶνται, ἐν οὐταλείς δοσι, μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐβλαψάν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακωναίων.

He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not unfrequently sold the highest offices for money.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας, 11. 5.
 sc. ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'But of the things which would be
 censured when compared with the ideal of aristocracy and constitu-
 tional government, etc.'

The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower 11. 5.
 sense, and like Aristotle's own *πολιτεία*, a combination of oligarchy
 and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that
 wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the
 condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the
 other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian
 constitution is expressly called an 'aristocracy' in iv. 7. § 4, because
 it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and
 once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other
 democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the
 people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them;
 2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed
 about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power
 of initiation.

ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις. 11. 6.
 Sc. Crete and Sparta. Cp. supra § 5, ταῖς εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις.

τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ. 11. 7.
 Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office
 before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired,
 nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or
 committees of the *γερονσία*. Their position may be illustrated by
 that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the *γερονσία*
 when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

τὴν τῶν ἐκείνων. 11. 7.
 Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the
 magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed
μεγίστη ἀρχή, the other is said to consist of great officers who
 are compared with the Ephors. If the two institutions are
 assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a
 like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the
 citizens in Plato's Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000.

But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the *ordo iudicum* consisted of 100. 'Centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur.' Justin xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year B.C. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

11. 7. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πάσας [ἀριστοκρατικόν], καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ.

Either 1)* καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ refers to the immediately preceding clause, μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων:—or 2), to the words δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πάσας, in which case καὶ . . . ἄλλων must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχέων, unless the words καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων be regarded as suggesting αὐτῶν by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. 'Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.' The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are

both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The difficulty in this way of construing the passage is not the parenthesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of *ἄλλων* vaguely for 'different persons,' and not, as the preceding words *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων* would lead us to expect, for 'different magistracies,' or 'boards of magistrates.'

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contradiction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter are as follows: 'For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extraordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates; at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided, some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.'

For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, 11. 9. *παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίαις δώρα φανερώς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις θάνατός ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον.*

δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτης κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office; the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the governing class, and then there would have been no need to appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even if the better classes generally are not to be protected against poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will ensure them leisure. See infra § 12, *βλῆτιον ὅ· εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπικεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.*

εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλῆτιον καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς, φαῖλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ἀνηγὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the *Politics*, the meaning can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian constitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words *τὰς μεγίστας*

ὡνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, *ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἵδει διαφανεῖ τῇ κείτῃ; δυναστεία γὰρ καὶ ὡνηταὶ βασιλείαι καὶ τοιαῦται τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὖροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.*

11. 12. βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ προέιτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπικεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης.

The MSS. vary between ἀπορίαν and εὐπορίαν without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth'] of the better class.' A similar confusion of ἄπορος and εὐπορος occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, ἀπόροις and εὐπόροις: v. 1. § 14, ἄποροι and εὐποροι: v. 3. § 8, ἀπόρων and εὐπόρων: vi. 2. § 9, ἀπόροις and εὐπόροις.

11. 14. κοινώτερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττων.

κοινώτερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, cp. § 13.

ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because each thing remains the same.

The insertion of ὑπὸ before τῶν, suggested by the Old Translation *ab eisdem*, is unnecessary. τῶν αὐτῶν, 'where the duties are the same.'

κάλλιον ἀποτελεῖται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

11. 15. ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν. See note on text.

So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there 'any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged' (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον.

11. 15.

Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

ὅν ἀτυχία γένηται τις.

11. 16.

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says 12. 2-6. that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle's criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the *δικαστήρια* to Solon (cp. Schömann's *Athenian Constitution*, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (*τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων*); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle's (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

ἑσπερος τῶν δημαγωγῶν.

12. 4.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the *Gorgias*, pp. 515, 516.

12. 5. ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔθηκε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῇ δήμῳ δύναμιν.
Cp. Solon, Fragm. 4 in Bergk Poet. Lyr. Graeci, Δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ
ἔδωκα τόσον κράτος, ὅσον ἐπαρκεί, | Τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελῶν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος.

12. 6. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πᾶσας, ἐκ τῶν
πεντακοσιομεδύμων καὶ ζευγυτῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἱππάδος·
τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμῶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippeis to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in Suidas and Photius about ἱππεῖς and ἱππᾶς (Boeckh, P. E. ii. 260) under ἱππᾶς, which in Photius *s. v.* is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (?) de Rep. Atheniensium, and an addition 'that ἱππᾶδες belong to ἱππεῖς' (?).

12. 6. νομοθέται δ' ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Δοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφυρίοις, καὶ Χαράν-
δας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting Ephorus, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given:

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

12. 7. Θάλητα.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by Ephorus apud Strabonem, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of Lycurgus; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in Plut. de Musica, pp. 1135, 1146, Clinton supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 B.C. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of Plutarch and Pausanias.

12. 7. Λυκούργου καὶ Ζάλευκου.

A greater anachronism respecting Lycurgus is found in the fragments of Ephorus (Strabo x. 482, ἐντυχότα δ', ὅς φασί τινες, καὶ

'Ομήρου διατρίβοντι ἐν Χίῳ, quoted by Oncken, Staatslehre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 346).

ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος.

12. 8.

The δὲ is not opposed to μέν at the end of the last sentence, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, πειρῶνται δέ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Androdamas, nothing more is known: 12. 11. of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xlv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν νομοθέτης, τοὺς νόμους ἔφησε τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ὁμοίους εἶναι ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰς ἐκείνα ἂν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ μῦθα ἢ κῶνῳψ, κατέχεται, ἂν δὲ σφῆξ ἢ μέλιττα, διαβρῆξασα ἀφίπταται, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἂν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ πένης, συνέχεται· ἂν δὲ πλούσιος ἢ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαβρῆξας ἀποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle's phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said 'to be of general application.' Stobaeus has also preserved (xlv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

Πλάτωνος δ' ἡ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ 12. 12. τὰ συσσιτία τῶν γυναικῶν, ἧτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νύμφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὥς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ ἐχρηστον.

The reference to Plato's communism in contrast with Phaleas' proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the 'Laws,' is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them on matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which

genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the Politics. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause *ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος*. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after *ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται*, or may be taken with *περὶ*.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the *ἀμφιδέξιος* as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων καὶ τοὶ ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδέξIOUS γενέσθαι), whereas in Plato (Laws 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

12. 13. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

Cp. Plut. Solon 17. Another reference to Draco occurs in Rhet. ii. 23, 1400 b. 21, καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπων οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος· χαλεποὶ γάρ.

BOOK III.

τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι.

1. 1.

The particle δὲ after τῷ was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου

1. 1.

are a resumption of the opening words τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. 'The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.' The clause τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ . . . περὶ πόλεως is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἡ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι. 1. 4.

καὶ is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες. 'Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.'

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖσι ὑπάρχει.

1. 4.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent μέτρους above, 'for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,' whereupon follows the correction, 'although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.' Or 2) they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e.g. infra c. 6. § 4, where

τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ is repeated in κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον: also iv. 1. § 1, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἐστίν, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for a) such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, καὶ εὐλασσόμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαῖς πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδοκεῖν δοκοῦμεν). δ) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

1. 5. οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν.

λίαν qualifies and at the same time emphasises ἀπλῶς: 'But not quite absolutely.'

1. 5. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων κ.τ.λ.

I. e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

1. 7. ἀνώνυμόν γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ.

'This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.' Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: 'Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.'

1. 8. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ἐποκειμένα διαφέρει τῇ εἰδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ ὃ ἔχοντες, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, ἢ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρω.

τὰ ἐποκειμένα. 1*) 'the underlying notions' or 'the notions to which the things in question are referred,' i. e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, 'the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends' (see Bonitz s. v.): α) ἐποκειμένα is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates 'where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.' But it is hard to see how things which are

different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας **l. 9.**
τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὕσας.

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with the imperfect. So in *Nic. Eth.* i. 6. § 2, 'there are no common ideas of things prior and posterior.' The logical conceptions of prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern metaphysics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions 'a priori' and 'a posteriori,' or 'prior in the order of thought,' which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind, they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing sense of the continuity or development of all things.

διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα ἐστὶ πολίτης. **l. 10.**

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle's own polity hereafter to be described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. *infra*, c. 13. § 12). Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (*infra*, c. 7. § 5), but he here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of democracy which is akin to the μέση πολιτεία.

κατὰ μέρος. **l. 10.**

Generally 'in turn,' but the examples show that the phrase must here mean 'by sections' or 'by different bodies or magistracies.'

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πᾶσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι **l. 11.**
τὰς δίνας.

τὸν αὐτὸν, i.e. because in both these cases the administration of justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.

The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at Lacedae-

mon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

1. 11. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διάρθρωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός.

The particle γὰρ implies an objection which is not expressed. 'But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies.' To which Aristotle answers, 'But I will correct the definition so as to include them.' Finding ἀόριστος ἀρχὴ to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, 'admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.'

1. 12. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.

Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

2. 1. πολιτικῶς.

'Popularly' or 'enough for the purposes of politics.' Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So νομικῶς (viii. 7. § 3), 'enough for the purposes of law.'

For ταχέως Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read παχέως.

2. 2. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίδος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἄλλους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσοποιούς.

ἀπορῶν. 'In doubt about the question who is a citizen?'

δημιουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only 'magistrates,' but 1) 'makers of the people,' 2) 'artisans.' The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

There is also a further pun upon the word Λαρισσαίους, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

'Artisans make kettles.

Magistrates make citizens.'

The sentence may be translated as follows:—'Gorgias, every

likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Laris-seans manufactured by their 'artisan-magistrates'; for some of them were makers of kettles' (Λάρισσαι or Λαρισσαῖοι).

For the term *ειρωνεύμενος*, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii. 7, 1408 b. 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωνείας, περὶ Γοργίᾳς ἐποίει: and for Λάρισσαι compare Τάσσυρα Ταναγρίς, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epigram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Λαβροσύνη τάδε δῶρα, φιλευλείχῃ τε Λαφυγμῷ
θῆκατο δεισέζου* Δωμείως κεφαλῇ,
τὸς Λαρισσαίῳς βουγάστορας ἐψητῆρας,
καὶ χύτρως καὶ τὰν εὐρυχαδῇ κύλικα,
καὶ τὰν εὐχάλκωτον ἐγναμπτὸν τε κρεάγραν,
καὶ κῆστιν, καὶ τὰν ἐττοδόνην τούνηαν.
Λαβροσύνα, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα κακοῦ κακὰ δωρητῆρος
δεξαμένα, νέυσαι μὴ ποκα σφροσύνην.

*δεισέζου=stinking; cp. Suidas, s.v. δεισαλέος:—δεισαλέος, κοπρώδης. δέισα γὰρ ἡ κόπρος.

ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.)

2. 3.

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they stand, taking μετοίκους with both ξένους and δούλους. He quotes Aristoph. Knights 347 (εἴ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου), and infers from the juxtaposition of the words δούλους μετοίκους, that they mean, 'slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves, though belonging to a master.' That is to say μέτοικοι are spoken of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics. Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures, like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave insulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον 2. 4. δδίκαιος ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι καὶ τοῦτό τις ὅτι προσπαροφύσειν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in

principle. These two senses of the words 'true' and 'false' were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

2. 5. τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς refers to τινί, sc. ἀορίστῃ, supra 1. § 7, 'an office such as we spoke of.'

3. 1. δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτεται πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν.

A doubt is raised whether the ἀδίκως πολιτεύων is truly a πολίτης. The answer is that the ἀδίκως ἄρχων is truly an ἄρχων. But the πολίτης is by definition an ἄρχων, and therefore the ἀδικος πολίτης may be rightly called a πολίτης.

καὶ τούτους, sc. τοὺς ἀμφισβητούμενους (§ 4), 'these as well as the legitimate citizens.'

πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1, and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the *de jure* citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the *de jure* state, which is now to be discussed.

3. 1, 2. ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνοι βούλονται διαλύσει.

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypselids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

3. 2. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τιναὶ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. πρὸς Λακτιόν, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedæ-

monians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διασκευθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

3. 3.

E.g. the case of the Athenian κληροῦχοι, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, ὁ τόπος εἰς ὃ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως.

πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης 3. 4.
ζητήσεως.

‘When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word “state” is used in different senses.’

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κατοικούντων,

3. 4.

sc. ἡ ἀπορία ἐστίν, supplied from τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης.

τοιαύτη δ' ὥς ἐστι καὶ Βαβυλῶν.

3. 5.

‘Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,’—further illustrated by ἡ γ' ἐλασκυίας κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γέ φασιν ἐλασκυίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθίσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. 3. 5.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: ‘The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.’ Also Jeremiah li. 31: ‘One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.’

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἢ σπίνγιν 3. 6.
περὶ γὰρ μεγίστου τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πύργον καὶ πύργον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω
συνέβηται, δεῖ μὴ λαθῆναι τὸν πολιτικόν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικῆς
κατασκευῆς πύργον τό τε πύργος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πύργος τε καὶ πόλις τοιαύτη
ἐνέχουσα δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀσπίς, ὥς τε εἶναι καὶ πόλιν

τὴν αὐτήν, and § 11. In the words τὸν πολιτικὸν Aristotle identifies himself with the statesman or politician of whom he is speaking.

πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω, cp. vii. 9. § 8 and 10. § 13.

3. 6, 7. Ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερον ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ γένος ταῦτ' ὅ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμούς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινωμένου νόματος, τοῦ δ' ὑπεξάντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives ἀλλὰ τῶν . . . ἑτέραν create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. 'For the same reason as the rivers;' i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or

for worse ; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree ; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word *πόλις* (§ 4). Cp. iv. 5. § 3 ; v. 1. § 8.

εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, 3. 7. γνομένης ἐτέρας τῇ εἶδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξαιεν ὅτι καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν.

‘For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, *ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας*, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes’: or, if this construction is deemed harsh *πολιτείας*, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle *γάρ* implies assent to the second alternative (*supra*).

‘The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which 4. 1, 2. is the safety of the ship ; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.’

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαφορῶντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν 4. 4. λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ.

The last words are an explanation of *καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον*.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men : secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6 ; vii. 14. §§ 2–5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide ; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (*ἐπ' αὐτῷ* in Aristotle's own language), and they appear to be here confused.

4. 5. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ζῆτων εἶναι πᾶν, δεῖ δ' ἕκαστον πρὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible with the different occupations or natural qualities of different citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation of society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of Aristotle. (Compare Ethics ii. 5. § 14, *ἰσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.*)

4. 6. καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτήσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου.

κτήσις is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of the *οἰκία*: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, *κτήσις* is a subdivision of the *οἰκία* under which the slave is included.

4. 7. φαμὲν δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of the *φρόνιμος*: and vi. 8. § 1, where *πολιτικὴ* is described as a species of *φρόνησις*.

4. 7, 8. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἴσται τιθεὶς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων νόμιμοι ἱερωὶ καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.

καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ. 'Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different.' So in § 6 above, εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5. § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν.

μή μοι τὰ κόμψ'.

4. 8.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol. Fr. 16:—

λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν αἰχμαῖς Ἄρεος ἔν τε συλλόγοις,
μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοῖσσι,
ἄλλ' ἔν πάλει δαί, μεγάλα βουλευόμεν' εἰ.

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poets (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀρχόντες τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ 4. 9.
καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὲς μέντοι πολίτου.

'If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,' i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχόντες καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἴδιον ἔφη ποιεῖν, 4. 9.
ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὥς οἱ αἰσθημένοι ἰδιότης εἶναι.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) 'that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station'; or 2) 'that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to

live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to *πειρῆν* and *ἐπιστάμενος*.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26, 'δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνα, ὅπως δύνῃται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.'

4. 10. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words *οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως* according to the first way = 'the citizen is more to be praised than the good man': according to the second, 'the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy'; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

4. 11. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὶ δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ ὁ ταῦτά διὸν τὸν ἀρχοντα μαθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφοτέρω ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοῦτον τεύθειν ἂν κατὰ τοις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1)* that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the *ἀρχων* and *ἀρχόμενος*, taken separately.

The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ἀμφότερα into ἀμφοῖν ἕτερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty, ('since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things'), because τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in favour of Bernays' emendation that ἀμφότερα may have crept in from the ἀμφοτέρω in the next line; and against it that the two words ἀμφοῖν ἕτερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8-10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν in § 14.

ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ κ.τ.λ.

4. 11.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ἀρχὴ πολιτικὴ to which they do.

ἔστι γὰρ refers back to τὸν ἄρχοντα, 'We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.'

διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον 4. 12.
γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον.

διὸ, referring to ἀνδραποδῶδες and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, 'Because of their servile and degraded character.'

τὸν ἀρχαίμενον οὕτως.

4. 13.

I.e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

εἰ μὴ ποτε χρεῖας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ.

4. 13.

* 'For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually' (indicated by ποτε), 'there is no longer any difference between master and slave,' i.e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τότε μὲν, τότε δέ, instead of τὸν μὲν, τὸν δέ, 'for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at

another time servant'—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.

4. 14. οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἀρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα.

An ancient proverb naturally attributed by tradition (Diog. Laert. i. 60; Stobaeus xlv. p. 308) to Solon. Cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 215 D, who assigns the saying to Agis, ἐρωτηθεὶς τί μάθημα μάλιστα ἐν Σπάρτῃ ἀσκέεται, εἶπεν, ἀρχειν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι.

4. 16. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἀμφω.

At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

4. 17. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός.

Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἥς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλῆσι ᾗ.

4. 18. ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αἰλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἀρχων αἰλητής ὁ χρώμενος.

Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητής who has only πίστις ὀρθή and the χρώμενος who has ἐπιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the αἰλοποιὸς and the αἰλητής, and Cratylus 388 ff. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, 'ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιστημονικὴ ἐστίν. . . ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κερτικὴ μόνον.'

5. The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

5. 1. οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης.

Sc. ὁ ἔχων τὴν τσιάνην ἀρετήν. See note on English text.

ἢ διὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄπορον; οὐδὲ γὰρ 5. 2.
οἱ δούλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι.

'But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.'

διὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον = so far as this objection goes, viz. the implied objection that he has no place in the state.

τῶν εἰρημένων refers to οὐδὲ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος.

ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

5. 2.

'On the supposition that they grow up to be men.'

τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων.

5. 4.

'But in respect to servile occupations'; either an anacoluthon resumed in τὰ τοιαῦτα, or governed by the idea of ἔργον contained in λειτουργοῦντες.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

φανερὸν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὸ γὰρ 5. 4.
φανὲν τὸ λεχθέν ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

'What has been said at once (φανὲν) makes the matter clear.' It has been said that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (supra c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows. 'For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.'

περὶ αὐτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δίκαιόν τινος μὴ ἀποσχημένον τῆς ἀγαθῆς μὴ 5. 7.
μεινέω ἀρχῆς.

Cp. infra vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated.

It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the

state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

5. 7, 8. *προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος . . οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.*

ξένων is partitive: 'The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.' For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

5. 8. *τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν.*

I.e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words *ἐκ δοῦλου*), but strangers or resident aliens.

5. 8. *τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν.*

The MSS. read *αὐτῶν*: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed *αὐτῶν* into *δοτῶν*, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word *δοτῆς* is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to *πολίτης*: and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. 'they make only those of them (*αὐτῶν*) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father's and mother's side.' *αὐτῶν*, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

5. 9. *ὥς εἰ τις ἀτίμητος μεταδόσση.*

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of *ἀτίμητος* = *τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων*. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.

ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικακρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι- 5. 9.
κούντων ἐστίν.

τὸ τοιοῦτον = τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i. e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, 'the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.'

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικούντων, which is taken in the sense of 'fellow-colonists': 'the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.' (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11-13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

κάκιστος.

5. 10.

Sc. ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ὢν. In his later edition Bekker reads *κάκιστος*, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read *κάκιστος*. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. 'Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i. e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.' *κάκιστος* = καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ. : *κάκιστος* = ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.

ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία . . πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων.

6. 1, 2.

Lit. 'The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολίτευμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἡ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly

we say that they differ in their constitutions.' The three words *πολίτευμα*, *πολιτεία*, *πόλις* have three primary gradations of meaning : 1) *πολίτευμα*=the government, i.e. the persons through whom the government acts ; *πολιτεία*=the government administering and being administered, i.e. the state or constitution ; *πόλις*=the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

6. 3. καὶ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς.

μέρος is to be taken with *καὶ ὅσον*, the genitive τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς is partitive. *ἐπιβάλλει*, sc. ἐκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

6. 4. συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔσκεν αὐτοῦ (ὥς γὰρ ἔρεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μέρους), καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μέσον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν.

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A : 'And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.'

6. 5. ὥς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ γλυκύτητος φύσεως : cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 7, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων κ.τ.λ.

6. 8. ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἰς γίγνηται καὶ αὐτός.

αὐτός refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

6. 9. τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν.

The reflexive refers to the principal subject ἀξιοῦντες : but is

changed into the singular by the introduction of *τινά*. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, 'Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.' For the 'disinterestedness' of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

νῦν δέ.

6. 10.

Answering to *πρότερον μὲν* above. 'The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.'

ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατίον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δὲ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ συμ- 7. 2.
φέροντος.

The meaning of *γὰρ* is as follows: 'Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.' For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, *πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ ὕσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἵκεν συσστηαίαν*. And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἡ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἡ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον. 7. 3.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like Plato in the *Cratylus*, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. *σωφροσύνη*, ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φρόνησιν, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; *ἡθικὴ* from *ἔθος*, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; *δικαιοσύνη* διὰ δίκην ἐστίν, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; *μακάριον* ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; *τιμοκρατία* . . ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of *ἀριστοκρατία* is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take *ἀριστοι* in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle's ideal state.

πολιτεία.

7. 3.

In *Ethics* viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with *τιμοκρατία* = ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, a government based upon a property qualification (ἡ τιμοκρατικὴ λέγουσιν οἰκίαν φέσται, πολιτείας δ' αὐτὴν εἰλόθεω οἱ πλείστοι

καλεῖν). No example of the word *τιμοκρατία* occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense—the government of honour (*ἡ φιλόδοτιμος πολιτεία*, Rep. viii. 545 B).

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, *πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτειῶν γὰρ καλοῦσιν)*, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶδη, καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον, ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: also ii. 6. § 16.

8. The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

8. 6. *διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ῥηθείας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς.*

The MSS. have *διαφορᾶς* ('That the already mentioned differences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat unusual sense to *αἰτίας*). The old translator has 'differentiae' in the genitive. Better to take *διαφορᾶς* as a genitive, making *αἰτίας* the predicate, and repeating the word with *ῥηθείας*. 'And thus the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays inserts *πολιτείας* after *ῥηθείας* without authority, and appears to translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the governing body being few or many (*τὰς ῥηθείας αἰτίας*), but by poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and the poor many.

9. 1. *καὶ ἴσους, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις.*

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp. Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honos summis et infimis . . ipsa aequitas iniquissima est.' Burke, French Revol. (vol. v. p. 106, ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to every man.'

τὸ δ' αἶτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις.

9. 2.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

ἐπεὶ . . διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

9. 3.

Lit. 'Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons.' τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον is to be taken not with διήρηται, but with the words which follow=ὁμοίως.

τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

9. 3.

τὴν δέ, sc. ἰσότητα is accusative after ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

οἷς as above τὸ οἷς, the technical word for persons, lit. 'in relation to the whom.' Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. §§ 6, 7.

οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν 9. 5.
μῶν τῇ δόσει τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγνομένων.

Either 1)* τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς is in apposition with τῶν ἑκατὸν μῶν or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may=τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰσενεγκάντων τινά i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burke, Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), 'In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.'

εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.

9. 6.

εἰ δὲ introduces the opposite side of the question. 'If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong' (cp. above, § 5, εἰς δ' ἡ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacoluthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν δοῦλον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῆν ἢ πᾶσι.

9. 6.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῃ μεταδίδωσιν εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.

οἷς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλλους.

9. 6.

Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν.

9. 8. μὴ λόγου χάριν

is either 1)* taken with περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖν εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ὡς ἀληθῶς, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

9. 8. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωμία.

‘For otherwise the state becomes’ or ‘would be.’

9. 8. συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τότῃ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων.

The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. ‘A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at a distance, in place only.’ Or τῶν ἄλλων may be taken with συμμαχιῶν, τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων being epeexegetic=other alliances of which the members live apart.

9. 8. Λυκόφρων δὲ σοφιστής.

An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1–3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Elench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra. Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that ‘the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.’ Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, αὐτὸς δὲ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): ‘The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.’

9. 11. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθουν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος μίγνται χρότῳ τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πῶλε καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπυμαχίας οὕσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μόνον, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀν εἶναι δόξειε πῶλε τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμοιοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χαλεπῶς.

'As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.' The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e. g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χρῆτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει. I. e. 'If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation;' in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

βοηθοῦντες is parallel with κοινοῦντες, and in apposition with the nominative to συνελθόντες.

καὶ διαγωγὰ τοῦ συζῆν.

9. 13.

Nearly = τρόποι τοῦ συζῆν, 'pleasant modes of common life,' or more freely 'enjoyments of society,' not 'relaxations for the sake of society,' a construction not admissible in prose.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίας κ.τ.λ.

10. 1.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of ἀπορίαι which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The ἀπορίαι are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

ῥαγε γὰρ νῆ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως.

10. 1.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία ὅπλων ἐστὶ περὶ ἐρίων ἀδύνατος: cp. Xen. Mem. v. 1. 4, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ Δία τῷδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 3. § 6, πότερουν ὅτι μέγας ταύτας ἢ καὶ νῆ Δι' ὅς ἐρίστας ἡμῶν εἰσπηγούσθαι πολεμειῶν; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not

based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

10. 2. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληφθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1)* 'when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted;' for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) 'when all the citizens are taken together,' but this is a doubtful use of ληφθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the previous argument: 'When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.'

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve,—and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

10. 2. ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἡ γ' ἀρετὴ φθαίρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper ἔργον. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

10. 5. ἂν οὖν ᾗ νόμος μὲν ἀνταρχικός διὰ τὴν δημοκρατικὴν, τί δὲ δύναται περὶ τῶν ἡπορημένων;

'Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the pre-

judices or interests of oligarchy or democracy.' Compare *infra*. c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἀν ἀλήθειαν.

11. 1.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) εἰπορίαν for ἀπορίαν (but the sense which would be given to εἰπορία is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of λύεσθαι or λύεσθαι καί, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of ἀπορίαν, or to be a corruption of ἀλήθειαν. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), ἔχει γάρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. The text may therefore be accepted.

ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς (διαφέρειν) φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα 11. 4.
διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνήχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ
κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τοῦδε μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν,
ἐτέρου δὲ τινος ἕτερον μόριον.

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e. g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. (Cp. *Plat. Rep.* iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (*infra* c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (*Rep.* vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in *Rep.* vi. 498–500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: 'Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (*das Ganze*).'

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—

individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

11. 5. ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἀν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσσει λόγος. καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων;

'Assuredly,' retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, 'this principle cannot be true of all men. For it would be a *reductio ad absurdum* to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.'

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of 'collective wisdom' is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

11. 7. διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἂν τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as *εἰκὸς ἔστιν* or *ἀνάγκη* have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

11. 9. ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἰκανὴν αἴσθησιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between *σύνσις* (= *αἴσθησις* in this passage), which is *κριτικὴ μόνον*, and *φρόνησις*, which is *ἐπιτακτική*. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, *ἡτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα*.

11. 10, 11. Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—'The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term "physician" is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man, whether he be a statesman or

not, is better able to judge than the multitude.' This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word 'artist,' for which Aristotle substitutes 'one who has knowledge' (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the *δημιουργός* and the *ἀρχιτεκτονικός* *ιατρός* cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the *ιδιώτης* *ιατρός* (*ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην*) cp. Politicus 259 A, 'εἴ τίς τις τῶν δημοσιονόντων *ιατρῶν* ἱκανὸς συμβουλεύειν *ιδιωτέων* αὐτός, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ *προσαγορεύεσθαι τοῦνομα τῆς τέχνης ταύτης* ὅπερ *ὁ συμβουλεύει* ;'

Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many. 11.14-17.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, *ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον*) and subject to fits of panic and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, 'whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature' is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares

many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness.

See *infra* at the beginning of c. 12.

11. 18. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλείον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἓνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. *infra* c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

11. 19. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία κ.τ.λ.

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

12. According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I-III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9-11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2, c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism; and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

12. 1. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις κ.τ.λ.

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words ποίων δ' ἰσότης κ.τ.λ. (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then

be as follows: 'Seeing that the end of the state is "justice" which is the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality?'

δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν . . τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις.

12. 1.

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτίον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν.

εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνίμιλλον εἴη καὶ 12. 6. πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλείον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ πλείων ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσούδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρείττον τοσοῦδε, τοσούδε δὴλον ὡς ἴσον.

That is to say, If different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον, 'for if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.'

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

ἔστι τῶν προτέρων . . ἔστι δὲ τούτων.

12. 9.

1) freedom and wealth . . 2) justice and valour.

ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεμβάσεις.

12. 1.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. *infra* §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.

13. 2. ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν.

'The common or inclusive element of the state,' 'an element in which all are concerned'; or, if the phrase be modernized, 'the land is a great public interest.'

The word is here used nearly as in τὸ κοινόν = 'public' or 'common': elsewhere in the sense of 'comprehensive,' 'general,' (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (*supra* ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

13. 5. καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχη χρόνος, πῶς διοριστέον.

'There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.'

13. 6. εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάνπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρόπον;

'How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?' For διελεῖν see ii. 2. § 1: also τίνα τρόπον κινέμενται, iv. 1. § 10.

13. 6. ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσούτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὅσθ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν;

'Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?'

τὸ ὀλίγοι = 'the idea of the few,' like τὸ ὀλίγος *supra* c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὸ ἔργον may be taken either with δεῖ σκοπεῖν, or with τὸ ὀλίγοι.

τοσούτοι is dependent on εἰ, understood from εἰ δυνατοὶ = ἢ δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσούτοι τὸ πλῆθος εἰσὶ.

δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσι τινες, ἐνδέχεται 13. 11, 12. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετήσον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.

Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1)* ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἀποροῦσι . . . πλειόνων in a parenthesis explanatory of τὴν ἀπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν to the words τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., not 'when all the elements co-exist,' but 'when the whole people is better and richer than the few.'

ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν 13. 13. αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων.

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are 'out of all proportion to other men' are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλων αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν Ἀργεῖ.

13. 16.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, φθονομένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτον βίβρω. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word εἶναι is taken to mean 'convey,' 'take on board,' as in Soph. Phil. 901,

ὥστε μή μ' ἄγειν αὐτὴν ἔτι. Stahr translates wrongly: 'Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.'

13. 16. τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλου συμβουλίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasylbulus, but by Thrasylbulus to Periander; and Livy i. 54; also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

'Go thou, and, like an executioner;

Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays

That look too lofty in our commonwealth.'

13. 16. διὰ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλου συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν.

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

13. 18. ὁ δστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν . . τῷ κολοῦειν.

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read τὸ κολοῦειν = 'have the same effect in respect of putting down the chief citizens.'

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether τῷ κολοῦειν, 1) is to be taken after τὴν αὐτὴν (Bernays), or 2)* is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that τῷ κολοῦειν must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

13.18-23. It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if

they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking to the public good, they used ostracism for factious purposes.' Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished because the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice prevailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίων καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων.

18. 19.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51; for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 18. 22.
εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.

1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). τοῦτο δρῶσιν refers to the whole passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to this way of taking the passage that ταῖς πόλεσιν then occurs in two successive lines in different senses.

κατὰ τὰς δημολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς.

18. 22.

The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or government is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a rival out of the way.

ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰδ' ἄρχειν γι τοῦ τοιούτου παραπλήσιον γὰρ εἰς εἰ τοῦ Διὸς 18. 25.
ἄρχειν εἰσοίον, παρὶσσιν τὰς ἀρχάς.

See note on text. 'Nay, more; a man superior to others is like

a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.' The words *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς* may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* 'as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods' according to the old legend, they, i.e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, 'as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.' Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, *ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν*, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, *ὁμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχεω τῶν θεῶν*, and Herod. v. 49, *τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε*: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates *μερίζοντες* 'upon the principle of rotation of offices,' but no such use of *μερίζειν* occurs.

14. 4. κτείνει γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξέδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ.

οὐ κύριος, sc. ὁ βασιλεὺς, supplied from ἡ βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) *ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ* must be explained 'in a certain exercise of the royal office,' i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), 'for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy'; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words *ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes *ἐνεκα δουλίας* for *ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is often translated 'by martial law.' But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word *νόμος* is only pleonastic, and that *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* = *ἐν χειρὶ*, 'hand to hand,' or 'by a sudden blow.'

ὅν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης κ.τ.λ.

14. 5.

Il. ii. 391-393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

πᾶρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

14. 5.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348:—

ὅν δ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθεν νοήσω,

αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μῆτιςσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

ἔχουσι δ' αὖται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννικῇ· εἰσι δ' ὅμως 14. 6.
κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads *τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ*, instead of *τυραννικῇ· εἰσι δ' ὅμως*. So Paris 1, 2, but omitting *καί*: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read *παραπλησίως τυραννικῇν*. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however *ὅμως* seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susemihl reads *τυραννίσιν· εἰσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*

For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 14. 6. 7. §§ 1-4.

καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οἱ 14. 7.
γὰρ πολῖται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοισι τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν.

διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. 'Because the form of government is legal.'

The omission of the article before *ξενικόν* emphasizes the opposition between *οἱ πολῖται* and *ξενικόν*—'their own citizens' are contrasted with 'any mercenary body.'

τὸν κακοπαίδηδα.

14. 10.

Either on analogy of *ἐδωκεν*,* 'the base born,' or possibly 'the injurer of his country,' like *κακόδουλος*, 'the maltreater of his slaves.'

διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλείονος εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ 14. 12.
πώλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσασθαι χώραν, εἰναιστο βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ τούτοις
καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριαι.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7-9, where royalty is said to be based on merit;

and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation : and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

14. 13. *ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.*

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty ; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

15. 2. *ὥστε τὸ σκῆμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν αἰδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἓνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, κατὰ μέρος, not 'by rotation in a fixed order,' (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, 'by a succession of one citizen to another.' It is implied, though not expressed, that they are chosen by vote : cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίον τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἵρεταί.*

Three MSS. read *καθ' αἵρεσιν* instead of *κατὰ μέρος*. It is more likely that *καθ' αἵρεσιν* is a gloss on *κατὰ μέρος*, than the reverse.

15. 2. *τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας.*

'Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,' is to be regarded as a matter of administration. *εἶδος νόμων μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείας* is an abridgment of *εἶδος τοῦ ἐπισκοπεῖν περὶ τῶν νόμων μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτείας*.

εἶδος (like *φύσις* i. 8. § 10, *νόμος* iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, *ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ἐστίν*, 'has the form or character of an instrument.'

15. 2. *ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην.*

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This is a strange notion ; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἀφείσθω, sc. *τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος*.

τὴν πρώτην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of 'to begin with' or 'at once' : so *τὴν τεχίστην*, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs

in Xenophon Mem. iii. 6. § 10, *περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τὴν γὰρ πρώτην ἐπισχέσομεν*: and in Arist. Met. ζ. 12, 1038 a. 35, *τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην*. Aristotle refers to the Lacedaemonian kings again in v. 11. § 2, and to the life generalship, c. 16. § 1, *infra*.

This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in 15. 3 ff. Plato's *Politicus* 293-295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician's art is also introduced. Cp. also *Rhet.* i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον,

15. 4.

sc. ἡμέραν = μετὰ τὴν τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between *τρήμερον* and *τετρήμερον*.

ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλευέσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα 15. 5, 6. καλλίων. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίου ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίου.

αὐτόν, sc. τὸν βουλευόμενον, incorrectly translated in the text 'a king:' better, 'whether you call him king or not' there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίου ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—'although they have no authority when they err,' i. e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle's *Politics* in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words *ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . δεῖ κυρίου* had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words *ἀλλ' ὥς . . . καλλίων* is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν . . . κυρίου.*

15. 7. ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πῶς ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μίας καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὅστισοῦν.

Compare the saying 'that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;' and again, Burke, 'Besides the characters of the individuals that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.'

15. 8. ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermae, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

15. 10. αἰρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὐσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this 'aristocracy of virtue.' In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

ὁμοίους, 'equal in virtue to one another,' an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of ἀριστοκρατία in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, § 11.

15. 12. ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth., viii. 10.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μάλιστος εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾷδιον ἔτι 15. 13.
γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

Here as elsewhere iv. 6. § 5, he accepts democracy not as a good but as a necessity, which arises as soon as wealth begins to flow and tradesmen 'circulate' in the agora, vi. 4. § 13; and the numbers of the people become disproportioned to the numbers of the governing class.

ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ἣ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. 15. 15.

Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. that 'there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.' Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, 'there is no difference between a king and a free state because' &c.

διδόναι τοσοῦτους. 15. 16.

Either 1)* with emphasis 'so many and no more'; or better 2) with reference to the previous words εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλαιόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλεόνους ἥττω, 'so many as would not make him dangerous.'

Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of ἀπορίαι; as in c. 16. 15, Aristotle states, 'without clearly distinguishing, them.

Yet the στρατηγὸς αἰδιός, who in time of peace is deprived of 16. 1. functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with ὁ κατὰ νόμον βασιλεύς.

περὶ Ὀπούντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος (sc. τῆς διοικήσεως) ἔλαττον (sc. τῆς 16. 1. Ἐπιδάμνου).

'With a somewhat more limited power than at Epidamnus.'

δοκῇ δὲ τισιν. 16. 2.

Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or δὲ after δοκῇ may mark the apodosis.

διότι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἀρχεσθαι δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ μέρος τοῖνον 16. 3. ὥσπερ τούτοις. τοῦτο δ' ἔβη νόμος.

καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ μέρος = καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ μέρος ἄρχειν ὥσπερ τούτοις δίκαιον.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the παρβασιλεία,

asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government ; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled : and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. 'And here law steps in ; for the order of their rule is determined by law.'

16. 4, 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπαγορεύσθαι δίδωσιν, ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. 'But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them.' τὰ λοιπά, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

16. 5. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὃ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον.

This is a reflection on the *παμβασιλεύς*. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason : in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τὸν νοῦν (instead of τὸν νόμον), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, and Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τὸν νόμον in the beginning of the clause and read τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νοῦν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεόν.

16. 8. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὃ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον.

'And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.'

ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὸ 16. 9.
 ἔθῃ εἰσίν, ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὼν ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ'
 οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.

The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεύνται καὶ ὅσοι ἀγραφοὶ ὄντες αἰσχύνῃν ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἀγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

16. 9.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατὰ τὸ πλεονεξεῖν εἶναι τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἀρχοντας.

In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of 16. 9-13. the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

εἰ τοῖτους οἶται δὲ ἀρχὴν τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἀρχὴν οἶται δὲ ὁμοίους. 16. 13.

Even in the *παμβασιλείᾳ* there is an element of equality. *ὁμοίους* either 1) 'equally with himself'; or 2) with a slight play of words 'after the manner of equals.'

εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά.

17. 2.

To be taken after *ἀμείνω* 'better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the

virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

17. 4. ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε [καὶ ἐν] ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν.

The reading of Bekker, καὶ ἐν, which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of πέφυκεν. If they are retained the meaning will be 'in which there is likewise a single' or 'compact body, defined by their all carrying arms' (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.

17. 4. κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμονται τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.

The citizens of a polity are here called εὐποροι, 'respectable' or 'upper class,' though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are 'the hoplites' (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called εὐποροι (vi. 7. § 1). τοῖς εὐπόροις is found in the better MSS.: *al. ἀπόροις*.

17. 6. οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν.

'He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.'

17. 7. ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν.

'This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.' The double meaning of μέρος is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. τοῦτο = τὸ εἶναι πᾶν.

18. 1. ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων.

Bekker's insertion of καὶ ἀρχειν after ἀρχεσθαι (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some, of command in others.

18. 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις εἰδείσθαι λόγους εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολλοῦ τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης.

The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—

1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).

2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).

3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).

4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).

5) And still a 'grain of a scruple may be made'; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.

6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. 18. 2.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

BOOK IV.

1. 2-6. The statesman has four problems to consider,
- 1) What is the best or ideal state?
 - 2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
 - 3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
 - 4) What is the best state for average men?
- 1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances; 3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

1. 2. *ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύνανται.*

The MSS. vary between *ἐστὶ* and *ἐστὶν*: *ἐστὶ* has rather the greater MSS. authority, but *ἐστὶν* is required for the construction, and the recurrence of *ἐστὶ* which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is displeasing.

1. 4. *ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων.*

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, *‘not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,’ but the words ‘for the best state,’ are not found in the Greek. Better ‘not possessing the common necessities or simple requisites of life,’ a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cp. c. 11. § 21, *πολλὰς οὐσας ἄλλης πολιτείας ἀρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οἶθ’ ἐκλύσει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν*, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For *ἀχορήγητον*, cp. *ἀχορηγημένη* in § 1, and *δεομένη πολλῆς χορηγίας* in § 6.

τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιρούντες πολιτείας τὴν Λακωνικὴν . . . ἐπαινοῦσιν. L 6.

Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an 'existing' constitution), the meaning is plain. 'They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.'

χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγείσθαι τάξιν ἣν ῥηδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ L 7.
πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ
ἐπαγορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμαν-
θάνειν τοῦ μαθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

'The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.'

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν (sc. πολιτειῶν) may be taken either with τάξιν or with κοινωνεῖν, either we ought to introduce 1) 'from among existing constitutions'; or 2) 'in passing out of existing constitutions that form,' &c.; cp. in next sentence ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν.

κοινωνεῖν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have κινεῖν. The emendation κίχεῖν [Susemihl], taken from 'consequi' in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; κινεῖν is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον κ.τ.λ. The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

Διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημίοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι L 7.
βοηθεῖν.

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i. e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to

be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

1. 7. *καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.*

There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

1. 8. *νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἶονται τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν oligarchían.*

This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, *ἔσοι μὲν οἶονται κ.τ.λ.*, and c. 2. § 3 *infra*.

1. 8. *συντίθενται ποσάχως.*

That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another: for the latter cp. *infra* c. 5. §§ 3, 4; c. 9. §§ 4-9.

1. 10. *καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.*

'And what is the end of each individual form of society?' i.e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).

ἐκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.

κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.

1. 10. *νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλοῦντων τὴν πολιτείαν.*

Either 1)* the words *τῶν δηλοῦντων* are governed by *κεχωρισμένοι*, 'are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution'; i.e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions; but see *infra* § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive: 'Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.'

1. 11. *τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις.*

Either 1), 'we must know the differences of states (sc. *πολιτειῶν*) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation; or 2)*, referring *τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης* only to *διαφορὰς*, and supplying *πολιτειῶν* with *ἀριθμὸν*, 'the difference of each state and the number of states; or 3), *τὸν ἀριθμὸν* means 'the order of classification' (Susemihl; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt)

states are said to be 'posterior' to the good states). This gives a good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.

ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ.

2. 1.

Cp. *infra* c. 8. § 1, where the words ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν refer to iii. c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης 2. 1. πολιτείας θεωρήσῃσι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων).

He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless, as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows: c. 3. § 4, ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν, κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιούτων ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, a passage which is supposed to refer to vii. i. e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books (Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be different; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14-18, where Aristotle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good, is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in some former part of the work also occurs *infra* c. 7. § 2, ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς δεῖλεσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.

βούλεται γὰρ ἑκάτερα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνιστάναι καὶ χορηγούμενα.

2. 1.

'For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a principle of virtue, provided with external means.'

πότε δὲ βασιλείαν νομίζω.

2. 1.

Not 'when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,' for there is no question about this, but νομίζω is taken in the other sense of 'having,' 'using,' 'having as an institution,' like *utor* in Latin. For this use of the word cp. νομίζω ἐκκλησίαν, iii. 1. § 10; and for the matter cp. iii. 17. §§ 4-8.

2. 2. τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὔσαν, ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος, ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὔσαν πλείστον ἀπέχει πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ἀλγερχίαν (ἢ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας).

Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the pre-eminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is overmastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

πολιτείας. We might expect αὐτῆς, or τῆς ἀρίστης to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general πολιτεία here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare infra c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μίαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡμιστά ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῶν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας: also for the general meaning, Plat. Polit. 301 D, Rep. ix. 576 D, etc.

In the phrase ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας the word refers to ἀλγερχίαν.

2. 3. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφίνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως.

The difference between Plato (Polit. 303) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. Cp. vi. 4. § 1, δημοκρατίων οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη ἢ πρώτη τάξει.

καὶ τῶν πρότερον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle.

2. 4-6. The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity, tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

3. 1. The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6-8.

ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ κατ' 3. 4.
ἀρετὴν, κἀν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πῶς εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the *ὑποθέσεις* or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν.

3. 5.

'As the parts of states differ from one another (*σφῶν αὐτῶν*), so must states differ from one another.' Compare the curious comparison *infra* c. 4. §§ 8, 9.

πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἡ 3. 5.
κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινῇ, λέγω
ὅ' ὅλον τῶν ἀπύρων ἢ τῶν εὐπύρων, ἢ κοινῇ τιν' ἀμφοῖν.

The last words, *κοινῇ τιν' ἀμφοῖν*, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with *δύναμιν*, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: *cp. infra* c. 4. § 2. The words *ὅλον τῶν ἀπύρων ἢ τῶν εὐπύρων* may be an explanation of *κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων*, which comes in out of place, and ἢ *κοινῇ τιν' ἀμφοῖν*, as in the English text, may be an explanation of *ἰσότητα κοινῇ*.

κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινῇ, 'More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;' as e.g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty

in the words *ἡ κοινὴ τῶν ἀμφοῖν*, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

3. 7. For the winds compare *Meteorologica* ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato's *Laws* iii. 693 C : according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

3. 8. *ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς διειλομεν, δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς οὕσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὐ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.*

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence, and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him : ' There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, *δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς* (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.' From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion ; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

4. 4. *ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπία φασὶ τυγεῖν.*

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind : and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

4. 5. *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μέρη καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ἀλιγαρχίας εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ.*

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor fewness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy : neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8 ; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise

it (cp. G. C. Lewis' 'Political Terms,' Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly 'that there is more in actual sovereignty than force' (Early Institutions, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the *quality* than on the *quantity* of the sovereign power.

τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδοῦς.

4. 5.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31. 526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους 4. 7.
τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγουμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην
πρότερον· ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πᾶσι.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3. § 4). His reason for returning to them is that he is going to make a new sub-division of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων. As he says, infra § 20, Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολι-
τεῖαι πλείους καὶ διὰ τίνες αἰτίαι εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅτι ὃ ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρα-
τίας εἶδη πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας λέγουμεν. Compare Book vii. 8. § 9.

The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. 4. 8.
Suppose the different kinds of teeth were *a*, *a'*, *a''*, *a'''*, etc., the different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were *b*, *b'*, *b''*, *b'''*, *c*, *c'*, *c''*, *c'''*, and so on with the other organs which are important in determining the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the different combinations of these will give the different species. Thus:—

a', *b*, *c''*, will be one species,

a, *b'*, *c''*, another and so on.

So with constitutions:—

If we combine γερουσίαι, having some political power and coming occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised βέουσαι, and a politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or

very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργοί, βάνανσοι, θῆτες with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

4. 9-17. The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato's enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). 'Then at any rate there must be soldiers' (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premisses. At this point the writer looses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τὸ προπολεμῆσον in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7-9.

4. 11-14. διότι ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (Rep. ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is *παιδαριώδης λίσαν*. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word ἀνεγκέλη of which Aristotle

here takes advantage. Plato means by the ἀναγκαιότατη πόλις, 'the barest idea of a state' or 'the state in its lowest terms.' But when Aristotle says judges are 'more necessary' than the providers of the means of life, he means 'contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.' The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the 'soul' and 'body' of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the μέρη of the πόλις and the *mere* conditions (ὡν οὐκ ἄνευ) of it. 'Husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.'

ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ.

4. 11.

Here evidently the title of the book.

ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

4. 12.

Equally with τὸ καλόν.

ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον.

4. 14.

ὅπερ grammatically refers to τὸ βουλευέσθαι, suggested by τὸ βουλευόμενον.

ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα.

4. 15.

ταῦτα=τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, gathered from τὰ τοιαῦτα in § 14.

ἐκεῖνα=τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντείνοντα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts: Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν,

4. 16.

sc. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

πολλοῖς.

4. 18.

1) 'To many' or 'in many cases' opposed to πάντες in what follows; or 2*) πολλοῖς may be taken with δοκῇ, the meaning being 'many (differing from Plato) think, etc.'; the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.

4. 18. ἀντιποιούνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—‘Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.’

4. 20. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον
is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὰ τίνος αἰτίας for δι’ ἣν αἰτίας) of the first words of § 7.

4. 20. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

4. 21. κἂν εἴ τι τοιούτων ἐτέρου πλήθους εἶδος.

Usemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause=‘and the like.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ’ αἰσθῆσαι αἱ δ’ ἐθισμῶ τινι καὶ ἄλλαι δ’ ἄλλως, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

4. 22. τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων.

Sc. εἶδη, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of εἶδη.

4. 22. τὰ τοιούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν.

τοιούτοις, dative after τὴν αὐτὴν, and refers to πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, κ.τ.λ. Lit. ‘the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,’ or ‘similar differences having a relation to these,’ e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

4. 22. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους.

If the reading ὑπάρχειν is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηδὲν μᾶλλον which must be taken closely with it, ‘that the poor shall be no more’—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—‘than the rich’; or ‘shall have no priority,’ which gives a rather curious sense to ὑπάρχειν. A doubt about the propriety of

the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) *ὑπερέχειν* (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P¹, P⁴; and Aretino's transl. 2) *ἄρχειν* an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation 'nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus' seems to favour *ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς ἐπύροις*.

δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην.

4. 23.

ταύτην is slightly inaccurate = 'the state in which this occurs.'

ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.

4. 24.

Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 *ἄλλο δὲ* seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

*ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἀν- 4. 24.
υπεύθυναι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι
μετέχουσιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰάν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.*

The words *ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυναι* agree with *τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος*, as the *εἰάν ἢ πολίτης* does with the *ὅσοι ἀν ἐλευθέροι ὄντι* in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word *ἀνυπεύθυναι* is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, *ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος*) to be, 'not proved to be disqualified by birth.'

**Ὁμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ 4. 27.
ὅταν πλείους ᾖσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος, ἀδελφον.*

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a

poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

4. 31. τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνουν.

For use of gen: after κρίνουν cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws i. 646 D, τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτεία here=πολίτευμα) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with αἱ ἀρχαί, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

5. 1. ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences τῶν ἐχόντων τιμήματα τηλικαῦτα ὥστε κ.τ.λ. or τῶν ἐχόντων μακρὰ τιμήματα.

In what follows the *dynastia* is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

5. 2. For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

5. 4. τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἀλλήλων.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

6. 3. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κταμένοις ἔστι μετέχειν.

Omitted by Π³ (i. e. the MSS. of the second family except P³) and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that

account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην αἵρεσιν.

6. 3.

'The principle of election which follows next in order' (cp. c. 4. § 24, ἕτερον εἶδος). This use of the word ἐχομένη is supported by iii. 11. § 15, ἀλλ' ὅ ἐστιν (ἀπορία) ἐχομένη ταύτης, and vi. 8. § 4, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεργος, and several other passages. The other interpretation of ἐχομένη, given in a note to the English text, 'proper to it' is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσδοτον.

6. 4.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλείους.

6. 5.

Either 1*) 'on account of the preponderance of their numbers,' or 2) more definitely 'on account of the preponderance of the multitude'; (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

καὶ διὰ τὸ πλεῖθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς 6. 8. ἀποτρέψουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. infra § 9.

μήθ' οὕτως ἀλίην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον 6. 8. δεῖν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν.

'When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (αὐτοῖς) the rule of law.'

6. 9. *πλείω δέ,
sc. οὐσίαν ἔχοντες.*

6. 9. *τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον.*
Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

6. 10. *εἰάν δ' ἐπιτείνωσι.*
'But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.'

7. 1. *ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.*

Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idiomatic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus (302) seven.

7. 2. *ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν.*

The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already referred in iv. 2. § 1: the particle γὰρ seems to imply that he had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation of the good ruler to the good man.

7. *καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταί.*

According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the government of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with constitutional government.

7. 4. *καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιούμεναις κοινῇ ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἶσιν ὅμοιαι τινὲς οὐδ' αἰδοῦντο καὶ δοκῶντες εἶναι ἐπικρατεῖς.*

Cp. Plat. Laws xii. 951.: 'There are always in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.'

οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι . . οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων.

7. 4.

Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (τὸ πιστόν τῆς πολιτείας, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ 7. 4. δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, followed by δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, instead of δήμου τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο 7. 5. εἶδη· καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ῥέπουσι πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (πολιτεία) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ ὁδῶν οὐτε ταύτην παρίκταν οὐτε τὰς ἄρας 8. 1. ῥηθείας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διαμαρτάνουσι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὐταὶ παρεκβάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν εἶπομεν.

αὐταὶ refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβεβηκυῶν ὅς διαμαρτηκυῶν πολιτειῶν, and this to the singular παρίκταν.

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν εἶπομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.

8. 2.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'

8. 3. διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις.
Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. *infra* § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For *εὐγένεια*, see *Rhet.* i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

8. 5. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην.

The words *πονηροκρατουμένην* (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must 1) supply *εὐνομεῖσθαι* from τὸ μὴ *εὐνομεῖσθαι*, 'A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.' 2) We may alter the order of words by placing *μὴ* before *ἀριστοκρατουμένην*, instead of before *εὐνομεῖσθαι* (Thurot, Susem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert *μὴ* before *πονηροκρατουμένην*. Or 4) alter *πονηροκρατουμένην* into *πονηροκρατεῖσθαι*, answering to *εὐνομεῖσθαι*.

8. 6. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν . . . τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. *Thuc.* iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξη πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις.

8. 6. τοῦτο δ' ἐνδέχεται διχῶς κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τὸ καλῶς κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμμένουσιν, the clause ἔστι γὰρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

8. 6. ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ἔστι πείθεσθαι.

8. 8. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται.

Sc. *πολιτεία*. Preserving the play of words and supplying *πολιτεία* with *καλεῖται* from τῆς *πολιτείας*, we may translate, 'in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.' But are there 'many' such governments? Cp. *supra* c. 7. § 1; *infra* c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see *Essay on the μέση πολιτεία*, &c.

8. 8. μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις.

'It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom

of the poor and the wealth of the rich; *λευθερίας* answering to *ἀπόρων* as *πλούτου* to *εὐπόρων*.

As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems *Θ. 1-4*. to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. *supra* note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his mind a syncretism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

σύμβολον.

Θ. 1.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, *οἱ ἐπιγενοῦμενοι, ἀστραγάλον κατατέμνοντες, θάτερον μὲν αὐτοὶ κατεῖχον μέρος, θάτερον δὲ κατελίμπανον τοῖς ὑποδεξαμένοις ἵνα εἰ δόσι πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐπιγενοῦσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπαγόμενοι τὸ ἡμῶν ἀστραγάλιον, ἀνταποῦντο τὴν ξενίαν*: and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, *ἀνθρώπου ξύμβολον ἄτε τετμημένοι . . ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο*.

ἢ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτίον ἐν ἑκάτεραι νομοθετοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.

Θ. 2.

'For either they must take the legislation of both.' These words are resumed in *εἰς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος* and followed by *ἕτερος δι* instead of repeating *ἢ*.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν ἡμερῶν.

Θ. 6.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, *ἐπιδεικνύσονται οἱ ἄριστοι τῆς πόλεως χάριαι*.

9. 9. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἰροῦνται, τῆς δ' ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν.

I.e. 'The people choose the elders, but are not eligible themselves; and they share in the Ephoralty.' Whether they elected the Ephors is nowhere expressly said. We are only told that the mode of election was extremely childish (ii. 9. § 23).

10. 1. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος.

Tyranny is and is not a form of polity, in the sense in which the word 'polity' is used by Aristotle. Cp. c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι μείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.

10. 1. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν.

Either 'royalty* commonly so called,' or 'the most truly called royalty,' which would seem to be the παμβασιλεία. Cp. iii. c. 16.

10. 1. τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς.

Two slightly different senses are here combined in δεῖ, 1) 'what we ought to establish,' and 2), incorrectly, 'how or by what means we may or must establish it.'

10. 2. τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διελομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπισκοποῦμεν.

Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6-10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnētia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnētes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

10. 2. διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πρὸς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.

Not 'because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty;' for the words 'change into one another' would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but 'because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;' likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of ἐπαλλάττειν, cp. vi. 1. § 3, and i. 6. § 3.

10. 4. τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημέτους αἰτίας.

εἰρημέτους, sc. in the previous sentences. 'There is more than

one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.'

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution 11. to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστος ἐνδεχομένης 11. 3. τυχεῖν μεσότητος.

The gen. μεσότητος is a resumption of μέσον, and depends on βίον. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν.

11. 5.

ἀμφοτέρω, sc. either 1) *'their rogueries and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,' or 2) simply 'their dislike both of civil and military duties.' It is possible also that ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω may refer to the μεγαλοπρόηροι and μικροπρόηροι, in which case the words ἔτι . . . ἄρχουσι are either inserted or misplaced.

The φύλαρχοι at Athens were the cavalry officers under the ἑπάρχοι. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. βουλευαρχεῖν literally = 'to be a chief of the senate.' The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. φιλαρχοῦσι, translates by an obvious mistake, 'minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.' For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon's law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), τῶν δ' ἄλλων αὐτοῦ νόμον ἴδουσιν μάλιστα καὶ παράδοξος ἐ καλεῖται εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηδετέρας μερίδος γινόμενον: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπρέγμενα ἀλλ' ἀρχεῖον νομίζομεν.

οἱ δὲ καθ' ἑκαστὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπεινοὶ γίνονται.

11. 6.

τούτων, sc. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

ἀρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ.

11. 7.

Dative of the manner; 'to be ruled in any fashion.'

11. 8. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ἡν φαιέν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

'So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural components of it, will of necessity be best administered.' ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐξ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων . . . ἐξ ἡν κ.τ.λ.

11. 9. πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα.

'Many things are best to those who are in the mean;' or as we might say in modern phraseology, 'The middle class have many advantages.' Cp. Eur. Suppl. 238-245:—

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν δλβιοι
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλείονων τ' ἐρῶσ' αἰε'
οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμαντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλείον μέρος,
εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιάσιν κακά,
γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστάτῶν φηλούμενοι·
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σάζει πόλις,
κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὅτιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις.

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

11. 15. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3:

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,
ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμενόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλούτον.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

11. 15. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεὺς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, οὗν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔχειν συγγένητα τὸν Λυκούργον, ὃς οὐτε βασιλεὺς ἦν, οὐτ' ἄρχων, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλείῳ ἐπιχειρῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις προῆλθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν ὥστε δεισάτω τὸν βασιλέα Χαρίλαον ἐπὶ βωμῷ καταφυγεῖν. Yet Plutarch

is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

"Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' 11.18, 19. αὐτοῖς ἑκάτεροι πολιτείας ἀποβλέποντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίστασαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ὥστε διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed to ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι the states of Hellas generally.

εἰς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεκτίσθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον [ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων] 11. 19. ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν.

The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1-6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, *δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἴδμεν τόσον κρείττος ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖ*). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρότερον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If 'one man' only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, *διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλὰς γίνεσθαι λαοθάλας*. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, 'the leading men.' For ἐπὶ cp. οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι. (Dem.) But are not the words a copyist's repetition of τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων above?

ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν. Not necessarily 'to restore' or 'give back' but more simply 'to give what is suitable, assign,' like [οἱ εἰκονογράφοι] ἀποδίδοντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφήν, Poet. 15, 1454 b. 10.

11. 20. τίς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν.

Here, as limited in § 1, ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείσταυς πόλεσι,

διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, i. e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp. v. 1. § 16 where it is implied that the safety of democracy is due to its approximation to the μέση πολιτεία.

11. 21. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὕσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύσει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in itself] and some other better suited to the peculiar circumstances of some state.'

πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given constitution, which may not be the best possible under the circumstances, but is the one to be preferred, in some states of society.

12. 2. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιῶν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις.

'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the clause ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ. is explanatory of ἑτέρῳ μέρει = ἑτέρῳ τῶν μερῶν.

12. 3. ὅπου ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημίνην ἀναλογίαν.

'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion implied in the last words.'

12. 3. καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους.

'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each sort of oligarchy varies according to the predominance of each sort of oligarchical population (sc. ὃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ).

12. 5. πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διατηγῆς, διατηγῆς δ' ὁ μέσος.

The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of oligarchy and democracy. When Aristotle calls the arbiter ὁ μέσος, this is probably meant in the same sense in which δικαιοσύνη is said to be a mean because it fixes a mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 17, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρύτερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσος ἐστίν, and v. 4. § 7, Διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν,

ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν *λίται λίται* ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὃ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι ὅσον δίκαιον ἔμφυχον· καὶ ζητοῖσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνοι μεσιδίους, ὥς, εἰν τοῦ μέσου τύχῳσι, τοῦ δίκαιου τευζόμενοι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὶ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθεῖς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ 12. 6.
γὰρ πλεονεξία τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.

Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies: the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answer- 13.
ing, whether all these artifices (*σοφίσματα*) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. *infra* p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14-18.

τοῖς μὲν μεγάλῳ, τοῖς δὲ μικρῷ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρόνδου νόμοις. 13. 2.

Yet the penalty must have been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

θέλωσι γὰρ οἱ πάντες καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἰσχυρίαν ἔχειν, εἰν 13. 8.
μὴ ἐβρίξῃ τις αὐτοὺς μέγα ἀφαιρήται μὲν τῆς οὐσίας.

The connexion is as follows: 'The qualification must be such

as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

13. 9. *ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἦν ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.*

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (*ἦν*) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

13. 10. *ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύσιν εἶναι τὴν ἰσχύν.*

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

13. 11. *ὅς γ' οὖν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας.*

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

13. 11. *κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.*

1*) Some word like *ἀσθενείας* has to be supplied from *ὀλίγοι ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος* before *κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν*; or 2) *κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν* may be taken after *ὑπέμενον*, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

14. 1. *Πᾶσι δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἐκάστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν.*

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14-16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.

A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων (sc. μορίων) ἓν μὲν τι τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ 14. 2. τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς (τούτο δ' ἔστιν ὃς δεῖ καὶ τίνας εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποῖαν τιὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τι τὸ δικάζον.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over individuals; see infra § 3): 2) the administrative or executive: 3) the judicial. The words *τούτο δ' ἔστιν* seem to refer back to *δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην*. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with *ἐν* and with *τρίτον*.

Nothing more is known about Telecles. From the manner in 14. 4. which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather than a legislator. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Τηλεκλέους* is said like *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

ἔως ἂν διέλθῃ.

14. 4.

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be supplied, e. g. *ἡ ἀρχὴ* from *τὰς ἀρχάς*. The same phrase occurs infra c. 15. § 17.

συνίεναι δὲ μέντοι

14. 4.

is governed by *εἰς μὲν τρόπος* above.

ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

14. 6.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22-24; c. 6. §§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences. There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies. First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indistinguishable, lastly the most extreme.

14. 6. τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἰρετὰς οὐσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται· τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν ὅσας ἀρχῶν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους.

The words *ὅσας ἐνδέχεται* can only mean 'as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.' The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δεόνται καὶ τέχνης. Susemihl has introduced *κληρωτὰς οὐκ* before *ἐνδέχεται* = *ὅσας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κληρωτὰς εἶναι*· τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν referring to *αἰρετὰς*. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

14. 8. fin. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευέσθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἰρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἀρχῶσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν.

Opposed to the milder πολιτικὴ ὀλιγαρχία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i. e. 'not all [who possess the required qualification].' Yet these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

14. 8-10. Compare for several verbal resemblances, supra c. 5.

14. 10. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἰρετοὶ ἢ κληρωτοί.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

14. 10. ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἢ πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

14. 11. διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἐκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημέον διορισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν εἰρημέον διορισμόν, i. e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which

the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

δοικεῖ has been changed into *διοίσει* and *δοικεῖται*, for which latter there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads *disponitur*. But no change is needed. For use of *δοικεῖν*, cp. v. 10. § 36.

συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατία τῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούση δημοκρατία νῦν κ.τ.λ. 14. 12.

Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question: but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους.

14. 13.

I.e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

αἰροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί.

15. 3.

'Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are *ἐκτὸν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς*.'

οἷον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων,

15. 3.

sc. *ἐπιμελείται* implied in *ἐπιμελείων*.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπὴν οὐ γάρ πο 15. 4.
κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούμετων περὶ τοῦ δόματος. ἔχει δὲ τι' ἄλλην διανοη-
τικὴν πραγμασίαν.

'Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them.' *ἄλλαν* is redundant.

ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἀπορήσει.

15. 5.

I.e. rather than dispute about the name.

15. 6. βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἢ πολυπραγματούσης.

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 370 B ff.

15. 9. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ' οἷον ἓνα τῆς εἰκοσμίας, ἢ παῖδων ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence : cp. infra § 13, παιδοκόμος καὶ γυναικονόμος : and vi. 8. § 22, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν . . . γυναικονομία . . . παιδονομία κ.τ.λ.

15. 10. ἔτεροι ἐν ἑτέροις, οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.

'Differing,' i. e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word ἔτεροι is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of ἑτέρων, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

15. 10. πότερον διαφέρει . . . ἢ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οὖσαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταί.

The alternative πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. is repeated and expanded. 'Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?'

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for τῶν ἀρχῶν is taken with τινές : and with κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς has to be supplied τῶν πολιτειῶν from κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας supra. We may also supply πολιτεῖαι with τινές, and translate 'may not some states essentially derive their character from offices.' But the abrupt transition to a new subject (ἀρχαί)

in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (2nd Edit.) after Victorius reads *διαφοραὶ* for *τὰς διαφοράς*.

οἷον ἡ τῶν προβούλων αὐτῇ γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατική.

15. 11.

πρόβουλοι, as he says vi. 8. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution ; supra c. 14. § 14.

εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ κ.τ.λ.

15.14-18.

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme :—

οἱ τρεῖς ὅροι.

i. *τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς.*

ii. *ἐκ τίνων.*

iii. *τίνα τρόπον.*

- a) ἡ πάντες.
- β) ἡ τινὲς.
- γ) ἡ τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς.

- a) ἡ ἐκ πάντων.
- β) ἡ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφορισμένων.
- γ) ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων, τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν.

- a) ἡ αἰρέσει.
- β) ἡ κλήρῳ.
- γ) ἡ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει, τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραὶ.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραὶ.

αἱ τρεῖς διαφοραὶ.

οἱ δώδεκα τρόποι.

- 1. πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει.
- 2. πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ.
- 3. πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει.
- 4. πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ.

- A. τινὲς ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει.
- B. τινὲς ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ.
- C. τινὲς ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει.
- D. τινὲς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ.

- a. τὰς μὲν ἀρχάς πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει.
- β. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ.
- γ. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει.
- δ. τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ.

οἱ δύο συνδυασμοί.

τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ.
τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων.

τὰ δὲ αἰρέσει.
τὰ δὲ ἐκ τινῶν.

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot ; or by vote and by lot.

The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties :

All elect	by vote out of all,
	by lot out of all,
	by vote out of some,
	by lot out of some ;
Some elect	by vote out of all,
	by lot out of all,
	by vote out of some,
	by lot out of some ;
All and some elect	by vote out of all,
	by lot out of all,
	by vote out of some,
	by lot out of some ;

and to the two further combinations (of δύο συνδυασμοί): partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a 'bazaar of constitutions' (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

15. 15. *ὡς περ ἐν Μεγάρῳ.*

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5, 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year a.c. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.

τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο κ.τ.λ.

15. 19.

The vote is considered less democratical than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (*ἄμα*, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of 'some out of some' and 'some out of all' are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is 'some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,' the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

γίνεσθαι.

15. 19.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense=*καθίστασθαι*, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

διεγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

15. 20.

ἐξ ἀμφοῖν seems naturally to mean *τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τινῶν*, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election 'out of all and out of some' should be 'more oligarchical' than the election out of some. Another way of taking the words is to explain *ἐξ ἀμφοῖν* as a double election. But in this passage *ἐξ* is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore *ἐξ ἀμφοῖν* could not=*ἀμφοῖν*. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. *τὸ ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν* is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of 'some out of some' is maintained, the election in both ways, i.e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons

...elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

15. 21. *μη γινόμενον ὁμοίως,*
sc. δλιγαρχικόν. These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr): that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. *μη* must be taken with *γινόμενον*.

15. 21. *τινὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφοῶν.*
 'In both ways,' *sc. κλήρῳ καὶ αἰρέσει.*

15. 22. *τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρεῖ καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν τίνες εἰσὶν, ἔσται φανερόν.*

Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit* *καὶ* before *τίνες*, thus referring *τίνες εἰσὶν* to *δυνάμεις*. If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain *καὶ* before *τίνες εἰσὶν*, the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i.e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

16. 3. *τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον.*

Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28. § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piræus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed; probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his

native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις.

This sentence appears to be out of place; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17-22.

οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες.

16. 5, 6.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people: for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the

laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that 'Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people' (ii. 12. § 2).

BOOK V.

The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of l. 1. the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαί τινες καὶ κοινὴ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων l. 1.
 ἂν μέλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐκάστη.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws over-subtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written *σωτηρίαί τινες* and *διὰ τίνων ἂν σώζοιτο*, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν.

l. 2.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after *ὑπολαβεῖν*, 1) 'We must in the first place begin by conceiving' or 2)* 'we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.'

τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

l. 2.

In Bekker's and edition *καὶ* is altered to *εἰς* without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The *καὶ* here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of *id est*. Cp. Nic. Eth. l. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ κατ' αἰνὸν καὶ ἡ εἰσὶν ἀπρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὰ δαίμονα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά where τὰ δαίμονα = τὰ μαθηματικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this

passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

1. 4. οἱ δ' ὡς ἄνιστοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσι· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνιστον.

The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτεῖν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v.

2. § 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον ἅπαν ἄνιστον, τὸ δὲ ἄνιστον οὐ πᾶν πλεον.

1. 5. ἡμαρτημένοι δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ.

Spengel reads ἡμαρτηκῆναι δὲ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: 'They are perversions, when regarded simply,' i.e. 'by an absolute standard of justice'; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy, or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

1. 8. Διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς.

The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading *δικαίως* shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1)* the particle διὸ is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word διχῶς referring to what follows: 'Hence arise changes; and in two ways.' Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Con-

ring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle's Politics to infer a 'lacuna' between the words *στάσεων εἶναι* and *ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν* from the want of connexion.

ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονί φασί Λύσανδρον τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλύσαι τῇ 1. 10.
Βασιλείαν.

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24-26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidae, of which he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to all the Spartans.

Πανσωσίαν τὸν βασιλέα.

L. 10.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 182, *ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμῇ τυχόντα* (Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιὸς ὢν ἐπετρόπευσεν). The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ. δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μέρος· ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν 1. 10, 11.
*φυλάρχων βουλήν ἐποίησαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἡλιαίαν ἐκτάραγξίς ἐστι· ἔτι τῶν
 ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζουσιν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐπιτηφίζηται ἀρχή τις.
 Διγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχὸς ὁ εἰς ἣν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ.*

The revolution at Epidamnus was only partial. The change of *φυλάρχων* into a *βουλὴ* made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8. § 17, *καλεῖται δὲ [τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας] ἕρθε μὲν πρόβουλοι . . . ὅπου δὲ πλεονέχῃ ἐστὶ βουλὴ πολλὰν.* But according to an ancient custom in the governing body the magistrates (*τὰς ἀρχάς* = *τοὺς ἀρχοντας*) were required to go to the Heliaea at every election—this relic of oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit was indicated in the appointment of 'the single magistrate' (cp. iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting *τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* with *εἰς τὴν Ἡλιαίαν* instead of with *τὰς ἀρχάς*. 'It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote re-

quiring it.' Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (Dorians, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of *Ἡλιαία* simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ is doubtful. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. Either 1)* the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6. § 11; iv. 6. § 9 and v. 4. § 2. Compare also iii. 7. § 2, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει τῶν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, and infra v. 8. § 5, τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, which show that the two meanings of πολίτευμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word 'government' or 'state,' pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

ὁ ἄρχων δ' εἰς ἑν. ἑν is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, (πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον) where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamnus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamnus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

1. 11. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἢ στάσις· οὐ μὴν τοῖς ἀνίστοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον αἰτίας γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾗ ἐν ἴσοις ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον (ἡτοῦντες στασιάζουσιν).

οὐ μὴν . . . ἴσοις is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἄνισον.

1) 'Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.' According to this way of taking the passage ἀνάλογον is the nom. to ὑπάρχει.

2) Others supply τὸ ἄνισον from the preceding sentence (sc. ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον). '*I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.'

This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἀνάλογον with τοῖς ἀνίστοις. 'Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.' According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

1. 13. The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after τὸ κατ'

ἀξίαν, in his 2nd Edition (see note on Text) accords with his correction of the text in § 2, *ὁμολοούντων τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον* instead of *καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν*.

εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν δλίγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείοσιν. L. 14.

The antecedent of *ταῦτα* is wealth and poverty, latent in *δῆμος* and *δολιγαρχία*. The conj. *πάντα*, adopted by Bekker following Lambinus in his 2nd Edition, is unnecessary.

ἄποροι δὲ πολλοὶ πολλοῦ. L. 14.

‘But there are in many places a large class of poor.’ Some MSS. read *εὐποροι*, some omit *πολλοί*, and it has been contended by Stahr that *ἄποροι δὲ καὶ εὐποροι πολλοῦ* is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς πάντα καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἰσότητα φαῖλον. L. 14.

‘Either equality of number or equality of proportion, if the only principle of a state, is vicious’: cp. *infra* c. 9. § 13; iv. 13. § 6; vi. 5. § 2.

ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου. L. 15.

ἡμαρτημένου is to be taken with *τοῦ πρώτου* as well as with *τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ*.

ἡ πρὸς τὴν δολιγαρχίαν. L. 16.

δολιγαρχία is here used for the oligarchical party, *τοὺς δλίγους*, parallel to *δῆμος* in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle's transitional and uncertain use of language.

αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἶναι, οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται τῷ δῆμῳ στάσις. L. 16.

This reflection is probably true of Greek democracies, but can hardly be justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.

1. 16. ἔτι δὲ ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων, ἥπερ ἔστιν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτείων.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the μέση πολιτεία, which is the safest of all *such* forms of government, [i.e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

ἥπερ refers to ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία. τοιούτων=the imperfect forms.

3. An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence=δῆμος ἐγγυτέρω τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας ἢ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων ἔστι τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., ἡ before τῶν ὀλίγων was omitted.

2. 1. The πῶς ἔχοντες, τίτων ἕνεκεν, τίνες ἀρχαὶ τῶν στάσεων are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

2. 2. περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about ἴσον and ἀνίσον in the previous chapter.

2. 4. αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αἱτοὶ τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους.

The seven causes are κέρδος, τιμὴ, ὕβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνῃς, αἰθέσις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Or, according to another way of reckoning (ἄλλον τρόπον), other elements, partly the same, and partly different, are added, viz. ἐριθεία, ἀλγυρία, μικρότης, ἀνομίαι.

As often happens both in the Politics (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the Ethics (cp. vii. cc. 1-10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: ὕβρις, κέρδος, τιμὴ, ὑπεροχή, φόβος, καταφρόνῃς: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων. To be taken closely with τὸν εἰρημὸν τρόπον, in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described, sc. κέρδος and τιμὴ to which τοὺς εἰρημένους (§ 5) also refers.

2. 5. ΔΑΛ' οὐχ ὁσαύτως, sc. ὁσαύτως ταῦτά. They are the game and not the game: 'The

love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.'

διὰ μικρότητα,

2. 6.

sc. τῆς κινήσεως. Cp. below, c. 3. § 10, ἐτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρὸν, ὅτι πολλάκις λαμβάνει μεγάλη γυνόμενη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι τὸ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. for the explanation of the term.

συνέστησαν οἱ γυρόμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας. 3. 4.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidos in the year 394 B.C. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian B.C. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the ἐναντιοστασις mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας. Cp. infra c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

οἶον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἢ 3. 5. δημοκρατία διεφθόρη.

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle's knowledge of Theban history, infra c. 8. § 15, and note.

ἢ Μεγαρίων [δημοκρατία διεφθόρη] δὲ ἀναξίων καὶ ἀναρχῶν ἐπτηθέντων. 3. 5.

Probably the same event mentioned infra c. 8. § 4, but apparently

not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (B.C. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

3. 5. ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος,

sc. ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γαῖονοι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconciliation. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelo we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiq. Rom. vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

3. 7. ἐν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων.

Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) 'the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.' Diodorus, 'the Sicilian,' (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

3. 7. δημοκρατία ἔγιντο ἐκ πολιτείας.

Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of πολιτεία or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

3. 7. καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολαύσαντα ἐπὶ Κλεομένης τοῦ Ἀλέξανδρος ἡγαγέσθαι παραδίξασθαι τὸν περίοικον τὸν δῆμον.

The meaning of the name Hebdomê was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is men-

tioned in Herodotus (vi. 76-83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (*De Mulierum Virtutibus*, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word *ἑβδόμη*. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 7777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month (*ἑβδόμη ἰσταμένου μηνός*, *Ib.*); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (*Apophth. Lacon.* 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (*loc. cit.*) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους κ.τ.λ. Read in the English text: 'the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.'

καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχοῦντων περὶ οἱ γνέριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ 3. 7. καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον.

The *κατάλογος ἐπιτεῶν* mentioned in *Thuc.* vi. 43, *καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακῆσσοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου*, and elsewhere, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 4. § 1, in which the *Θῆτες*, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

ἐκ καταλόγου. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word *ἀτυχοῦντων* chiefly refers. Cp. *Thuc.* vii. 27.

πλείους γὰρ τῶν ἀπείρων γινόμεναι. 3. 8.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of *ἐντέρας*. But *ἀπείρων*, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, 'when the citizens become more and more

divided into rich and poor.' The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of ἀπύρων.

3. 9. ἐν Ὁρεῶ.

A later name of Hestiaeae in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles, on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea. After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time κατελύθη ἡ ἀλιγάρχεια. For another reference to Hestiaeae, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

3. 10. τέλος δ' οὐθενὸς ἤρχον.

οὐθενὸς is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom οὐθενὸς would be governed by ἤρχον, we may adopt the emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, ἀπ' οὐθενός.

3. 11. οἷον Τροειηίοις Ἀχαιοὶ συνήκησαν Σύβαριν, εἴτα πλείους οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξίβαλον τοὺς Τροειηίους· ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

The foundation of Sybaris (B.C. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Troezenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.

3. 12. καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίταις τοῖς συνουμήσαν.

Sc. ἰσχυροτάτων or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. xi. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.

3. 12. Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Ζαπύριοι ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσαν καὶ αὐτοί.

This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 23. The Zancleans had

invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.

Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας 3. 13.
ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίαςαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἦλθον.

Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia; and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.

καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἀποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων 3. 13.
πλείστοι αὐτῶν.

αὐτῶν is to be taken with οἱ πλείστοι, which is in partitive apposition with Ἀμφιπολίται. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of 'as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians' who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.

στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ.

3. 14.

'There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.' This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e. g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

καθέπερ εἶρηται πρότερον.

3. 14.

Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.

3. 15. Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς.

That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

3. 15. μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκούντες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ.

The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piræus was its head-quarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piræus, from which it returned victorious.

4. 1. γίνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν.

Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

4. 1. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

4. 2. ἔθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ διεσπασίαν πάντας.

Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word *διεσπασίαν* may be causal and active, 'they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.' (Cp. *κατασπασιάζεσθαι* v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking *διασπασιάω*, like *σπασιάω*, as a neuter) 'they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.'

ὅστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἀμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς 4. 3. ἄλλοις μέρεσιν.

The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν 4. 5. στάσεων τῶν ὑστερον.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. reip. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgilus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο 4. 6. ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὃ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱίσιν αὐτοῦ Δόξανδρος ἤρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παράξυνε, πρὸξενος ἂν τῆς πόλεως.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long premeditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Nicias 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have

repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

4. 7. Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

4. 8. ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῃ βουλὴ εὐδοκμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that 'at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.' Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the Politics to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

4. 8. συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Cp. iv. 3. § 8, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνεμείνας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικὰς, sc. πολιτείας. σύντονος means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

4. 8. ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἷτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησε.

διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης, 'by means of this victory.'

τῆς ἡγεμονίας, sc. αἷτιος γενόμενος. διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν follows τῆς ἡγεμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of

Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχην.

4. 9.

I.e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 B.C. described by Thuc. v. 70-74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς 4. 9.
Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Diocles after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ.

4. 9.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were ἀδελφοί): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

οἱ δυνάμεις αἴτιαι.

4. 10.

‘Who are the causes of the power of a state:’ cp. supra,

§ 9, ὁ δὲ δῆμος αἰτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

4. 13. *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες . . . ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*

I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the *coup d'état*, and ended in the *plébiscite* by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

4. 13. *οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακισίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέχειν.*

Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

4. 13. *ψευδόμενοι.*

'Having once told the lie' which, it is inferred, was detected.

5. 2. *καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ μισθοφορὰν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπείρουν, καὶ ἐκέλευον ἀποδιδόναι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις· οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἠναγκάσθησαν συντάττες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον.*

'The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.' Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, *supra*, c. 3. § 4. The words *διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας* occur in both passages.

5. 3. *κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος.*

Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in B.C. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century B.C. a democratical party existed in the mother-city. Nine

places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἡ ἐν Μεγάρους κατελύθη δημοκρατία.

5. 4.

Cp. *supra* c. 3. § 5.

ἡ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίας.

5. 5.

Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from *ἀναδάστους ποιούντες*.

Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First. 5. 7.

Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich. 5. 8.

Πεισίστρατος στασιάζας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακοὺς.

5. 9.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάρους.

5. 9.

Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

Διονύσιος περιγγοῦν Δαφναίου.

5. 10.

Cp. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.

5. 10. ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας.

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἡ πάτριος δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, 'the good old democracy,' as opposed to the later and extreme form.

5. 11. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἦγον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον.

τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τὸν δῆμον τῶν νόμων = 'a remedy against the people becoming master.' That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes: cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: 'What should be the area of a constituency?' Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvan-

tages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common action; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους τοὺς φανερο- 6. 1, 2.
τάτους . . . ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφορὰς.

According to c. 1. § 16, ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίνονται δύο, ἢ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεις καὶ ἢ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into 'that arising from those outside the governing body' (ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Τοῖς μὲν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μάλιστα δέ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσεις arising ἐξ ἄλλων although the leader comes ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 κινεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ.; with which the second main division begins.

ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις.

6. 1.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Νάξιον πολιτεία in the so-called 'Politics' of Aristotle.

ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφορὰς.

6. 2.

Goettling would interpret ἄλλων as=ἄλλων ἢ τοῦ πλείονος which is harsh. The conjectures αὐτῶν and ἀλλήλων seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μάλιστα δ' in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσεις (ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν): but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the εὐποροὶ who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising ἐξ ἀλλήλων or ἐξ αὐτῶν.

6. 2. οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (πολιτικώτερα ἐγένετο ἢ ὀλιγαρχία).

6. 3. The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

6. 5. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

6. 6. ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρκλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθέται whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynichus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

6. 6. καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἧν οἱ ἀρχοντές εἰσι.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

6. 6. ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαιεν.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οἱ ἀπλῆται ἢ ὁ δῆμος or ὁ δῆμος only. That the membership of a club should

have been the qualification for an office of which the election was in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 *infra*).

καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐστὶν· δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ θ. 7. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ἀλγυχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσῃσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες θ. 8. ἀσελγῶς.

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also *infra* c. 12. § 17.

Hipparinus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of θ. 8. Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

Καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ὁ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν πρὸς Χάρητα πρῶτος ἐνεχείρησε μετα- θ. 9. βαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν.

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between 367-333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory. Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν,

θ. 9.

sc. διὰ τὸ ἀναλώσαι τὰ ἴδια τοὺς εὐπόρους ζῶντας ἀσελγῶς.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τι κοινόν, ὅτι δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινὰ· ὅθεν πρὸς θ. 9. αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν ἢ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τοὺτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας.

αὐτοὺς=‘the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the theft is made.’

οὗτοι=‘the thieves or peculators.’ The revolution arises in two ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government; or of the government upon the thieves.

ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ γερύσει.

θ. 11.

I.e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election out of certain families (*δυναστευικῆς*), resembled that of the Lacedaemonian elders who were chosen but ‘in a ridiculous fashion’ by the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.

6. 12. Timophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

6. 13. τῶν περὶ Σίμων.

σίμων is found in all the Greek MSS. and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. *Σίμων* which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaeon who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

6. 13. ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑταίρων ὃν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in Aristocratem, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

6. 14. Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which 'divided all Hellas,' again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

6. 15. τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' Ἀρχίον.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition

with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

ἐφιλονείκησαν αὐτούς.

6. 15.

Const. *preg.* = *φιλονεικούντες ἐδίωκαν*. The infinitive *δεθῆναι* helps the construction of *αὐτούς*, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

διὰ τὸ ἔργον δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀλιγαρχίας . . . ἢ ἐν Χίῳ ἀλιγαρχία. 6. 16.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, *supra*, iv. 4. § 21.

πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα . . . τοὺς μέσους. 6. 17.

is an *accusativus pendens*; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first . . . the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτον ὀλίγοι. 7. 1.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fewness of men of wealth and birth.

Παρθενίαι (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν). 7. 2.

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called *ἐπινόεσται*. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until

the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

7. 2. Λύσανδρος.

For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch's Life of Lysander, 24-26.

7. 3. Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ συστήσας ἐπίβασιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. Hell. iii. 3. §§ 4-11.

ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ if genuine must mean 'against Agesilaus' and (less directly) against the Spartans.

7. 4. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας.

See Bergk Frag. 2-7, p. 316.

7. 4. Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

7. 5. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τε πειρῶνται μεγάλαι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν.

ταῦτα refers to τὰ δύο, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

7. 6. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῃ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἥττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μέγιστοι αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλειούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας.

τούτῃ and διὰ τοῦτο have been taken as follows: 1)* 'Aristocracies differ from what are termed politics in the number of elements

which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to *διαφέρουσι*: 'there are such differences; for those of them which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) *τούτῃ* and *διὰ τοῦτο* may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner: 3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i. e. in having the three elements of *δῆμος*, *πλοῦτος*, *ἀρετὴ* instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (*αὐτῶν*) are less stable and the latter more so. For those which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The *δῆμος* being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words *αἱ μὲν ἦσαν*, *αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον*, are partitive of *αὐτῶν*, which refers to *αἱ ἀριστοκρατίας* and cannot therefore be applied *αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον πόλεις* to timocracies *αἱ δὲ ἦσαν πόλεις* to aristocracies. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημῆεν ἐν Θουρίαις.

7. 9.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.

ἐν Θουρίοις. Thurii was founded in the year 443 under the protection of Athens, and had nearly ceased to exist in 390. Yet in this short time it was subjected to at least two serious revolutions, 1) that which is mentioned here from an oligarchical aristocracy into a democracy; 2) another revolution, noted *infra* § 12, by which it passed from a polity into an oligarchy of a few families, whether earlier or later than the preceding, is unknown. It may be conjectured, but it is only a conjecture, that the narrowing of the aristocracy briefly alluded to in this passage is the same change with that which is afterwards mentioned more fully in § 12, and their overthrow which ensued may be further identified with the expulsion of the Sybarites soon after the foundation of the city. It may also be conjectured with considerable probability that the government of Thurii became an oligarchy at the time when the Athenian citizens were driven out, after the failure of the Syracusan expedition.

7. 9. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἑλαττον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For, *εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω*, cp. ii. 11. § 14, *ὅσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πῶλις, πολυμικρότερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικότερον κοινώτερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάπτεται.*

ἔτι διὰ τὸ πᾶσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον 7. 10.
κ.τ.λ.

Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. *infra*, c. 8. § 16.

ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις.

7. 10.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [*Diodorus* xiv. 44, *Justin* xxi. 2 and 3].

δ' ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμνημένη. 7. 10.

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

ὅπερ συνέβαιεν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

7. 14.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'

παρολογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἐπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ δ' σοφιστικὸς λόγος. 8. 3.

ἐπ' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλέων.

σοφιστικὸς λόγος = ὁ σωρός, or 'acervus.'

τῇ μὴ ἀδικεῖν

8. 5.

and the following are causal or instrumental datives after διὰ τὸ εἶς χρῆσθαι. The article is to be continued with the second μὴ ἀδικεῖν.

τῇ τοῦ ἐγχευομένου αὐτῶν εἰσέγῃ εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν.

8. 5.

For the expression of a similar spirit acting in a wider field and giving a mythological origin to the traditional policy of Rome, cp. *Tac. Ann.* xi. 24: 'Quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Athenien-

sibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit,' and the real speech of Claudius (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in their editions).

8. 6. ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ δμοιοι, διὰ καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις ἐγγέγονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλὰκις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

ἤδη, sc. ὅταν πλείους ᾖσι.

ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον refers only to the clause, διὰ καὶ . . . πολλὰκις as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6. § 6 (demagogues in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy becoming a democracy.

8. 9. πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοὺς.

The construction is πρὶν τὰς φιλονεικίας παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς ἕξω), ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄλλους.

αὐτοὺς may be either the subject or the object of παρειληφέναι, with a slightly different meaning. Either 'before the spirit of contention has also carried away or absorbed them,' or, 'before they too have caught the spirit of contention.'

8. 10. τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος.

i. e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth of a city has increased or diminished.

8. 10. συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθὸν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν πόλεσι τιμᾶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, κ.τ.λ.

The words κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, though somewhat pleonastic, have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare the present with the past value of property at that time, i. e. with the property serving as a qualification at the time when the change is occurring (εἰσφοράς, νομίσματος γιγνομένης). The words are placed after κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν by Susemihl following the authority of William of Moerbeke, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν repeat κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ἀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ. 8. 12.

καὶ μοναρχίᾳ is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is found in the best MSS. The advice given is at least as applicable to kings as to other rulers of states. *πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ* = not 'every constitutional government' but in a more general sense 'every form of government.' (See note on text.)

τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν. 8. 12.

= τοὺς παραστάτας, 'their followers' or 'followings.'

τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφέρους πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. 8. 13.

As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.

τούτου ὃ ἄσπος τὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ 8. 14.
τὰς ἀρχάς.

In this favourite remedy of 'conservation by antagonism,' which is really only an 'unstable equilibrium,' Aristotle does not seem to see how much of the force of the state is lost.

μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἕνα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ 8. 17.
τοῦτο κατασκευάσει τις.

τοῦτο, sc. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν κερδαίνειν, to be gathered from the previous sentence.

ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φραγρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλάς τιθίσθωσαν. 8. 19.

λόχοι are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions appear to have corresponded. Cp. Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, *δεῖρηται μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντες αἱ πόλεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ φυλάς αἱ δὲ κατὰ μοίρας αἱ δὲ κατὰ λόχους* καὶ ἀρχόντες ἐφ' ἑκάστην μίρει ἐφεισθήσασιν. The accounts apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such divisions.

μὴ μόνον τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιῶν ἀναδάσονται, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρποὺς, 8. 20.
ὃ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν πολιτειῶν λαμβάνει γυγνόμενον.

As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed on the rich, or by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion to the amount assessed. *Infra* c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how

Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.

8. 20. *κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν.*

The construction is *ἂν τις ὑβρίσῃ τινὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν*; but whether *σφῶν αὐτῶν* refers 1) to *οἱ εὐποροὶ* or 2)* to *τούτους*, i.e. *τοὺς ἀπόρους*, is not clear.

8. 20. *μηδὲ πλείονων ἢ μᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν.*

Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk, v. c. 9. § 1, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'

9. 1. *τρία δέ τινα χρή ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.*

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, *τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἷτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι' ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία*: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims *εὐνοία, φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ* as the proper qualities of a statesman: *καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτο ἀνδρὶ ὀργίξεσθε δε σὺδεὸς οἶμαι ἦσσαν εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσω.*

9. 1. *δύναμιν τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς.*

= 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

9. 2. *πῶς χρή ποιείσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν.*

In this passage (cp. *infra* *πῶς δεῖ ποιείσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν*) the words *αἵρεσις* and *διαίρεσις* are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,'—'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

9. 4. *ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.*

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from

ἀπορίσειεν ἂν τις. 'May not the reason be that those who have these two qualities are possibly wanting in self control?'

ἀπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγονται ταῖς πολιτείαις. 9. 5.

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the Politics, or to a special treatise called 'οἱ νόμοι.' The meaning is that 'enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.' τοῖς νόμοις = 'their laws,' the article referring to πολιτείας which follows.

οἱ δ' αἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετήν. 9. 7.

ταύτην, sc. τὸ ἀριστοκράτεον (or δημοκρατικόν) εἶναι gathered from the preceding sentence.

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that 'happy inconsistencies' may be better than extremes. The *Opportunist* may do greater service to the Republic than the *Intransigent*.

καθίκερ ρίς. 9. 7.

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκίῳ φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνέμονται καὶ ἐπικεινόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιμένη ἀσθενοστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἔχει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπικεινόμενη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γυναικείη καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνέμονται ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρηπὶ γινόμενα ἢ σιμὰ οὕτω διαπίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ μεταστῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων. 9. 7.

'On account of the excess (cp. above ἐὰν ἐκπεύῃ) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.'

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. 9. 8.

Ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of 'likewise.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3, πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχων, where ἄλλας = 'which we are comparing with the virtues;' and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν.

δοτ' ἔχων. 9. 8.

δοτε is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is

found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. *Περὶ Ψυχῆς* ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 11, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ τυπόμενόν ὃν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον.

9. 9. φθείροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις.

Sc. τοὺς εὐφρούς ἢ τὸ πλεόνους. 'So that when they destroy either party by laws *carried to excess [or possibly 'by laws based on superior power'] they destroy the state.'

9. 11. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων . . . τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας.

Cp. *Rep.* iv. 423 E, ταῦτα . . . πάντα φαῖλα, εἰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν μέγα φυλάττωσι, μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἱκανόν. τί τοῦτο; ἔφη. τὴν παιδείαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφήν.

9. 11. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις δμνύουσι 'καὶ τῇ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὃ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.'

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

ὁμνύω . . . θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας, μὴ μὲν ἐγὼ ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φρονησέω μήτε τέχνη μήτε μαχανῶ μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεδ' ἀμέραν καὶ σπενυσίω ὃ τι καὶ δύναμαι κακὸν τῇ πόλει τῇ τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 106.

9. 11. χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀντιτίον.

'To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong,' not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 *infra*, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς.

9. 13. νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. *Plat. Rep.* viii. 556 D, εἴαν ἰσχυρὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιμμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἰσχυροφρονέτι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἰδὼν ἀσθματὸς τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν κ.τ.λ.

9. 15. 'eis δ' χρῆζον.'

Probably ἐστὶ is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.

πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου.

10. 3.

'The assistance which arises from i.e. is necessitated by the people.' Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause ἐπὶ τοὺς γυμνάσιους which follows.

τοῖς ἐπιεικίσι.

10. 3.

'The good' in the party sense, i.e. the higher classes like the ἀγαθοὶ of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in 10. 3. i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the 10. 5. need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τὰς πόλεις); here, when they were already 'increased in power,' (ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ἡδὲ γιγνάντων). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

οἱ δῆμοι.

10. 5.

Not 'the democracies,' but 'the peoples in different states.'

Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent 10. 6. from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was 10. 6. elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story

of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

10.8. ὥσπερ Κόδρος.

In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

10.8. λευθερώσαντες ὥσπερ Κῦρος,
who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See *infra*, § 24.

10.8. κτίσαντες χώραν.

'Who have settled a country.'

κτίσειν χώραν is said like κτίζειν πόλιν, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

10.8. ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς.

Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

10.8. Μακεδόνων.

Such as Perdiccas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Archelaus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

10.8. Μολοσσίων.

Cp. *infra*, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

10.9. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν ἀρχομένων οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ

βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποῖη τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις:—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

10. 13.

See note on iii. 13. § 16.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος.

10. 15.

Sc. ἐπέθετο, to be supplied from τῶν ἐπιθέσεων, or from ἐπιτίθενται (supra, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54–58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz. whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ.

10. 16.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ.

10. 16.

Probably Amyntas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne B.C. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ἐκ Πανσωνίου.

10. 16.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θεβαίωνι δώσειν Φιλίππου εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Θεαίᾳς ἦξεν, ἐπέσχοντο

ἀν' ἀποκρίν οὐκ εἰ δίδωμι προαίτιον καὶ ἐπίστανται μὴ δέχουσαν. To Alexander there is none.

The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus B.C. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 93). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 B.C., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6; and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

10. 16. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ.

Sc. ἡ ἐπίθεσις. Εὐαγόρα is governed by the ἐπὶ in ἐπίθεσις. The story is differently told by Theopompus (Fragm. 111, Müller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydaeus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his 'Evagoras' throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

10. 17. Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413-399, and had two wives,—the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or

Arrhibaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδικῆς Ἰρῶα δὲ θυγάτηρ where read Εὐρυδικῆ Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)

10. 18.

Cotys was assassinated in 358 B.C. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

10. 19.

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέφθειραν οἱ δ' ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας.

The first καὶ means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second καὶ that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

ἐνεχείρησαν, sc. διαφθεῖραι.

10. 19.

Πενθαλίδας.

It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthalidae derived their name from him.

10. 20.

ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης ἐχολόγουνεν εἰκότως τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος.

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Εὐριπίδης ἀντιδίζοντας αὐτῷ τῷδε ὅτι τὸ στόμα δυσώδες ἦν, πολλὰ γάρ, ἔλεν αὐτῷ, ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐγκατεσάκη, i.e. Some one said to Euripides, 'Your breath smells.' 'Yes,' he replied, 'for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.'

δοῦναι καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας.

10. 21.

We must supply περὶ in thought before μοναρχίας. It is inserted

in the margin of P⁶. 'As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.'

10. 21. οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρείου, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ξέρξου, ἀλλ' οἰόμενος συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμνημονούντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesiae Fragmenta, Περσικά § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), Ἀρτάπανος (sic) δὲ μέγα παρὰ Ξέρξῃ δυνάμενος, μετ' Ἀσπαμίτρου τοῦ εὐνούχου καὶ αὐτοῦ μέγα δυναμένου βουλευόνται ἀνελεῖν Ξέρξην, καὶ ἀναροῦσι, καὶ πείθουσιν Ἀρτοξέρξην (sic) τὸν υἱὸν ὡς Δαρεῖαιος (sic) αὐτὸν ὁ ἕτερος παῖς ἀνέλε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρεῖαιος ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ Ἀρταπάνου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν Ἀρτοξέρξου πολλὰ βοῶν καὶ ἀπαρνούμενος ὡς οὐκ εἶη φονεὺς τοῦ πατρὸς· καὶ ἀποθνήσκει. According to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing οὐ before ἐκρέμασε. The purport of Aristotle's rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for οὐ κελεύσαντος may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the *Historia Animalium* but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also *De Gen. An.* ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

10. 22. Σαρδανάπαλον.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23-27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in *Nic. Eth.* i. 5. § 3.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο ἀληθές. 10. 22.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

Διουσιῶν τῇ ὑστίρῃ Δίῳ ἐπίθετο. 10. 23.

See infra §§ 28 and 32.

ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις, οἷον Κύρος Ἀστυάγῃ. 10. 24.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his *Historia Animalium*, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

Σείθης δ' Ἐρῆξ. 10. 24.

A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in *Anab.* vii. 3, *Hell.* iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

οἷον Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ Μιθριδάτῃ. 10. 25.

According to Corn. Nepos Datames, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 8. 4, ὥσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνην προδοῦς.

οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὴν Δίῳτος ἐπιληψίαν. 10. 28.

'There should be ever present ~~with~~ them the resolution of Dion.'

ἰκανὸν αὐτῇ. 10. 28.

Sc. *ἐν*.

Διὸ δακταίμενοι πλείους κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας. 10. 30.

Διό, 'because one form of government naturally hates another.'

Cp. *Thuc.* i. 18, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος

Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννεύσεως οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν : and Hdt. v. 92 about the Lacedaemonian hatred to tyranny.

10. 30. καὶ Συρακούσιοι.

This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466—406, from the overthrow of Thrasybulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

10. 31. καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον.

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred B.C. 343 ; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, B.C. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see *supra* note on § 16). We have thus a measure of the latitude with which Aristotle uses the expression καὶ νῦν 'quite lately' which recurs in ii. 9. § 20, καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς Ἀσπυρτίοις.

10. 31. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν.

Either 1) the same persons who are called οἰκείοι συστάντες, or some part of them, οἱ συστάντες being taken substantively=οἱ συστασιῶται. Or 2) αὐτῶν may be understood of the whole people as if πολῖται had preceded ; συστάντες would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted κατ' before αὐτῶν without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests μετά. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasybulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months ; see *infra* c. 12. § 6. According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

10. 32. Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστής ὢν καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, ἐκείνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη.

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on ἐκβαλὼν. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by

members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος,

10. 35.

sc. *χρηται τῷ λογισμῷ* which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε διγαρχίας,

10. 35.

sc. *τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς διγαρχίας*, understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

οὐ γίνονται ὅτι βασιλείαι νῦν.

10. 37.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

ἀλλ' ἂν περ γίνονται μοναρχίαι [καὶ] τυραννίδες μᾶλλον.

10. 37.

The objection to the *καὶ* (which is found in all the MSS.) is that *μοναρχία* is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including *βασιλεία* and *τυραννίς*. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of government' must be supplied with *γίνονται* from *βασιλείαι*. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to *βασιλείαι*. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's *Politics*.

ῥῆθρα γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ κατάλυσις.

10. 38.

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

ἡ περὶ Μελισσοῦς βασιλεία.

11. 2.

Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.

11. 2. Theopompus is said by Tyrtaeus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:—

Ἡμετέρῳ βασιλῇ θεοῖσι φίλῳ Θεοπόμπῳ,
 ὃν διὰ Μεσσήνην εἰλομεν εὐρύχορον,
 Μεσσήνην ἀγαθὴν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὴν δὲ φυτεύειν·
 ἀμφ' αὐτὴν δ' ἐμάχοντ' ἐννεακαίδεκα ἔτη
 ναλεμέως, αἰεὶ ταλασίφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
 αἰχμηταὶ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες·
 εἰκοστῇ δ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ πῖονα ἔργα λιπόντες,
 φεύγον Ἴθωμαίων ἐκ μεγάλων ὀρέων.

According to Plutarch, Lyc. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the *ρήτρα* more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note *in loc.*

11. 5. ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις πίστιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

11. 6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας δεῖ φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας.

ἐπιδημοῦντας is translated by William de Moerbek without any authority 'praefectos populi,' apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θύρας. Either *'at his gate' or 'at their own gates.' In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

11. 8. καὶ τὸ πάντας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους, τυραννικόν, ὅπως ἢ τε φυλακὴ τρέφεται.

1) * Reading *ἢ τε* with Bekker's second edition after Victorius: 'Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.' Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain *μήτε* with the MSS. we must translate either 'that he may not have to keep soldiers,' for his subjects will keep them for him; or, 'so that a guard need not

be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν κ.τ.λ.

11. 9.

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια.

11. 9.

Lit. and 'among' or 'of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελεῶν, ὅσον ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν πάντε γὰρ ἔτεσι ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τῆς οὐσίας ἅπασαν εἰσπληροχέται συνέβαινεν.

11. 10.

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomics* ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the *Oeconomics*, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6. The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

11. 10. βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.

Cp. note on text.

11. 11. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται μοναρχος.

i.e. 'for they are both alike.'

11. 13. ἦλθ' ὁ ἥλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία.

Sc. ἐκκρούεται, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say; 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, *Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum*, § 7, *μυρία δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔκ τε ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων καταδείξαι σοι ἔχων, προτιμώντων τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, τοῦτο μὲν παραιτήσομαι, ὥς μὴ εἰς ἀπειροκαλίαν τινα μεираκιώδη ἐκπέσῃ μοι τὸ σύγγραμμα καὶ κινδυνεύωμεν ἄλλ' ἢ λ' ἐκκρούειν τὸν ἥλον.*

11. 13. αὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος.

Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considérable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's *Russia*, p. 280, ed. 8.

11. 14. οὐθέν ὃ ἐλλείπει μοχθηρίας.

Sc. ὁ τύραννος; or οὐθέν may be the nominative to ἐλλείπει.

11. 16. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν δρῶνς . . . φρονῶσιν.

The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.

The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.

" 2nd " = 1st "

" 3rd " = 2nd "

The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.

But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.

ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. 11. 17.

Literally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,'
i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

ἐν φυλάττοντα μόνον τὴν δύναμιν . . . τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δεῖ 11. 18, 19.
μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν
καλῶς.

Compare Machiavelli, who in his 'Prince' goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of 'doing evil that good may come' and of 'keeping up appearances' and of 'fear to be preferred to love.' 'Let it be the Prince's chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.' (c. 18, Bohn's Translation, p. 461.) Again 'A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects' property.' . . . 'To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.' (c. 16. pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, *infra* §§ 20, 25: 'He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.' (ib.) Again, cp. §§ 22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19. p. 462: 'Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.' Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at

certain periods of the year and 'should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,' p. 476. Cp. Hallam, *Mid. Ages* i. 66, 'The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?' (quoted by Congreve).

11. 19. Bekker in his 2nd edition, following a suggestion of Schneider, adds *eis* before *δωρεάς*, but unnecessarily.

11. 22. The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos *De Regibus* c. 2: 'Dionysius prior . . et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitae, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.'

The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian Polity of Syracuse, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῇ Συρακοσίᾳ πολιτείᾳ καὶ συνεχῶς φησὶν αὐτὸν [Διονύσιον τὸν νεώτερον] ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ ἡμέρας ἐνεθήκοντα μεθύειν διὰ καὶ ἀμβλυπότερον γενέσθαι τὰς ὄψεις. (Arist. Berl. Ed. 1568, b. 19.)

11. 23. φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο ποιοῦντες.

These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.

11. 24. κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.

11. 28. κολάσεως.

Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with *ῥακίδαν*, but *ὑβρεως* may be supplied with *τῆς eis τὴν ῥακίδαν* from the preceding.

11. 30. διαφθείραντες.

Sc. τὸν τύραννον.

χαλεπὸν θυμῷ μάχεσθαι.

11. 31.

Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, *ἔτι χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος.*

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli's 'Prince' quoted above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ σώζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν.

11. 32.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακείσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἥθος ἥτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον 11. 34. ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπόνηρον.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15. p. 453, in a still more subtle style of reflection: 'It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his ruin.' And again: 'He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his states; for there are some things having the appearance of virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.'

Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicyonian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 12. 1. 3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3. p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a victory in the Pythian games B.C. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says 'there is some confusion about the names of Orthagoras and Andreas. It has been supposed with some probability that the same person is designated under both names: for the two names do not seem to occur in the same author.' Orthagoras, 'speaker for the right,' may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. *Infra* § 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from Myron to Cleisthenes.

Πισίστρατον ὑπομῖναι ποτε προσκληθέντα διαγν εἰς Ἄρκειον πάγον.

12. 2.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to

have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

12. 3. Cypselidae.

The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

Cypselus	30	years.
Periander	44	"
Psammetichus	3	"
	<hr/>	
	77	

From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total $73\frac{1}{2}$ years?

Sylburg would change *τρία καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα* into *ἑνὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα*. Giphanius would omit *καὶ τέτταρα* after *τετραράκοντα*. Susemihl would change *τέτταρα* into *ἡμῶν*, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read *τέτταρα* or *τέσσαρα*.

12. 5. *τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε*.

Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 B.C. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. $17 + 14 + 4 = 35$.

The whole period 560–510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

12. 6. Here the addition is correct. $7 + 10 + 1 = 18$, although the time assigned to Hiero's reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does

Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I B.C. 405-367, Dionysius II 367-356, and again 346-344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

Idios.

12. 7.

i. e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as 12. 8. if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits *τῆς αὐξηθείς*, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after *δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται*. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

διὰ τε τοῦ χρόνου.

12. 9.

Sc. *τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολή* to be supplied from the preceding sentence. 'And in what is any special change made by time?'
i. e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

With *τὰ μὴ ἀρξάμενα* supply *τί* or *διὰ τί* from *τί ἂν εἴη* above; cp. 12. 9. *διὰ τί' αἰτίαν* (infra § 10). 'And why should things which do not begin together change together?'

διὰ τί' αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει;

12. 10.

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato's order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases *μεταβάλλειν* and *μεταβαίνειν* in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always 'passed over' into their opposites:—the 'passing over' is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὐτ' εἰ ἔσται μεταβολή, οὐτ' εἰ μὴ ἔσται, 12. 11.
διὰ τί' αἰτίαν, καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν.

1) *He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes'—a condensed sentence in which *καὶ* is omitted before *διὰ τί' αἰτίαν*. *εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν*, sc. *ἔσται μεταβολή*.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second *οὐτε*: *οὐτ', εἰ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί' αἰτίαν*. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last

development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why does not the cycle continue or return into itself?') The meaning may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government, experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this inconsistency?'

12. 12. ἡ Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilaus, as here, made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change from tyranny to aristocracy.

12. 12. ἐν Καρχηδόνι.

Sc. τυραννὶς μετέβαλεν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii. c. 11. § 2—'that Carthage has never had a sedition worth speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,' and a similar statement occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. 5. § 9, τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνοι πολιστευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουκίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους κ.τ.λ. To avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηδόνι, a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a time in the history of Carthage *before* the establishment of the aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be assumed in order to save Aristotle's consistency. In § 14 *infra*, he calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he talks of it as having a democratic element.

12. 15. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ἀλγαρχικὴν, πλουσίαν καὶ πενήταν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

Bekker inserts *καὶ* in his 2nd Edition—*ἀστυνόμενοι (καὶ) κατατοκο-* 12. 17.
ζόμενοι. The addition makes no change in the sense.

μεταβάλλουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδέποτε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. 12. 18.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.

BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view: in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

1. 2. *ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἰ τι λοιπὸν*

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) 'As well as any omission of those matters (*ἐκείνων*) which have just been mentioned,' i. e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) *ἐκείνων* may refer to the forms of constitutions [*πολιτεϊῶν*].

1. 4-6. Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts *περὶ τὸ* before *βουλευόμενον* in § 4, and *ἐπεὶ* before *δεῖ* in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.

αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢν καλοῦσιν οἱ τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν,

1. 6.

'which they call oligarchy,' is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the expression ὁ καλούμενος ἀήρ, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3; τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γαλακτος φύσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

τῇ δ' ἅπαντα ταῦτα.

1. 9.

'All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,' i.e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), 'may exist in the same state.'

ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντες ἐλευθερίας.

2. 1.

μετέχοντες, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγειν εἰκόσασιν, the subject and object being nearly the same.

τούτ' εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τούτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.

2. 2.

'That is also the end, and that is the just principle.'

εἴπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος τὸ ζῆν.

2. 3.

The MSS. vary between δουλεύοντες and δούλου ὄντος. Supply ἔστι or some weaker word than ἔργον.

συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον.

2. 4.

'The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.'

τὸ διαίρειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων.

2. 5.

The old translator takes this as if he read § ἐκ. But we may retain καί, regarding ἐκ πάντων as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.

2. 5. τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1*) by placing the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μὴ before τῶν μεγίστων [Lambinus].

2. 6. ἀρχῶν

is used in the generic sense to include the ἀρίστος ἀρχή of iii.

1. § 7.

2. 6. μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

2. 7. τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἐνέγκη συσσεπτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων.

i. e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

2. 7. ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γίνεται καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ παιδεία ὀρίζεται κ.τ.λ.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 'The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.'

2. 8. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν εἶδον εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

2. 8. ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς.

These words are translated in the text 'has survived some ancient change'; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, 'have survived from the old state before the change.' For an example of such a 'survival' compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.

τὰ μὲν οὖν κούα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταύτ' ἐστίν.

2. 9.

ταῦτα, i. e. 'election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.'

τὸ μὴθὲν μᾶλλον ἀρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους

2. 9.

is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbek. The phrase is peculiar: 'that the poor should no more have power than the rich'—we might expect rather 'that the rich should no more have power than the poor.' But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of *εὐποροι* and *ἀποροι* (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἔξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα 3. 1.
διελεῖν χιλίους τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς
πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν
μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων,
τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained ($500 = 1000$), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίους is the dative after *διελεῖν*: 'to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.' The clause which follows (καὶ . . . πεντακοσίοις) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with *ἴσον δύνασθαι*, placing a comma at *διελεῖν*, 'and arrange the qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.' According to this

way of taking the passage, τὰ τιμήματα τῶν πεντακοσίων is not parallel with χαλίσαις, sc. πολιταῖς, for which we should have expected τοῖς τῶν χαλίων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως. 'We ought to distribute the qualification in this proportion, i.e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as 500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an equal number of representatives from both.' In the previous case Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through representatives.

The word διαιρέσεων in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts, like διελεῖν in the previous sentence (ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.).

3. 4. λέγουσι γὰρ ὅς τε ἂν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κ.τ.λ.

'It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor. When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification exceeds, that is supreme.'

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which

$$\text{the poor have a majority} = 4 \times 2 + 15 = 23,$$

$$\text{the rich have a majority} = 6 \times 2 + 5 = 17,$$

$$\text{Majority of poor} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad \overline{6}$$

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy pure and simple.

3. 5. ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέρους, τοῦτο κύριον.

ἑκατέρους is the dative after ὑπερτείνει and a pleonastic explanation of ὁποτέρων.

λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἂν τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους· βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος 4. 1.
ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῇ τὸ
πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς.

ὥσπερ ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. is the explanation of *πρώτην*, 'I call it the first, meaning that which comes first in the classification of democracies,' because it is the best and most natural, implied in *βέλτιστος* γὰρ δῆμος.

ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the addition of *βελτίστην* which may be supplied from *βέλτιστος*. Or Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is the very best material of a democracy.

ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic tribes 'cultivating their living farm' (i. 8. § 6), who are far from being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολοί, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις 4. 2.
ἐκκλησιάζειν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason why people do not desire the property of others. But though a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a population which having little or no independent means, is absorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the necessities of life; they are patient as well as industrious, and too busy to covet the property of others.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνδεὴς τῆς αἰρίσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινες αἰρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος 4. 4.
ἐκ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαιωνίᾳ.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle was adopted in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian (iv. 14. § 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they elect by turns.

4. 5. καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμά τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν.

So iv. 9. § 7, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὖσης [τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας] διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν. Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy 'after a fashion,' at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, B.C. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle's cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

4. 5, 6. The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratical constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are 'paper-constitutions' only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

4. 5. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον βεβηθείᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ.

διὸ refers to what has preceded. 'And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge': a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.

ἀρχεω τοὺς ἐπικαιεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας.

4. 7.

Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connexion with the preceding words, as in the translation, *'are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν 4. 8.
παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ
ἐξίναί κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρον τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

ἀπὸ τινος τόπου, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply μὴ from μὴ ἐξίναί; if outwards, the force of μὴ is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

ἄστυ the city is more precisely defined by πόλις, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυάμενος, τὸ μὴ 4. 9.
δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστη γῆς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

νῦν δὲ δεῖ διαρθεῖν καὶ τῇ Ἀθηναίων νόμῳ· πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομεν ἔστι 4. 9, 10.
χρήσιμοις. ἐκείνοι γάρ, καίπερ ὅσους πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως
πάντες γεωργοῦσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῆς
καὶ τα μέτρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς
πώλητας.

διαρθεῖν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as
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that which is ascribed to Oxyllus the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one, however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was small.'

The meaning of *ὑπερβάλλειν* is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller, vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. *Δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως βιοῦσιν καὶ ἀλλοτρῶν οὐ διγγάπουσιν ἀνεφγμένον τῶν θυρῶν*. Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

4. 11. τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις.

Not to be taken after *γεγυμνασμένοι*; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket *τά*. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months before his death, 323 B.C., recorded by Arrian, *Exped. Alexandri*, vii. 9, in which he contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

4. 15. ἐπομένως δὲ παραβαίνειν.

sc. τὰς ἄλλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'

ἐπομένους, i.e. 'in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,' gathered from *βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην*.

χαίρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χαρίζεω.

4. 15.

'At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding stage.' Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of *τεχίται* (and *a fortiori* of course all below them). The second excludes the *θῆτες*, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. *infra* c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρό- 4. 15.
τερον τὰ πλείεστα σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon *καὶ ταύτην*, to which the words *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας* are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, 'Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.' Or, if the emphasis on *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας* is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

ἃ δὲ . . . εἴρηται. The connexion is, 'But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.' For the absolute use of *μᾶλλον* cp. *Plat. Phaedo* 63 D, *φρσὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγομένους*.

ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκίον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον.

4. 16.

The last word qualifies *οἰκίον*: 'For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.'

ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἰτίον γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνην.

4. 17.

ὅπερ=the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (*Herod. iv. 161*), about 460 or 450 B.C., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

Κλεισθήνης.

4. 18.

Cp. *Hdt. v. 69*, ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρότερον ἀπωσμένον τότε πάντα (al. *lect. πάντων*) πρὸς τὴν ἰουνοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο, τὰς φυλάς μετανοήμασι καὶ ἐποίησε πλείους ἐξ ἑλασσόνων. δῖον τε δὴ φυλάρ-

χοὺς ἀντὶ τεσσάρων ἐποίησε, δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένεμε ἐς τὰς φυλάς.

Cp. Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece*, Engl. Transl., p. 336.

The breaking up old divisions in an army and a state is not a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal relations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments, are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

5. 1. ἴσται δ' ἔργον . . . μέγιστον ἔργον.

The repetition of *ἔργον* is awkward; but the general style of the *Politics* is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in either place.

5. 2. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.

διὸ because of the instability of states; the words *περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον* are either omitted or altered by those who change the order of the books.

The clause *τίνες σωτηρίαι* is the explanation of *περὶ ὧν*, and is resumed in *ἐκ τούτων*.

5. 3. καὶ φερόντων πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.

These words are an explanation of *τῶν καταδικαζομένων*, 'of those who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,' not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.

Cp. Cleon in *Aristoph. Knights* (923):

δώσεις ἐμοὶ καλὴν δίκην,
 ἱπύμενος ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς.
 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐς τοὺς πλουσίους
 σπείσω σ' ὅπως ἂν ἐγγραφῇς.

5. 5. δεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας.

Cp. iv. 14. § 4.

5. 8. ἀθρόα χρὴ διανέμειν τοῖς ἀπύροις, μάλιστα μὲν, εἴ τις δύναται τοσούτων ἀθροΐων ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτήσιν.

ἀθρόα, 'in lump sums,' opposed to the piecemeal method of doling out money which he had been describing above.

εἴ τις, indefinite 'if we can only collect.'

δύναται, sc. ἀθρόα διανέμειν. The MSS. vary between ἀθροίζων and συναθροίζων. Bekker's emendation ἀθροίζειν is unnecessary.

ἐν δὲ τούτῳ.

5. 9.

'In the meantime,' i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

ἀφεμένους τῶν μάταιον λειτουργιῶν.

5. 9.

They being excused from those services which are useless.
Cp. v. 8. § 20.

For Tarentum, see Müller's Dorians (iii. 9. § 14), who suggests without any proof that the words κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα refer only to the *ager publicus*. Compare ii. 5. § 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another's horses and dogs in common.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας, τοὺς μὲν κληρω- 5. 11.
τοὺς τοὺς δ' αἰρετούς.

See note on text.

ἀρχῆς is a genitive of respect, assisted by μερίζειν. 'Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.'

•

τοὺς μὲν ἀληθεύουσιν, sc. ἀρχοντας. Either the accusative immediately follows ποιῆσαι, or is in apposition with τοῦτο; or some word like καθιστάνας is to be supplied from μερίζοντας.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

πῶς δὲ φανερόν ἐκ τούτων.

6. 1.

With δὲ, κατασκευάζειν from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.

6. 1. τὴν μὲν εὐκρατον μάλιστα τῶν διγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην.

With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρὸς τὴν βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρώτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

6. 2. ἢ δει.

ἢ = ἐν ἢ. 'And in this.'

6. 2. μετέχειν ἐξείναι,

sc. δει.

6. 2. τοσούτον εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλήθος,

'The people being introduced in such numbers.' An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

6. 4. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εὖ διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτήρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἀμαρτίας.

καλῶς ἔχοντα is taken in a double construction with τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν and with πλωτήρσιν. Either (1)* 'well furnished with sailors for navigation,' or (2) 'well furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.' τοῖς πλωτήρσιν may also be construed with ἐπιδέχεται, 'allow of more errors in their sailors.' (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλωτῆρων τετυχηκότα φασίλων.

7. 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἐσσι κ.τ.λ.

Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

7. 1. ἐνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.

'There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,' or 'we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.'

7. 1. ὅπου δ' ὁπλίτην.

Sc. εἶναι συμβέβηκε understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἶναι. It is not necessary to read 1) ὁπλίτην with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) ὁπλιτικῶν with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads ὁπλιτικῶν and the old translator who gives 'armativam').

The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched 7. 2, 3. by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavy-armed.

οὐκ μὲν οὖν ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἐστίν, ὅταν διαστώσι, παλλάκις 7. 2. ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρω.

The change in the nominatives is observable, 'When the two parties (πλῆθος καὶ εὐποροὶ) fall out, the rich (εὐποροὶ) are often worsted in the struggle.'

φάρμακον . . . στρατηγῶν. 7. 2.

'A remedy such as military commanders employ.'

ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν. 7. 3.

The antecedent of ταύτῃ, 'in this way,' is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) 'by their superior flexibility'—sc. διὰ τὸ ψιλὴν τὴν δύναμιν εἶναι.

ἐκκεκρυμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων. 7. 3.

Lit. 'and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.' The opposition of ἐκκεκρυμένους δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὄντας νέους implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἔργων cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, ἀθλητὰς πολέμου.

ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ. 7. 4.

See note on v. 6. § 2.

κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν 7. 6.

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

τὰ λήμματα γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἥττον ἢ τὴν τιμὴν. 7. 7.

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἕνα χρηματίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι.

The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition 8. of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy

and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering 'the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.'

8. 3. *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν, ἐφ' ἧ δεῖ τινα ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορᾶσαν περὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν.*

τῶν ἀναγκαίων, SC. 1) *ἐπιμελειῶν*; or *2) *ἀρχῶν*, cp. supra § 1, *τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν*.

8. 8. *μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς.*

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιθεμένων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (*κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς*), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10, *περὶ τὰς προθέσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων*: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (*ἀναγεγραμμένοι*) and deprived of citizenship.

8. 9. *καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων,*
SC. *κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις.*

8. 10. *ἔτι δ' ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἐτέρας καταδικασάσης ἐτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἐτέρους.*

'Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (*τῶν ἐκιστώτων* opposed to *τῶν νέων*) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.'

With *τὰς τῶν νέων* and *τὰς τῶν ἐκιστώτων* supply *δίκας*.

τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.

8. 11.

Sc. ποιεῖ understood from ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆν.

διὰ βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ 8. 12.
ταύτην.

τὸ σόφισμα, 'the suitable or appropriate device.' The correction τὶ σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression εἰ μὴ τι σοφίζονται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e.g. 'to find out the way' or 'the proper way of making the office less unpopular.'

καὶ περὶ ταύτην, sc. τὴν φυλάττουσαν. 'About this as well as the last case,' i.e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.

τοιαῦται δ' εἴεν αἱ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται 8. 14.
πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

The optative here would seem to require ᾗ, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or εἴεν may be altered into εἴσι.

τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν τι τούτων ἐστὶν εἶδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

8. 15.

The order of the words is τὸ δὲ πᾶν εἶδος τούτων ἐστὶν ἐν τι εἶδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμέλεια, a change which is unnecessary.

καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν.

8. 16.

'And which in addition audits them.'

ἡ γὰρ αὕτη πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφορὴν.

8. 17.

The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean 'the final ratification and the introduction of measures.'

ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὅσας 8. 20.
μὴ τοῖς λεγούσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν
τιμὴν.

Either 1)* the words ἐκείνης ὅσαι, or 2) αἱ θυσίαι must be supplied before ἔχουσι.

Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.

8. 20. καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας κ.τ.λ.

Cp. iii. 14. § 13.

8. 21. ἐπιλογισμοῖς.

Audits by the officers called λογισταί (cp. § 16). But it is hard to distinguish them from ἐξετάσεις since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that λογισταί and ἐξετασταί are only different names for the same officers.

BOOK VII.

Bernays (*Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 69 ff.) has drawn 1-3. attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See *Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings*.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the *Politics*: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3-5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e.g. *Eth.* i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, *ὁμοιὸν δὲ καὶ . . . μεγάλῳ ψυχῷ*; ix. 4. §§ 3-6; x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (*Acad.* ii. 38), and other writers.

ἀδύλον γὰρ ἔστος τοῦτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδύλον εἶναι l. i. πολιτείαν.

‘For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.’

ἀριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοῖς ἀριστα πολιτευομένοις ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ- l. i. χόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ τι γένηται παράλογον.

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is to be taken closely with *πολιτευομένους*. Not ‘they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit, who are governed in the best manner:’ but ‘they lead the best

life who have the best form of government possible under their conditions of life.'

The qualification *ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*, though not mentioned in the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. *infra* § 13, *νῦν δ' ὑποκείσθω τοσούτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὃ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσούτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεων*.

Aristotle adds a further qualification *ἐὰν μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογον*: as we might say without much meaning and almost as a *façon de parler*, 'under ordinary circumstances.'

1. 2, 3. νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. ὥς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαιρέσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἂν ὥς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ.

καὶ τῶν is partitive, 'enough has been said among, or in, the things which have been said.'

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. 'Popular writings in general,' whether those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods, into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, here said to be found in the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, is again mentioned in *Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360 a. 25*, and would seem to have been a received notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. *Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, νεκρομένων δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιῶν οὐσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων*. The *λόγοι ἐξωτερικοὶ* are alluded to in the same manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, *Nic. Eth. i. 13. § 9*. They are opposed to *λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν* *Eud. Eth. 1217 b. 22*.

τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, sc. *τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, which is somewhat strangely omitted. The clause which follows *τῶν τε ἐκτὸς κ.τ.λ.*, is either dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.

ἀνδρίας κ.τ.λ.

1. 4.

The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls φρόνησις by the term σοφία, making no such distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

τοὺς φιλάτους φίλους.

1. 4.

φίλους is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' 1. 5.
ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

ὥσπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with ἂν συγχωρήσειαν, 'as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ' etc.; or ὥσπερ may be a qualification of πάντες, 'in a manner every one' (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

1. 5.

Cp. infra § 8, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἥπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν.

'Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue 1. 5-13. is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.'

The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the 1. 6, 7. soul is twofold:

1) διὰ τῶν ἔργων, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not *vice versa*.

2) κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπούμεναι, from reason, i. e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπερβέλλῃ, τοσούτῃ 1. 7.
μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι.

Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a *μεσότης*, is careful to explain that it is also an *ἀκρότης*.

1. 8. *Ὡς τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἥνπερ εἰληφε διάστασιν ὧν φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαβάσεις ταύτας.*

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. 'If one thing is superior to another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.' But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of *διάστασιν*, after the relative *ἥνπερ* in apposition with *ὑπεροχὴν*. 'According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.' The subject of *εἰληφε* is the antecedent of *ὧν*, i. e. *πράγματα*, supplied from *ἐκάστου πράγματος*.

Bekker, following the old translation 'sortita est,' reads *εἰσῆγε* for *εἰληφε* in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

1. 9. *ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν.*

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, *τί γὰρ ὠφελθήσεται ἄνθρωπος εἰὰν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον κερδήσῃ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ζημιωθῇ;*

1. 10. *μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένους.*

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 14. § 8, *Διὸ δὲ θεὸς δὲι μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ θεωρησίας καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡμερίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει:* also Ib. x. 8. § 7, *ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρονσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη:* and Metaph. xi. c. 7, 1072 b. 26, *ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκείνος δὲ (sc. ὁ θεός) ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδιος.*

1. 11. *ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων διόμενον καὶ πᾶσι εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς.*

The words *πράττουσαν καλῶς* may be taken either with *εὐδαίμονα* or with *τὴν ἀρίστην*. Either 1)* 'the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly': or 2) 'the happy state and that which does rightly is the best': or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) 'the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,' as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words *πράττουσαν καλῶς* are ambiguous, including both our own 'doing well,' and 'faring well.' The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

ἀνδρία δὲ πόλις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ 1. 12.
μορφὴν, ὡς μετασχόντων ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.

τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, sc. *ἐκείνους*, to be supplied before *ὡς μετασχόντων*, 'with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.' Cp. for construction supra § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts *καὶ σωφροσύνη* after *φρόνησις*, and *ἀνδρείος καὶ* before *δίκαιος* to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

ἑτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργων σχολῆς ταῦτα.

1. 13.

Lit. 'For this is the business of another time of leisure,' or 'of another time when we shall be at leisure,' or*, 'of another discussion.' Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word *σχολή* is translated 'discussion' in this passage by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*. It is found in this sense in the *Laws of Plato*, 820 C, and perhaps in *Arist. Polit.* v. 11. § 5.

ἐπὶ τῇ νῦν μεθόδῳ.

1. 14.

'Enquiry,' rather than 'treatise.' No reference is made in the *Politics* to the whole work as a book.

It has been already said, c. 1. § 11, not exactly that the happiness 2. 1. of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can

be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question, which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Susemihl that c. 1. § 11, *ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον* κ.τ.λ. is another form of what follows, and that if c. 1. §§ 11, 12 be omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2 would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2 is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

2. 3. *εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἰρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.*

'Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.' The remark is parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

2. 4. *ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἰρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηγήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.*

ταυτήν, sc. *σκέψιν πολιτικὴν* supplied from *πολιτικῆς*.

ἐκεῖνο, sc. the question, 'which is the more eligible life?'

τοῦτο, sc. the question, 'which is the best state?' Cp. Nic. Eth.

i. 2. § 8.

2. 5. *ἀμφισβητεῖται . . . πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολειψάμενος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις.*

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of life is fully discussed.

2. 6. *ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τε εὖ φρονούντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν.*

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and

contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' 2. 7.
ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπό-
διον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ.

ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν, 'to contain an impediment.' The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὸ μὲν ἄδικον.

ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν 2. 9.
ᾧ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πληθὺς.

Cp. Plato's Laws, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, *supra*, ii. 9. § 34.

καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίων κόσμον λαμβάνειν. 2. 10.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbek either reading κρίων from κρίνον, 'a lily,' or confusing κρίων and κρίων, translated 'lilia.'

ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τιπὶ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ 2. 11.
μηδένα ἀπεκταγῶτι πολέμῳ.

Cp. Hdt. iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύφον περιφερόμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, 'when the cup was brought round.'

Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The 2. 12-18. question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior was discussed in Nic. Eth. x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised con-

cerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6. § 7; c. 7. § 14.

2. 15. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευνόν.

Cp. in i. 7. § 5, οἷον ἡ δικαία, and infra c. 14. § 21.

3. 3, 4. καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διαρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παρίεναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μῖτε πατέρα παιδων μῖτε παῖδας πατρὸς μῖθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηθένα ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀριστον αἰρετώτατον.

‘It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue, and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue. But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.’ Compare the notion of Thrasymachus (Plat. Rep. i.) that justice is the interest of the superior and supra, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis maintained by Callicles (Gorgias 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τοῦτο, sc. πρὸς τὸ ὑπολογεῖν παῖδων, κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. μὴ διαφέρουσι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government answering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical (cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10).

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given only by a natural superiority.

τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ μέρει.

3. 5.

Either 1) 'For equals to share in the honourable is just,' or 2)*

'For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a turn.'

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει.

3. 9.

καὶ τοῦτο = οὐκ ἀπρακτεῖν; or rather some positive idea which is to be elicited from these words. 'There may be in a state internal as well as external activity.'

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὁπουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

3. 10.

'Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have many thoughts and powers enèrgizing within him.'

σχαλῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ 3. 10.
πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

i.e. 'were happiness not possible in isolation.' Cp. Nic. Eth. ix.

4. § 4, ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἂν εἴη ποτ' ἐστίν; ib. x. 8.
§ 7, quoted supra, c. 1. § 10.

καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

3. 10.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has done in his second edition; ='mankind generally.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 17, where πόλεις are joined with γένος ἀνθρώπων.

περὶ αὐτῶν.

4. 1.

'About these general questions.'

περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.

4. 1.

'Other than the best.' These words seem most naturally to refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these words. (See Susemihl's note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνιστάται πόλις.

4. 1.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, ὥστε δῆλον εἶναι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αἰτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ πόλις τις ἂν οὕσα μάλιστα εἴη κατ' εὐχὴν,

μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός. Aristotle appears to start with a consideration of the perfect state; but in attempting to describe the conditions of it he seems to forget his higher purpose. Unless it may be supposed that the Politics is an unfinished work.

4. 3. τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην.

= τὰς ὑποθέσεις, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

4. 5. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλις ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἱπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἱατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσκειν ἢ τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος.

'That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.' The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

4. 8, 9. ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλον ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τότε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶωθε γίνεσθαι, διὰ καὶ πόλιν ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὁρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον.

The connexion is as follows: 'The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.'

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. *Metaph.* xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, παραδίδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπολαίων ἐν μύθῳ σχήματι καταλειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τῆς ὅλης φύσεως· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθεύει ἤδη προσήκει πρὸς τὴν πειθὰ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.

τοῦτο refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἔργον.

ὁ λεχθεὶς ὁρος, 'the above-mentioned principle,' sc. εὐταξία.

διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους δὲ πρῶτον 4. 11.
πλήθος αὐταρκείας πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν.

διὸ refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις, ἥ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10. § 3, *οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν.*

πρῶτην and *πρῶτον*. 'We then first have a state when we first have a sufficient number.' *πρῶτον* may be either adjective or adverb.

κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. 'A good life according to the requirements of the political community,' i.e. the life of a freeman and citizen.

εἶναι μείζω πόλιν.

4. 12.

μείζω is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. The point is as follows: 'There may be also a greater city than is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not unlimited.' He has said above (§ 4) 'that the more numerous city is not necessarily the greater,' but in this case it is or may be.

εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων, τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων. 4. 12.

The *πράξεις*, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp. i. 5. § 3, *ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δ' ἄρχεται ἐστὶ τι τοῦτων ἔργον.*

ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους.

4. 13.

Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, E, *οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς πολίτας) αὐτοῖς εἶναι.* 'Ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὐτ' ἂν τιμῇ τῆς ἀξίας οὐτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δόξης ποτὶ τίς ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ὁρθῶς τυγχάνοι.

ὁπλον τοῖσιν ὅς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἢ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους 4. 14.
ἱπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνωτος.

This is a condensed sentence, meaning 'the largest number which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the purposes of life.' Aristotle wishes to combine *μέγιστός τε* with *εὐσυνμία*. Cp. Poet. 7, 1451 a. 3, *ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνωτον εἶναι.*

5. 2. *ἑλαστος*,

like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who draw or pull to either extreme.'

5. 3, 4. The paragraph—*τὸ δ' εἶδος . . . εὐπαρακόμστον*—is ill arranged : it may be analysed as follows : 'The city should be difficult of access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens ; the whole territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily seen is easily protected) : it should be well situated both in regard to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles : 1) the one already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience to friends : to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words *δεῖ γὰρ . . . ἀπάντων* are a repetition of the words *τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν*.

5. 4. *εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος*,

sc. *περὶ τοῦ εἵδους τῆς χώρας*.

5. 4. *ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, κὰν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμστον*.

τῆς ὕλης dependent on *εὐπαρακόμστον* = *εὐ ἔχουσαν πρὸς τὴν κομιδὴν* : *τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης* either 1) wood (*ὕλη*) which is used as timber, or 2) timber which is used as material (*ὕλη*).

6. The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero, who discusses the subject at length in his *De Republica*, Book ii. cc. 3 and 4.

6. 1. *καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν*,

sc. *ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασιν*.

6. 2. *ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.*

'That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.'

6. 4. *αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν*.

'Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.'

Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὄρωμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχον καὶ χώρας καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίπεια θ. 5.
καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ
μήτε πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιοῦτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,
φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γέγνησθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν,
ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥᾷδιον
τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίεσθαι δεῖ
πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

In this passage *ὑπάρχον* the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) *ὑπάρχειν* by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into *ὑπάρχοντα*, in the latter case with the omission of *καί*. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for *ἐμπόριον* may be supplied with *ὑπάρχον* from the preceding sentence, the plural words *ἐπίπεια καὶ λιμένας* being taken in apposition as an epexegetis. 'But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.'

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piræus at Athens, Nisæa at Megara, Cenchreæ and Lechæum at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphæ at Thespiæ, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖσθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίος. 6. 7.

ἡγεμονικόν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of *πολιτικόν* into *πολεμικόν* in Bekker's 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For *πολιτικὸς βίος*, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, *εἰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν*.

πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τρυφῆς [οἱ Ἡρακλεῶται]. 6. 8.

Cp. Xen. Anab. v. 6. § 10, *πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ πλοῖα ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ*.

6. 9. καὶ πόλεων.

πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of 'ports like the Piraeus' *; or closely connected with λιμένων of 'cities in relation to their harbours,' cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἐπωρίων (Coraes), ἐμπορίων (Schmidt), περιπολίων (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίων might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read *περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεων* [οἱ πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. οἱ, *περὶ μὲν οὖν πόλεων* [οἱ πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

7. 2. τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην are explanatory of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo l. 250 :

ἡμὲν ὅσοι Πελοπόννησον πλείραν ἔχουσιν,
ἡδ' ὅσοι Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἀμφιρῆτας κατὰ νήσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.

Plato too was no stranger to speculations about race. Cp. Laws v. 747 D, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους: and Rep. iv. 435 E, τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδὸν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν μάλιστα ἂν τις αἰτιάσαστο τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματος, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα. Cp. also Herod. ix. 122, φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι: οὐ γάρ τοι τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπὸν τε θωμαστὸν φύειν καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια: and iii. 106, ἢ Ἑλλὰς τὰς ὥρας πολλὰν τι κάλλιστα κεκρημένης ἔχει. So Plat. Tim. 24 C, ἢ θεὸς . . . ἐκλεξαμένη τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ γεγένεσθε (viz. Hellas), τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὥρων ἐν αὐτῇ καταδοῦσα, οἷτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἴσοι.

7. 3. μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας.

Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too

strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—*κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, ὡς περ καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπασιν ἀνθρώποισι.*

φασὶ τίνας δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. 7. 5.

This, like some of Aristotle's other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, *πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πρᾶστατους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώστους τοῦναντίον*, where we may observe that the word *φιλητικός* is not used by Plato.

ὁ θυμός. 7. 5.

'Passion' = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

*ἀργαλῆως μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος,
οὕτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὕτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι.*

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. 1 Aristotle raises the question whether *φιλία* resides in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and not in τὸ θυμοειδές. Like our word passion, *θυμός* has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, 7. 5–8. but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, *καὶ [ὀργίζονται] μᾶλλον τοῖς φίλοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις*: and Psalm xli. 9, 'Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.'

οὐ γὰρ δὲ περὶ φίλων ἀπάχεται. 7. 6.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible, though, in the absence of context, it is im-

possible to interpret it with certainty: 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved'? cp. again from Psalm lv. 12: 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A *mot* attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning *θυμὲ θυμὲ ἀμνηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε*, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60): the metre might be restored either by omitting *δή*, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting *οὖν* before *δή*.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render ἀπάγχεο 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read ἀπ' ἐγχείων.

7. 7. οὐδ' εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας.
Yet the *μεγαλόψυχος* described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

7. 9. οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the *ἀκρίβεια* in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and *a priori* truth of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

8. 1. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συσσεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μέρη τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετίον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμῆς, ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words *ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη* answer to *ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν* in the application to the state.

The editions vary between *ταῦτα* and *ταῦτά*. *ταῦτα* is confirmed by the words of § 6, *πόσα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη*. If we

read *ταὐτὰ* it will be convenient to supply *ἐκείνοις* with *ἐν αὐτοῖς*, if *ταὐτὰ*, *ἐκείνα*.

ἐξ ἧς ἐν τῷ γένει, i. e. 'out of which is formed,' or 'which forms a lower class having a unity;' 'which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,' *ἐν τῷ γένει* = *ἐν τῷ ὅτι τὸ γένος*.

'The end has nothing in common with the means; the final 8. 3. cause with the conditions.' Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection, 'that the end is inseparable from the means,' or, 'is only the sum of the means'; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; 'that no line can be drawn between *à priori* and *à posteriori* truth.' The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

ἀργάνῃ τε παρὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς. 8. 3.

Governed by *οὐδὲν κοινὸν ἔστι*. 'The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.'

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts 8. 5-6. and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: 'Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.' He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the

character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 *infra*), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

8. 5. ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14-16, ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην ἐν βίῃ τελείῃ.

8. 6. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃν ἄνεν πόλιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

'Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.' All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the θῆτες are a condition but not a part; τὸ βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

8. 7. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον.

'First,' i.e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class.

Spengel would omit καὶ πρῶτον. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἦν καλοῦσιν ἱερατεῖαν, 'which they call ritual.' The formula ἦν καλοῦσιν seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. ἦν καλοῦσιν τινας ἀλιγαρχίαν, vi. 1. § 6.

8. 7. ἔκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν.

The last words are pleonastic, 'sixth in numerical succession.'

8. 9. The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'of necessary matters of life,' is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἀναγκαϊότατον in § 7. ἀναγκαίων may also refer to punishments: see *infra* c. 13. § 6.

9. 1, 2. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τοῦτο πολιτεία.

'This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is

already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.

καθάπερ γὰρ εἰπομεν.

9. 2.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see *supra* c. 4. § 1.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας . . . εἴρηται 9. 3. πρότερον.

The connexion is as follows: 'But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.'

εἴρηται πρότερον in c. 8. § 5 *supra*. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

τοὺς μάλιστα ἵσεισθαι,

9. 4.

sc. πολίτας, (ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει § 3), 'citizens of the best state.'

πότερῳ ἑτέρα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον.

9. 4.

Bekker in his second edition inserts *ἐτέρους* after *ἑτέρα* unnecessarily. Without it we may translate: 'Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?'

Compare Book ii. 5. § 26.

9. 5.

ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τοῦτους.

9. 7.

The use of *περὶ* is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: 'they too should have a near interest in property,' an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said *infra* § 8 τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τοῦτων.

9. 8. εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

9. 10. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

τούτων, i. e. not merely the ἐπλετικών and βουλευτικών; to these must be added the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται, and τὸ θητικόν, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται and τὸ θητικόν) and the parts of it (τὸ ἐπλετικόν καὶ βουλευτικόν) is permanent. The division between τὸ ἐπλετικόν, τὸ τῶν ἱερίων γένος and τὸ βουλευτικόν is transitory or κατὰ μέρος, i. e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

10. 1. ἔοικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

10. 2. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, 'the custom in Crete: going back to the reign of Minos.'

10. 3-5. 'The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs' (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), 'and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians' (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) 'who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrhenia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis' (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) 'Chones.'

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.

δοη τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὐσα, viz. that part of Italy which is bounded or enclosed at its narrowest point by the two gulfs. The reason (ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα) is imperfectly expressed: 'You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.' It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, 'What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?' There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, 'breaks out' into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions 'their existence in Italy.

Σύρτην is the reading of most MSS., σύρτην of two only. The 10. 5. MSS. of the old translator appear all to give *syrtem*. Σίρην is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Πολιτείας 542, καὶ οἱ τὴν Σίρην δὲ κατοικοῦντες . . . ὅς φησι Τίμαιος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἰς τρυφήν ἐξέκειλαν οὐχ ἥσσαν Συβαριτῶν, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëttling's conjecture Σιρῆτις the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy called Syrtis or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐπείθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ χωρισμὸς δ 10. 6. κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερβαίνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σεσωστρίους,

is translated in the English text: 'From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.'

It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: 'The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.'

The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called 'the origin of the institution' (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter

country its origin dates further back than in the former, for Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have originated there.

10. 7. *σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρησθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ.*

A favourite reflection of Aristotle's. See note on text for parallel passages.

10. 8. *ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα.*

'All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.' Cp. Plat. Laws ii. 657. 'Their (i. e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.' For further references see note on text. That this sameness was the weakness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.

10. 8. *τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις*

is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus into *εὐρημένοις*, a change which seems to be required by the want of a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of *παρὰλελειμμένα*. Cp. supra, *σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρησθαι πολλάκις*, and ii. 5. § 16.

10. 10. *ἕστερον ἐροῦμεν.*

This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § 1 the common meals are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of the institution.

10. 11. *τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγέτονας πολέμους ὁμονητικώτερον.*

A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly (Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 *ἐστειρημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔσσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν*,

στάσω δὲ ἐνέσεσθαι), and as Aristophanes in his 'Acharnians' seems to imply, were wanting to make peace.

For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text. 10. 11.

δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιόικους.

10. 13.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιόικους, a comparison which has led to the insertion of ἢ before περιόικους in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. 'If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.'

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εἵχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς 11. 1. τέτταρα βλέποντας.

The order of the words is as follows—δεῖ εἵχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν [τοῦ] τὴν θέσιν εἶναι.

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows:

1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra): 2) good water: 3) convenience for administration (πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις): 4) adaptation to military requirements (πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις).

Cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, καὶ σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπέδειξα αὐτῇ, ὅτι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἀναπέπταται, ὥστε εὐδηλον εἶναι, ὅτι χειμῶνος μὲν εὐήλιός ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ θέρους εὐσκιος.

Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: 'Oppidum magnificenter est aedificatum et eleganter; sed positum non prudenter. In quâ civitate auster cum fiat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiant, cum septentrio, restituuntur in sanitatem, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoris.' (Quoted by Eaton.)

δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

11. 2.

κατὰ βορέαν = 'facing the same way that the North wind does,' (cp. κατὰ νότον) i. e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. 118 A, B, εἰ δὲ τόπος οὗτος ἀπὸ τῆς νότου πρὸς νότον ἐνέτραπτο, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτων κατέβορρος.

δεύτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect is what is recommended; i.e. a situation which is open to the healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

11. 3. *τοῦτό γ' εὑρηται*

is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus, *εὐρησθαι*, adopted by Bekker in his second edition, is unnecessary.

τοῦτό γ' εὑρηται = 'a remedy has been found for this,' i.e. 'a remedy may be found.' The language is not quite symmetrical, but this is no reason for altering it.

11. 3. *ὑποδοχὰς ὑμβρίοις ὕδασιν.*

Five MSS. read *ὑμβρίους*, a possible reading, 'rain cisterns for water' instead of 'cisterns for rain water.'

11. 4. *ἐν τε τοιοῦτῃ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον.*

'In the situation described, and looking to the quarter described.'

11. 5. *τοιοῦτων ραμάτων.*

The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, 'such streams as I have spoken of above,' that is to say, 'good streams' (*ὑγιεινῶν* § 4).

11. 5. *ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὴν καὶ μοναρχικὴν, ἀριστοκρατικὴν . . . ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους.*

It may be asked: 'Why should a single fortress be adapted to a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?' Probably because in the former case the government is more concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain their power against the people, must draw together. An aristocracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is therefore better dispersed.

11. 7. *ἂν τις οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἀεὶ καλοῦσθαι τινες τῶν ἀμπελῶν συστάδας.*

The last word is explained by Hesychius (under *ἐυστάδες*) as *αἱ πυκναὶ ἀμπελοὶ, ἀμεινον δὲ τὰς εἰλῆ καὶ μὴ κατὰ στοῖχον πεφυτευμέναις*

ἀκούειν, i.e. 1) *vines planted thickly or in clumps, or 2) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν (τείχη).

11. 8.

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff, περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὃ Μέγας, ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ξυμφορὸν τὸ καθεύδειν εἶν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη.

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

ἐλεγχόμενος ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνους καλλωπισσάμενος.

11. 8.

The disasters of Leuctra (B.C. 371) and of Mantinea (B.C. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16). Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλείετι διαφέρουσαι οὐ 11. 9.
καλὸν τὸ παρᾶσθαι σέζεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρουμένης.

A somewhat romantic notion with which may be compared the further refinement of § 11, infra; also the saying of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when he saw catapults brought from Sicily, which in other words and under other circumstances has no doubt often been ejaculated by the African or New Zealand savage, *πολλὸν ἀνὴρ ἀνὰ δρεπά*. (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 219 A.)

πολεμικώτερον.

11. 9.

Either 'the most truly warlike in character' or *'the best defence of the warrior.' Both meanings may be included.

11. 10. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκίσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοίχους.*
Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might
in many cases need the protection of walls.
ὁμοίως δέ, sc. ἔχει.

12. 1. *αὐτά,*
sc. τὰ τείχη, i. e. the position of the walls; or more generally,
'the consideration of these circumstances.'

12. 2. *ἀρχαίων.*
The MSS. vary between *ἀρχῶν, ἀρχαίων, ἀρχαίων.*

12. 3. *εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς
θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνότερος.*

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness,
suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the
neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if
we may judge from his Latin '*bene se habentem ad apparentiam
virtutis*,' seems to have read *θέσιν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιφά-
νειαν*. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found
in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who
have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. i. 7 '*Aedibus
vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse,
unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur areae distribuantur*'
(quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107,
'The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence.'

12. 4, 5. *εἴη δ' ἂν εὐχαρὶς ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχῃ
τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διηγεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτων
τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀρχοντας τινὰς διατρέβειν, τοὺς δὲ
πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων
παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων
φύβον.*

The opposition of *μὲν* and *δὲ* before *νεωτέροις* and *πρεσβυτέροις*
seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of
certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates

as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasium, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. *‘Some of the rulers are to be present (*διατρίβειν*) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.’ Here either another verb has to be supplied with *παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχουσιν* or the word *διατρίβειν* is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, ‘and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.’ This, however, disregards *μὲν* and *δὲ* and seems not to cohere with the words *δηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας*: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (*τοὺς δὲ . . ἀρχουσιν*) that ‘the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders,’ (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause *ἣ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ.*, shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word *κόσμον* is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of ‘institution,’ which is in some degree supported by the use of *κόσμος τῆς πολιτείας* for ‘the order or constitution of the state,’ (*Περὶ Κόσμου* 6. 399 b. 18). Or* *τούτων τὸν κόσμον* may be the accusative after *δηρῆσθαι* and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of ‘this embellishment of the state:’ [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make *δηρῆσθαι* impersonal, *κόσμον* being the indirect accusative following it. *καὶ τούτων*, this institution too, i.e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

τῶν δὲ τῶν ἀνίων κ.τ.λ.

12. 6.

Cp. *supra*, c. 5. § 4.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλεῖθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἀρχοντας.

12. 6.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employ-

ments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος* appear to be a repetition of *ἐπεὶ δὲ δαί τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν* at the beginning of the Chapter. *πλῆθος* is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

12. 6. *περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν.*

'To have their proper place.' Cp. § 8, *τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν*. *τὴν . . . οἰκοδομημάτων*, sc. *τάξιν*, is to be supplied.

12. 7. *τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν.*

The qualifying *καλουμένην*, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

12. 8. The MSS. vary between *νενεμῆσθαι* and *μεμμηῆσθαι*. P⁴ has compounded them into *νεμεμῆσθαι*. Bekker in his second edition has adopted *μεμμηῆσθαι*. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

13. 1. *περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.*

Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its *ἰδιότης* (supra c. 4. §§ 1-3). Now he is going on to speak of the *πολιτεία* itself, which is the *εἶδος* of a *πᾶσις* (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7-9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the 'constitution' of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

13. 2. *ἵκεται καλῶς.*

'Stands out well,' or 'distinctly.' For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, *ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὁρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν*.

13. 3. In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary con-

ditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (*ελάττωτος τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις*), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9-12.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' 13. 4.
ἣν ἀριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἀριστα δ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν
μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστὶ, μὴ
λανθάνειν.

The connexion is as follows: 'In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.'

φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος. 13. 5.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. 13. 5.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text), and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. 13. 5, 6.

'Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;' they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word 'just,'—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' 13. 6.
ἀρετῆς μὲν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώ-
τερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μᾶλλον τὸν ἄνδρα μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν),
αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐνορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ καλλίσται πράξεις.

'They have their rightness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.' For the use of *ἀναγκαῖον*, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἑτερα ἀίρεται, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς.

Under the common notion of ἀναγκαῖα and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, by a play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the existence of states.

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς πράξεις, sc. φέρονται, τεύουσται οἱ γινόμεναι.

18. 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἵρεσίς ἐστιν.

'The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,' i.e. for the sake of removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end to crime.

The conjecture ἀναίρεσις, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes, Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

18. 7. χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσφ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαιλαῖς καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν.

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12, ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἔπειδαν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας μὴ δὲ ἀναλγησίαν ἀλλὰ γεννίδας ὧν καὶ μεγάλῳ ψυχος.

18. 8. ὁῖλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἰτία τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρόν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶντο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

'The good man will make a use of external goods which is absolutely good. And because (διὸ) this use of external goods is good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to the lyre and not to the player.'

αἰτιῶντο, sc. τις, gathered from ἄνθρωποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P^s) and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

18. 9. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία.

1) 'Since therefore some things must be presupposed (διὸ), our prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have the goods of fortune,' sc. εἶναι ἐξ ἐκείνων ὧν, etc.; or 2) 'we desire that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer to our prayer,' making κατ' εὐχὴν, sc. εἶναι, the predicate, ὧν, sc. εἶναι.

ἐπειούς ὧν; or 3) 'we ask if we could only have our prayer,' or 'though it be only an ideal,' as above, κατ' εὐχὴν, iv. 11. § 1, πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γυνομένην.

καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον διὰ τῶν 13. 10. πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, ii. 3. § 2, τὸ γὰρ πάντες δεσπύω, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes 'each' from 'all.'

ἐνὰ τε οὐθέν ὄφελος φύσει· τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ. 13. 11.

Lit. 'Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,' or 'such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.' To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for 'instinct,' or 'natural impulse.' From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term φύσις in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.

ἐτέρους . . . ἢ τοὺς αἰνοῦς διὰ βίου. 14. 1.

'Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?'

τοῖς ἀρχομένοις. 14. 2.

1) *Dative of reference: 'In relation to their subjects,' or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feebler sense, τοῖς ἀρχομένοις may be taken after φανερόν, 'so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.'

Σκόλαξ. 14. 3.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the

writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

14. 4. πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—'the country people combine with the malcontents of the town;' but, 'all the inhabitants *minus* the rulers,' i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

14. 5. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτόν τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὃν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεισθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν.

Lit. 'For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i.e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.'

αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦτόν. The word αὐτῷ has less MS. authority than αὐτό, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino's translation. Αὐτό may be translated: 'In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.' The correction τῶν αὐτῶν for αὐτῷ is unnecessary.

14. 8. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φάμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός.

i. e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

14. 11. ὥσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἔρουμένῃ ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος ἀρετῆς εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῦ δυοῖν.

ὥσαύτως . . ἔχειν. 'And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul;' ὥσαύτως answers to ἀνάλογον ἔχειν, and is to be taken closely with καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, SC. τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

ἡ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, sc. τῶν πράξεων. 'The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (τοῖν δυοῖν).' Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ [sc. εὐδαιμονία] κεχωρισμένη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τὰ νοούμενα and τὰ φαινόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν πολιτείαν ἄγεται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν 14. 16. σκοπὸν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἃ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐλέγετα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελέλεγται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῃ ἀσκήσει (sc. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) εὐθὺς νῖοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρείον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀναιμῶς διατρώμενοι οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰσοπάλεις κινδύνου χωροῦμεν.

καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελέλεγται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea. Cp. c. 11. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων.

14. 17.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the 'de Republica Lacedemoniorum,' attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolacon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένουσες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζ- 14. 18. ζῶντες πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβαλλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς.

'If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.'

14. 19. *ὅτι κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν.*

'If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.'

14. 20. *Πανσυνία τῇ βασιλείᾳ.*

See note on v. 1. § 10.

14. 21. *ταῦτά γάρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινὴ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐμποιοῦν δέι ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.*

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding *τε* after *τόν*.

14. 22. *τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφῆσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες.*

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf):—

*καὶ γὰρ, δε τὰ δεῖν' ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,
βαφῇ σίδηρος ὧς, ἐθελύνθη στόμα
πρὸς τῇσδε τῆς γυναικός.*

15. In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative idealism; we are put off with words such as *θεωρία*, *οὐσία*, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning

of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians 'provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil' (Thuc. ii. 38); that 'they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her' (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in 'the islands of the blest' than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that 'the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.'

δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως ἐξῇ σχολάζειν.

15. 2.

'The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.'

ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

15. 3.

Cp. Tennyson's *Maud* l. vi.—xiii. :—

'Why do they prate of the blessings of peace?

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.'

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῇ μὴ νομίζουσιν ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γινέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινος ἀρετῆς.

15. 6.

'The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.'

Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. 9. §§ 34, 35: 'Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.'

15. 6. ἐπει δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ἐπει δὲ φανερόν ἐκ τούτων μείζω [εἶναι] τὰ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν [sc. ἠθικῶν ἢ πολεμικῶν χρῆσιν understood from ἀπόλαυσιν] καὶ ὅτι [αἱ ἀρεταὶ] εἰσι δι' αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν τούτων ἀπόλαυσιν].

πῶς δὲ introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

ἀρετῶν goes back to διὰ τίνος ἀρετῆς in the previous sentence.

15. 7. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκῆναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἡχθαι.

The meaning of ἡχθαι is simply 'trained;,' whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to ὁμοίως. Either 1)* 'in the same i.e. a mistaken way'; or 2) 'all the same' = 'nevertheless.' The first is most in accordance with the context διημαρτηκῆναι καὶ τὸν λόγον. The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. 'For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.'

15. 8. φανερόν δὴ τοῦτό γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τίνος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος.

1) *The connexion is as follows: 'We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.' That is to say: 'In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.'

2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows: 'It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.' According to this way of taking the passage *γένεσις* in the 1st clause is equivalent to *τέλος* in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. α) *τινός* has no meaning. β) The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For *ἄλλου τέλους* would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, *ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς*.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: 'So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.' To this interpretation it may be objected that *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is taken in a different sense from *ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς* and that *τοῦ τέλους*, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

See infra note on § 9.

16. 5.

τὸν χρησμόν.

16. 7.

The oracle '*μὴ τέμνε νῆαν ἄλοκα*' which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Götting has constructed a hexameter *ἀλλὰ νῆας, Τροίξην, ἄλοκας μὴ τέμνε βαθείας*. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of *νῆας* 'fallow ground' (in Attic used for *νείας*) and *νῆας* 'the young maiden:' or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρρέττει περὶ τῶν δακακαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζυγνίσαι, 16. 9. τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρόν.

The words *ἢ μικρόν* probably mean 'thereabouts' or 'nearly,' like *μικροῦ*; or some word such as *πλείων* may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed

for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, *On Population* vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation 'must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.' But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the *Republic* (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time 'when they have passed the greatest speed of life' (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the *Laws* (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the *History of Animals* (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

16. 10. *ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν.*

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up to the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

16. 10. *τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσσω-
τε χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιέειν ταύτην.*

Sc. *δεῖ οὕτως ποιεῖν*, taking *δεῖ* from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read *δεῖ χρησθαι* after *χρόνοις*, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of *χρῶνται* after *χρησθαι* is unpleasant.

συναυλία, 'cohabitation' probably from *αἰλή* not from *αἰλές*.

καὶ αὐτοὺς ἦδη.

16. 11.

i.e. 'themselves when they come to be parents as well as the writers on these subjects.'

Like Plato, Aristotle prescribes gymnastics for women as well as men. Cp. Plat. Laws vii. 789; Rep. v. 457.

διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, εἰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθνῶν καλὴ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι 16. 15. τῶν γενομένων ὥρισται γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος. εἰν δὲ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶν, ἐμποιέσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν.

'But when there are too many children (for we have settled that there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be practised before sense and life have begun.'

ὥρισται γὰρ δὴ . . . τὸ πλῆθος gives the reason for introducing the previous remark. 'I speak of this because population has been limited.' Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for supposing that population will be kept down even if nothing is done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher (about 60 A.D.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of kindred.

Respecting the seven ages, see *infra*, note on c. 17. § 15; and 16. 17. for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early education, cp. Laws vii. 788-794.

αἰεσθαι.

17. 1.

sc. δεῖ. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

τὰς δὲ διατάξεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ 17. 6. καλλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αἰξίῃσιν.

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This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. ('When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.' *Laws* vii. 792 A). Yet the words *ἐν τοῖς νόμοις* sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

τὰς διατάσεις, 'the passions or struggles,' a neutral word to be interpreted by *κλαυθμοὶ* which follows.

17. 7. *ἐδλογον οὖν ἀπελευθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν δραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας.*

A thought enlarged upon by Plato *Rep.* ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered *ἀνελευθερίαν*, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into *ἀνελευθερίας*. In his 2nd edition he has substituted *ἀνελευθέρων*, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; *τηλικούτους ὄντας* may be taken as an accusative of the remoter object. *ἀπελαύνειν* has been altered by Susemihl into *ἀπολαβεῖν*, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading *ἀπολαύειν*, and partly on the 'absumere' of the old translator.

καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. 1)* 'Even when they are at this early age,' i.e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) *καὶ* may be emphatic, 'especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.'

17. 10. *ἐπιμαλὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἀρχουσι μὴδὲν μῆτε ἀγαλμα μῆτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλείον προήκουσαν καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.*

οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the *Acharnians* 263 ff.

The words *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις* introduce a second exception: 'in-

decency may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods;’ *πρὸς δὲ τοῖτοισι*, ‘and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.’ Cp. once more Plat. *Rep.* ii. 378: ‘The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.’

Θεόδωρος.

17. 13.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone: Aeschines was his tritagonist who played Creon. Dem. *Fal. Leg.* 418. He is mentioned in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι διαροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς, δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαρίσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. 17. 15.

It is uncertain whether we should read **οὐ καλῶς* or *οὐ κακῶς* in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand *οὐ κακῶς* is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcilable with the context:—‘Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature;’ or, ‘and we should observe the divisions made by nature, i. e. the divisions into sevens’ (Bergk 25). This is also confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, *αὕτη [sc. ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀκμή] ὅ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἥπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πενήκοντα ἐτών.*

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The ‘sevens’ of Aristotle agree with the ‘sevens’ of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50):—

*Παῖς μὲν ἀνηβος ἔων ἐτι νέπιος ἔρως ἐδότῃεν
φύσας ἐβαλλεῖ πρῶτον ἐν ἑπτ’ ἔτεσιν·*

τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελείῃ θεὸς ἔπτ' ἐνιαυτοῦς,
 ἥβης ἐκφαίνει σήματα γεινομένης·
 τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεζομένων ἔτι γυίων
 λαχνοῦται, χροῖης ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης·
 τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος
 ἰσχύς, ἣν τ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς·
 πέμπτῃ δ' ὥριον, ἄνδρα γάμου μεμνημένον εἶναι
 καὶ παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσπίσω γενεήν·
 τῇ δ' ἕκτῃ περὶ πάντα καταρτίζεται νόος ἀνδρός,
 οὐδ' ἔρδειν ἔθ' ὁμῶς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμνα θέλει·
 ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἐβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος
 ὀκτώ τ'· ἀμφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ' ἔτη·
 τῇ δ' ἐνάτῃ ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ
 πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλώσσά τε καὶ σοφίη·¹
 τῇ δεκάτῃ δ' ὅτε δὴ τελείῃ θεὸς ἔπτ' ἐνιαυτοῦς,
 οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἐὼν μοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου.

Compare an interesting note of Mr. Cope's in his edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 160.

¹ al. lect. σώμά τε καὶ δύναμις.

BOOK VIII.

δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην πολιτεύεσθαι.

1. 2.

Here Susemihl has adopted *παιδεύεσθαι* after Aretino's translation. But *πολιτεύεσθαι* the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbek, 'politizare,' and is more in accordance with the context: 'For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.'

φανερόν ἐστι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων 1. 3.
καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, *κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὁρθήν*, where he goes on to show that public education can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the education of individuals must be based upon general principles, and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

ἐπαινέσκει δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται 1. 4.
σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education (cp. *infra* c. 4), but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, *τοσούτων ἀπολειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰσὶν ὥστ' οὐδὲ γράμματα μαθήουσιν*: and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), 'not many of them could count.'

καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbek. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

2. 1. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων.

2. 2. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμποδὸν παιδείας.

'The customary education' or 'the education which meets us in life'—without any idea of obstruction.

2. 2. παραχώδης ἡ σκέψις.

'It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.'

2. 2. τὰ περιττά.

Lit. 'things in excess,' i. e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language 'the higher knowledge.' For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

2. 2. κριτὰς τινος.

Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8, πάντα τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἰληφε πλὴν τῆς γῆς, 'All these views have found approvers.'

2. 6. καταβεβλημένα,

'laid down and so established:' cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημένα παιδείματα. Cp. supra, ἡ ἐμποδὸν παιδεία.

2. 6. ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν,

'are of a double character,' partly liberal, partly illiberal.

3. 1. ὅστι δὲ τέτταρα κ.τ.λ.

μουσικὴ is here separated from γράμματα, which in Plato's Republic are included under it.

We may remark the form of sentence: 'There are four,' but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, *τέταρτον ἔτιον*.

αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

3. 2.

Not *φύσις* but *ἡ σχολή*, as is shown by the clause which follows, *ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς* referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. *ἄ* 6.

ὁλως.

3. 3.

Either, 1) 'the general question must be asked,' or 2) *taking *ὁλως* in an emphatic sense, 'the question must be surely' or 'absolutely asked.' In what follows §§ 3-6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But *ὁλως* is only a conjecture of Victorius. All the MSS. read *τέλος*, except one (P^o), which reads *τελευταῖον*. (Cp. the old trans. 'finaliter.') The reading *τέλος* gives a sufficient but not a very good sense ('lastly'), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. *συνέγειν*, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν.

3. 6.

Cp. *infra* § 8, *τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν*. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) 'the leisure occupied in *διαγωγή*:' 2) 'the *διαγωγή* of leisure.' It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms *διαγωγή*. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. *πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάσσεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπη, λατρεία τίς ἐστιν) καὶ τὴν διαγωγήν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν* *infra* c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with *φρόνησις* (c. 5. § 4. init. *πρὸς διαγωγήν συμβάλλεται τι καὶ φρόνησις*) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from *παιδιὰ* and *ἀνάπαυσις* 'amusement' and 'relaxation,' which are properly, not ends, but only means to renewed exertion (cp.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas *διαγωγή* and *σχολή* are ends in themselves. The idea of 'culture,' implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to *διαγωγή*.

3. 8. *ἦν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν.*
ἐν ταύτῃ, sc. τῇ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ. •
τάττουσιν, sc. αὐτὴν or music. 'They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.'
3. 8. *ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἐστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖν.*
 The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original *θαλεῖν* is to be taken with *δαῖτα*; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and *καλεῖν Θαλίην* is said in the same way as *καλείουσιν ἀοιδὸν* in the following quotation.
3. 11. *ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον.*
 i.e. 'the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education';—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.
4. 1. *οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὥς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον.*
 'The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.'
4. 2. *εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ζῴοις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁρώμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριατάτοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦβειν.*
 'And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.' Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle's Criticism on this passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5-8.
4. 3. *τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν.*
 Not 'of Epirus,' which would be wholly disconnected from the

Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation 'there are other inland tribes,' for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes 'about the Pontus' are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately 'other tribes on the mainland.' For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

μη πρὸς ἀσκούοντας.

4. 4.

Said for πρὸς μη ἀσκούοντας. But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn overpowered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, εἴτε τῷ τοῖς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τούτων διάφερον, εἴτε τῷ μόνον μη πρὸς ἀσκούοντας ἀσκέειν.

ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος.

4. 6.

Cp. Plato (e.g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἡλικίαν.

4. 9.

'To occupy,' 'engage,' 'employ.'

ὥς ὥστε ἐνθέσμιον γίγνεται τοῖς λόγοις.

5. 1.

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of

music='the keynote,' 'that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.' Cp. Arist. Rhet.

iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὃ τι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι τοῦτο προαυλίσαντες συνήψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν.

5. 2-4. Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music :

1) παιδιᾶς καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.

2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (παιδεία).

3) πρὸς διαγωγὴν καὶ φρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for a) παιδεία, δ) κάθαρσις, c) διαγωγή; a) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν), c) to 3).

This leaves δ) κάθαρσις to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to κάθαρσις (i. e. 'purgation' rather than 'purification'). Cp. c. 3. § 4, φαρμακείας χάριν, and c. 7. § 4, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. See note on c. 7. § 3.

5. 2. καὶ ἄμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered ἄμα παύει into ἀναπαύει, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380:—

ὅς [Βρόμιος] τάδ' ἔχει,
θιασύνειν τε χοροῖς
μετὰ τ' αἰλοῦ γελάσαι,
ἀποπαῦσάι τε μερίμνας.

5. 3. τάττουσιν αὐτήν.

Sc. εἰς παιδιᾶν καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν understood from the words preceding.

5. 3. Reading ὕπνῳ for οἶνῳ, gathered from ὕπνου καὶ μέθης supra, with

Bekker's 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbek.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδίδόται B. 4.
ταῖς τοιαύταις.

The particle τε is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into τι or τοῖς, or 3) that καὶ φρόνησιν should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4, ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ φρόνησιν.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσέκει τέλος.

B. 4.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. 'The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.' Yet the meaning of τέλος is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁλογίαις γίγνεσθαι.

§§ 5-8 are a series of ἀπορίαι which take the form of a sup-pressed dialogue. 1) But a child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες ἐκείνοι γὰρ οὐ μαθήσαντες ὁμῶς δύναται κρίνειν B. 7.
ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.

Cp. what Plato says of the 'timocratic man,' in Rep. viii. 548 E, αἰσθητότερον τε δεῖ αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποακουστότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ· καὶ φιλήκου μὲν, βηγορικὸν δ' αὖδαμῶς.

οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ καθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύστους B. 8.
καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους.

In II. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονὴν τῶν καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τοχούσων ζητούντες B. 13.

δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τελει τῶν πράξεων ἔχειν ὁμοιωμά τι.

There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of we know not what: no account can be given of it. ταύτην, sc. οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'the higher pleasure'; ἐκείνην, 'the lower pleasure.'

5. 14. δι' ἧν μὲν οὖν αἰτίας κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὐδ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον ἀλλ' ἐλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὁνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι.

5. 14. οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην,
sc. ζητοῦσιν.

5. 17. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

i. e. 'any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.'

5. 18. παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις.

'Near to or not far removed from their true natures.'

5. 20. συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἥθειςιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἡρέμα σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθησεως κοινωνοῦσιν.

'As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2*) are of an ethical character); but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.'

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of οὐ before πάντες: but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning

thus obtained, 'all do not participate in the sense of figure,' would be a strange statement.

ἔτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον. 5. 20.

'Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.'

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ 5. 21.
Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νίους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κλπ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν
γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἡθικός.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρεῖττους, Παῖσων δὲ
χεῖρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς. 5. 21.

'But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very expression of the feeling in music.'

καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι. 5. 25.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted *πρὸς τὴν ψύχην* before *εἶναι*. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, 'cognatio *ad animam*.' Aretino's translation suggests *ἡμῶν*, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, *ἡμῶν* (or *πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν*) being supplied from *τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην* or *οἱ νῆαι* in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92-95; Timaeus 35, 36.

ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν, 6. 6.
sc. τὸ ποιῶν βαναίους.

πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἦδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον. 6. 6.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Sussemihl transposes *χρήσεις* and *μαθήσεις*. Goettling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (x. 9. § 20) Aristotle says that the sophist

having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word *μάθησις*, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means 'early education,' not 'mature philosophical speculation.'

6. 7. Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

6. 10. τῷ λόγῳ.
'Speech,' as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

6. 11. The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynicus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

6. 12. Ἐκφαντίδῃ.
A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

6. 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων κ.τ.λ.
This, like many other sentences beginning with *ἐπεὶ*, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words *διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν*.

7. 1. ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ἕτερον.

Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτον δεῖ has been suspected. *τρίτον* is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. 11. §§ 1-4).

νομικῶς.

7. 2.

'After the manner of a law,' i. e. ἐν τύπῳ explained by the words which follow.

τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες.

7. 3.

These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,

sc. τῆς ψυχῆς οἱ *τῶν μελῶν.

7. 3.

τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κίθαριν, οὐκ μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ 7. 3. ποιητικῆς ἐρῶμεν σαφέστερον.

This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κίθαρις in Poet. c. 6.

διὰ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι θετέον τοὺς τὴν 7. 6. θεατρικὴν μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς.

'Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,' i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

παρακχεωσμένα.

7. 7.

παρακχώσεις are explained to mean 'deviations from the received scale in music.'

ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σακράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μὲν καταλείπει 7. 9. μετὰ τῆς δωριστῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αἰλῶν.

This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

καὶ διότι φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστῇ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς 7. 11. μύθους.

The emendation Μίους (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean 'to compose a dithyramb called the "Fables."' Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the

attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

7. 15. δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς

is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

7. 15. Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.

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